Volume LXII] *June 1947* [*Number 2*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF TRADE UNIONISM

I

OF the great changes occurring in our time public attention has mainly been attracted to those social movements that in historical perspective will probably appear as of lesser significance. The socialist, communist, nazi, and fascist eruptions, now so widely visible, may prove secondary manifestations of a deeper rift which has remained, if not unnoticed, at least until recently not fully appreciated. The popular upheavals, so compelling in their sweep as to seem cataclysmic in their import, are of passing significance because they rest upon general doctrine subject to modification as the fashions in the prevailing ideas change. If this dependence upon ideological formulae is a certain evidence of inner debility, their use of force to pattern the social design, dictated by the formula, assumes a competence to model and freeze man within some preconceived mold which is contrary to experience. The fantasies of a fertile imagination, under whatever name, are not strong enough to hold the protean flux of the people of the earth in an ideological strait jacket; and the use of force toward that end means, as it always has, that the rôle is temporary, the end violent.

These vast, but in their nature secondary, movements are merely symbolic of an underlying drift of the economy, which involves a natural, or rather organic, clustering of men about their work. This fusion has been going on for a long time, largely unplanned, responsive to immediate needs, irrepressible but inarticulate concerning its own purposes—because on the whole the trade-union movement did not know what they

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were. The lack of an "ideology" kept the movement from being obtrusively vocal, obscured its significance and permitted other more self-conscious and more immediately political groups —the Communists, Nazis and Socialists—to look upon it with a certain commiserating tolerance or to cast direct aspersion upon it, as something of no great importance. But its very lack of ideas made it strong, enabled it to concentrate upon immediate ends without wasting its energies in a futile pursuit of the "will-of-the-wisp". It could therefore go on generation after generation, with many failures in between, gradually accommodating itself to a changing industrial environment and, without challenging the political or moral ideas current at the time, nay while even espousing and defending them, gradually acquiring place and power within the community until suddenly it dawned upon men that a new *force*—not an idea but a force—had come into being. This force represents a change in the very structure of the economy and is of such a nature that it has compelled a new distribution of power within the community. It is a force potentially so great that the balance of contemporary society itself is involved.

It must by now be clear to the reader that the reference is to the trade-union movement. The emphasis is upon the fusion of men, either in their respective trades or in industries, and upon movement. There is nothing static about it; and to call this profound social process, that has now for a century and a half been of more or less public concern, a problem to be solved is a quaint commentary upon our insulated optimism. It is still true that books are being written upon the labor problem—a problem to which the authors, by implication, have a solution. But the trade-union movement is not a problem. It is a process giving rise to innumerable conflicts because it has incalculable consequences. Its influence is felt at every point just because it affects every phase of modern society. The trade-union movement—movement—is not soluble. There is nothing in modern political or social technique that can write *finis* to this flux—or even give it permanent direction.

It is no more a soluble "problem" than was the rise of the middle class. As we look back upon the centuries of conflict

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which record the slow, patient, unconscious, but continuous, and at times violent transition from a preponderantly feudal to a preponderantly middle-class, commercial and industrial commonwealth, it is perfectly clear that there was nothing the older society could have done that would have prevented the newer design from taking shape. If there was a "problem", it was to find a way for the changes, or the metamorphosis, to occur with as little violence and destruction as possible. And so it is with the trade-union movement.

Though the trade-union movement is essentially conservative because it is concerned with the detail, the immediate, it is profoundly revolutionary in outcome. What is involved is broader than any political platform or party program immediately envisioned. Likewise, in proper historical perspective, the rise of the middle class was more broadly significant than the French Revolution, the Reform Bill in Great Britain, the revolutions of 1848 in central Europe or the hundreds of other political upheavals recorded in history from the period of the Reformation down to our own time. It is in this sense that the communist movement in Russia, the nazi upheaval in Germany or the socialization projects in the contemporary world are merely incidents in a wide drift. The issues at stake have been obscured because, in a world where verbalization has become something of a public mania, the verbal utterance endows the conscious and deliberate project, and therefore the thing of secondary significance, with a seemingly primary importance.

II

It has been reported on the "grapevine" that the late President Roosevelt inquired of Phillip Murray, the leader of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, what was the basic difficulty in industrial relations, and that Murray replied "insecurity". This simple word "insecurity" if translated into a phrase "individual economic insecurity" is from a special angle descriptive of our modern "industrial epoch". What the "Industrial Revolution" did to the individual, and especially to the individual laborer, was to disrupt his society, tear him loose from a traditional family and communal mooring and

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throw him upon his own resources. The timeless custom of being a member of a community, of belonging to a landed estate, of carrying on one's work in a family or a "cottage industry", of being identified with a guild, of having a "mystery", in short, of being interlaced within a society as a moral person and having a specific "status", wore away more or less rapidly and in varying degrees. Man, for the first time in his history, was individualized to an extent he had never been previously. There had been unfortunate "masterless" men before, or itinerant tinkers or scholars; but here, for the first time, man in general was made independent. If he could get a job, he could live by himself, without a family, friends, guild or craft. The complex technological and economic changes which wrought this disintegration—social, economic, political and personal—are too well known to need detailing here. But the long-run consequence of this loosening of the moorings was unforeseen. As the process spread, it tended to embrace larger and larger sections of the community and more and more elements of the population. The individualization embraced not merely men, but women and children, old and young, skilled and unskilled; and it spread through most sections of the community so that a society of traditional "status" melted away and became increasingly composed of isolated, equal and independent persons who for the first time became responsible only to themselves and irresponsible for the well-being of any one—even of their closest relatives. The atomization of society had been set in motion, and it was never completed, even in the most industrialized societies, for there is no absolute consistency or logic to a social movement, except in theory. But its effects were sufficiently deep and broad to characterize an age and to lay the foundations for a series of conflicting social and political upheavals of which we, in our own time, are the unwitting heirs.

This broad consequence was symbolized by the increasing substitution of a money for a real wage. As the payment of an individual wage to an individual laborer—man, woman or child—steadily supplanted the acquisition of an income, mainly in kind, that supplied an entire family, the atomization of so-

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ciety was accelerated; for a money wage made children independent of their parents, made the old and young equal to each other or made the younger better than their elders, made it possible for sons to lord it over their father, and made even daughters competent to abandon the family roof and live "independent" lives. Hordes of individual men, women and even children drawn from different towns, and from different countries, were thrown together in crowded urban slums to find, as individuals, the way to the good life that had formerly been provided by the family, the church, the guild and the community. The isolated individual—free, irresponsible and independent—dominated the scene. (Pittsburgh was once described as a city of lonely, single men—lonely, but free, independent and equal.) Man was free, if he had a job; independent, because he could leave it; and equal to his fellows, because each had an opportunity to be measured by his competence to earn a living. Equality for the worker took on a peculiar twist—to earn a money wage. It came to mean equality for competitive strife; to secure a job and hold it proved to be the test of all else and the very condition of survival itself. A kind of free-for-all became the prevailing rule among men, and the social and economic milieu was sufficiently fluid to make room at the top for many who had the energy, competence, skill or shrewdness to swim with the tide and outstrip their competitors. But that was for the exceptional, the fortunate, the strong and the ruthless. The mass of men found the going hard, the life a lonely one, and the vaunted freedom and equality something of a burden.

III

This broad social trend fitted into a prevailing theory of politics that endowed the individual with inherent and equal rights, privileges and immunities, that presumed each to possess all of those moral and intellectual traits which would make him the best judge of what was of the greatest interest and use, and that ascribed to each a certain inner light with which he could discern the fine distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong, and take that course which was best for him and there-

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fore for society. The economists merely strengthened the existing predisposition to an extreme individualism by saying that economic relationships between men, if free and untrammeled, would result in a kind of competitive harmony, where each man would get his just due and each in turn, even if unconsciously, would be helping to work out a natural harmony that was represented by all men working individually, each for his own interest. What the logic of the theory imputed was that each man was sufficient unto himself, that the self-sufficient individuals were equal, and that among such equal individuals only a competitive relationship could reveal the natural harmony the design embodied. Government therefore rested upon each individual and was derived from his consent; morality was completely personal, for on the principle of "pleasure and pain" only the inner man could be an adequate judge of what was good or evil; and, in economics, the principle of gain and loss made each man the best judge of his relative rôle in the harmonious scheme.

This body of doctrine endowed atomization of society with a kind of moral purpose. The breaking down of customary and ancient "mysteries" that had clustered men together in small groups about some commonly held value, belief or function was described as a good and progressive sign; and in its extreme form it may be said to have taken on the proposition that that society was best in which organized social relations and responsibilities were least. One need but recall certain avowed implications of Malthusianism and the "tooth and claw" perversions of the theory of the survival of the fittest and the currency gained by such doctrines as those embodied in Herbert Spencer's *Man Versus the State*. The theoretical justification for individualism seemed to lie in the fact that man was related to the government vertically, each by himself, and to the society horizontally not at all. If this is too strong a statement, then he was related to the society through his immediate family which was, however, merely an extension of his own personality.

In those circumstances it was natural to assume that that government was best which governed least. If true harmony was to be found in the unimpeded competitive relationship

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between men, no other conclusion could be drawn. The trend of events cast doubt, not upon the theory, but upon the compromise the theory had accepted, that is, that that government was best which governed least. Men looking about the world as it developed under the early impact of the Industrial Revolution began to question not its implicit beneficence so much as what seemed to them the needless suffering and evil resulting from the perversion of the government and the abuse of the powers it had. If that government was best which governed least, then to anarchists like Proudhon that government was best which governed not at all, that, in fact, removed itself from the scene and permitted these self-sufficient, morally competent individuals to work out the natural harmony uncorrupted by legal interference. That was one solution of the difficulty.

The socialists offered another one. They accepted the whole theoretical formula from Locke, through Ricardo to Darwin, plus Hegel. Individuals were still equal; but, through the control of the government, some of them, the propertied ones, here called the bourgeoisie, oppressed the propertyless, here called the proletariat. The class in each case is composed of individuals, and the ideal remains individual felicity. "To each the full product of his labor" is purely individualistic philosophy with a new bias. But here, under the new version, that government is best which governs most, for in fact it now governs as much as is needed to keep the bourgeoisie in their possessions and the poor in their poverty. The implied notion in the socialist doctrine that the state will ultimately wither away is understood to mean when the time comes that all men are truly equal. The notion of the equal endowment of each individual is thus the essential prerequisite for each variation of this underlying formula that would explain the process of industrialization and its impact upon modern society. We thus have three solutions to this problem—that government is best which governs least, that government is best which governs not at all, and that government is best which governs most. Most of the social movements of the last century and a half in the Western World are in some measure a quarrel over this argument—the degree of governmental responsibility for individual felicity.

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IV

The current, however, was not all one way. There is no simple logic to a broad social trend; and while the theory and the public policy were mainly concerned with either fostering or alleviating certain consequences of the increasing atomization of society, another and unheralded movement came into being which denied the theory without repudiating it and, where it could, counteracted in its own way the process of atomization. The persistent individualization and isolation of the individual that resulted from the Industrial Revolution made men not merely free, equal and independent, but, by destroying the social texture into which their lives had been woven, made them economically helpless and morally adrift. The element of personal insecurity and isolation lay like a pall upon all men—not merely the workers. Men had known insecurity previously, but not as individuals. They had in fact known it throughout the ages—pestilence, drought, war and earthquake—but insecurity was collective. The community or the family or the city was involved. Men had their fortunes and misfortunes in common. Now, however, something new had come to bear upon the destiny of men. Misfortune came to be personal, and frequently the causes thereof were invisible.

More to the point, however, was the personal helplessness of the individual worker in the face of his employer. The reduction of all resource for life to a money income made the holding of a job imperative; and in the new circumstance the job was in the hands of an employer to give and to take away, without warning and even without explanation. As the Industrial Revolution became more inclusive in its effects, more and more individuals were cast into complete dependence upon the job; and as business enterprises grew larger and larger, the personal contact between the worker and his employer grew less and less, and the element of possible reasonableness and moral identity between the two became less and less. A new phase in the structure of the economy had come into being—numerous individually helpless persons, each impersonally dependent upon a common employer, and none individually competent to assert either moral or economic influence upon shaping the conditions

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of their labor or even to influence their retention of the job they had. They were equal in their helplessness.

What they had in common was their employer, the industry they worked in, the hours they labored, the bench or the machine they worked at, the wage rate they received, the foreman who ruled over them, the materials they worked with, the whistle that called them from their beds in the morning, or brought a halt to their labors. In addition, they had each other in common. They worked together upon the same bench, inside the same mill, or mine, struggled with the same refractory materials, and were dependent upon each other's coöperation. He who failed in the assembly line, or delayed the flow of materials, affected the entire group. Something new had happened. The process of atomization which had gathered these individuals from many places by the inducement of an individual money wage, and the theory which asserted that each man stands and falls by himself, had now thrown them together into an interdependent relationship where the growth of a sense of identity became inevitable. Men were so physically grouped together in the industrial process that they discovered a moral dependence upon each other and a basis of common faith, interest and objective.

Their individual helplessness was apparent to each. Their collective strength was to be discovered. But the fact that it could be discovered lay in the psychological identity that common association and common individual dependence upon the same outside source of power had provided. Their common association and experience gave them a common language—the language of the craft, the job, the shop and the industry. They shared the infinitely variable talk about the job—interesting in its repetitious monotony because it detailed the daily round and gave them a vocabulary locally meaningful. The common employer acted as the catalytic agent that crystallized them into a self-conscious group. The atomization consequent upon the payment of an individual money wage was in time to be defeated by the fusing of men together functionally, and this functional coalescence became the organic basis upon which the trade-union movement has grown and which, in fact, made it inevitable.

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The original organizer of the trade union is the shop, the factory, the mine or the industry. The agitator, the labor leader, merely announces the existing fact. This is true in spite of the many instances of workers refusing to join a union. The process has gone on for so long a time, over so wide an area, that it must be looked upon as a natural consequence of the spread of modern industry. The trade-union leader not merely symbolizes the existence of a group already forged but also expresses its grievances derived from the common experience. The hours of labor, the conditions under which it is done, the rates of pay, the securities in the job are defined by the job and the market conditions under which it exists. The union represents the spontaneous grouping of workers, thrown together functionally as individuals, for the manifestation of that moral identity and psychological unity which men working together always discover, discover because they need it and could not live without it. There is nothing new about this. The fact that it takes the form of a trade union is a historical accident, conditioned by the type of relationship the machine imposes and the doctrine that facilitated the assembly of the men in the first instance. The individualization and the insecurity derived from a competitive market, in which labor was a commodity like any other, made collective action the only means of asserting the moral status of the individual. The trade union, as visible evidence that man was not sufficient unto himself, always existed on a local basis originally, was generally unpremeditated, had no long-range plan, was often " provoked " by the breaking of some unwritten rule which had grown up in the relationship between " master and man ", and had only immediate and specific ends.

V

The trade-union movement represents a return to an older and socially " normal " way of life on the part of the men, skilled and unskilled, who do the labor of the world. If the historical record has any meaning, then we must assume that a sense of identity among men engaged in a common craft, trade, industry or occupation is an organic relationship to the function. Men functionally identified develop a sense of their part of the

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social universe which is peculiarly their own and which they, in fact, can share with no one else. How otherwise explain the fact that the guild for traders, craftsmen and artisans is a seemingly universal phenomenon? There were guilds in China at least a thousand years ago; in India we know of them in 600 B.C. They were prevalent in ancient Japan, were widely scattered and of long duration in the Islamic world, existed in Greece and in Rome and were common features of town life in the Europe of the Middle Ages and beyond. These guilds lasted for centuries; in some instances, as in India, perhaps for millennia, and in parts of the world they still persist. They seemed always to carry with them the same sort of group responsibility, special distinction, social or religious identification, that set them apart as a group—sometimes little groups, as must have been the case with the 1,100 guilds in Istanbul in 1640. But, large or small, these groups had some authority, distinction and recognizable personality. Their position in the sight of the law varied from time to time and place to place, but there are long periods when they had corporate standing, when their decisions were considered as part of the law—or at least when the judges took their decision into consideration. They owned property and had claims upon the property of their members, if they died intestate. They settled disputes among their members; dealt with questions of hours, wages, equality, apprenticeships, admissions to the craft; and controlled many, if not most, of those things that are an essential part of any trade subject to the vagaries of a market. Membership became in some instances hereditary so that the descendants of the same family continued in their father's trade and profession. At times these guilds were under strict control of the state—as was the case in Rome after the fourth century—at other times they shared in the control of the municipality—as they did in Liége after 1384, when the 32 guilds formed the City Council and retained power for almost three centuries. In so far as we can see, everywhere they seemed to seek objectives remarkably similar. They tried to control the labor supply by defining the conditions of entrance into the craft. They controlled wages, hours, prices, quality, tools used; they sought equality for each member; they pro-

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tected their members from undue competition and from injury; they strove for security and for a stable monopoly market. Membership became a privilege, often hereditary; or, as in India, often identified with a given caste.

We have said enough to indicate that for ages before the Industrial Revolution labor in other occupations than in agriculture—and in agriculture, too, it was organized about a manorial court—was associated labor; and the association, or guild, always carried with it a sense of craft, mystery, status, conformity, honor and responsibility. Every guild had its particular saint, its niche in the church, its special festivals, its peculiar customs, powers and laws. Generally democratically administered, it enforced its decisions by collective action, strikes, boycotts, ostracism and seemingly political influence as well.

The changing condition of the market—the difficulties of maintaining the rules of a limited monopoly implicit in the guild structure, the increase of the business classes, foreign commerce and the developing use of machinery—made the guild organization increasingly precarious. But its final abolition by legal enactment in France in 1776 and 1791 and in England in 1814 and 1835, and later in Germany and other European countries, marks a revolutionary departure from the historically "normal" relationship among men functionally grouped together. The theory of self-sufficiency and individualism, as applied to the worker, ran counter to historical experience. The early appearance of the trade union in spite of legal opposition, as well as its survival in the face of innumerable obstacles, was the reassertion of the moral fusion of men physically associated in labor. The need for devising a vehicle that would express the identity of the group proved imperative. The older functions performed and needs satisfied by the guild now reasserted themselves in a different organization.

The rôle of the new trade union was different, because the structure of the economy within which it was establishing itself had greatly changed. The older small-scale proprietary and family organization that had been the dominant form of business and of commerce was being modified, especially after the middle of the nineteenth century, into a nonproprietary, im-

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personal and corporate form, where the owner—that is, the owner of shares—and the wageworker were almost equally divorced from immediate moral responsibility for the enterprise from which each made his living.

VI

The nature of trade unionism, then, has been conditioned by the structural change within the economy. In terms of both theory and practice, labor is considered impersonal, pecuniary and fluid. A man is hired for the job by the day or even by the hour. Not only is he free to leave his job, but the doctrine of competition and personal advantage made it theoretically advisable for him to do so if a " better " job was available. He had no moral responsibility to the employer, to the enterprise, to the craft, to the body politic—only to himself, and his advantage was measured by pecuniary returns, that is, the price of labor. Thus theory fitted a substantial body of actual experience. The enormous migration of labor from rural to urban communities, and from foreign countries as well, the high labor turnover, the persistent sampling of different jobs by workers, in their search for a better niche, the ebb and flow of employment with the economic cycle, the periodic change of occupation in seasonal industries, the shifts in employment resulting from technological improvements, all induced a feeling of insecurity, a habit of wandering, and an essential moral indifference to any given job. This does not deny that there were numerous cases of stability and identity with job, business or skill. But the over-all feeling was one of insecurity and instability.

This change in the relation between the worker and the job was only part of the structural change. The other and the equally significant one was a similar change in the relationship between owner and the thing he owned. The millions of stockholders—and sometimes the hundreds of thousands—in a large corporation have ownership without knowledge, without direct responsibility or moral commitment; and if they are dissatisfied they sell their holdings and buy into another enterprise. They are like the worker who seeks a better job, who gets tired work-

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ing in one place, who stands in line waiting for employment or who scans the news advertisements to see if a good opportunity is opening in some other place. We thus have a double fluidity —both of labor and of ownership—and a double moral irresponsibility. In each case the controlling motif is pecuniary.

The proprietary ownership by the individual, the family or the partnership, where the living to be gained was conditioned by an insistent attention to details, by personal concern, worry and skill, by the fact that the owner was really personally responsible, has thus given way to a fluid, impersonal, nonmoral relation to the industries from which people draw their livings. The structural change represented by the corporation is not merely its size, its great wealth, its impersonality and its pecuniary commitment. It is in what it has done to ownership. Under the corporate form, ownership is not only impersonal but also fluid. The purchaser of stock has an ownership of which he can divest himself at a moment's notice, and he measures the prospect of profit in ways that bedevil the subtlest of psychologists or economists. He and the other stockholders own the industry, but they are not acquainted with the managers; they do not even know the names of the board of directors. They make no decisions affecting the enterprise; they feel no direct responsibility for its operations; and they would be incapable of expressing a sound judgment upon its multitudinous problems if called upon to do so. The industry is operated by the managers in the name of the owners, the managers themselves owning little or no stock in the industry; and while the managers are in fact responsible to the owners, whom they do not know, in practice they report to the board of directors who again may or may not be skilled in the problems of the industry. These directors are in fact, even if not in theory, selected by the managers to be elected by the owners, and their chief duty as directors is to approve the policies asked for by the management and submitted to the stockholders, for whom the directors act.

This anomalous and unlooked-for outcome, where both owners and labor have no spiritual identification with their

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source of livelihood, is not durable. It is not possible that a society shall continue which requires that the mass of the folk who make their living through ownership or labor shall have no concern with the source of their livelihood. The difficulty is upon us, even if its recognition has lagged behind the facts.

In its essence, trade unionism is a revulsion against the social atomization, on one hand, and the divorce of owner and worker from their historical function as moral agents in industry, on the other. If there is any meaning that can be derived from the persistent grouping of men about their tools or within their industry, it is the very clear attempt to reassert human experience, namely, that work must fill a social, a moral, as well as an economic rôle. The vacuum created between the job and the man has proved intolerable; and it cannot be filled by higher wages, shorter hours, better conditions of labor, music in the shops, or baby clinics. Man has to belong to something real, purposeful, useful, creative; he must belong to his job, to his industry—or it must belong to him. There is no way of permanently separating the two. What gnaws at the psychological and moral roots of the contemporary world is that most urban people, workers and owners, belong to nothing real, nothing greater than their own impersonal pecuniary interests. To escape from that—the most profound tragedy of our industrial society—is the great problem of our time. For the worker the trade union has been an attempt to escape from this dilemma.

There is still a failure to recognize that the trade union, as well as the corporation, represents a structural change within the economy. It is not a reform movement; it is not a political party; it is not revolutionary in intent; it is not a legislative activity. It may at times contribute to all of these; but it is none of them. It is the formal expression of the socially inevitable grouping of men in modern industry, just as the corporation is a new way of organizing capital for industry. The trade unión is the opposite side of the medal. Where you have corporate industry, there you have labor unions. As long as industry and commerce were small and proprietary the very nature of the trade union was different.

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VII

Monopoly is the child of competition. Monopoly, or a persistent tendency toward monopoly, is the logical consequence of a free market, either in industry or labor. There are many areas where monopoly is incomplete, or only incipient. There are few areas in our society where the effort to escape the insecurities of the competitive market has not set in motion tendencies which, if unchecked—or perhaps even in spite of legal prohibition—may in effect achieve monopolistic results. This is true of the trade union. Trade unionism is often monopolistic, restrictive, arbitrary, often at war within itself, costly, and in contradiction of all the theories of a free and unrestricted market. So is the corporation. If ownership is going to be divorced from direct responsibility, be impersonal, pecuniary and fluid, but increasingly represented by powerful corporations, labor which is also fluid, impersonal, pecuniary and deprived of responsibility is going to be organized into powerful unions, paralleling the organization of corporate industry and doing for the worker what the corporation does for the owner—attempt to protect and secure his pecuniary interest. If "management" represents the "owner", that is, the fluid stockholder, then "leadership"—no good name has yet developed for this function—represents the worker and attempts to protect and secure his pecuniary interest. There is, however, one great difference between the rôle of the "fluid" owner in modern industry and that of the worker: the worker still has to be physically present on the job, or in the shop, or in the factory. It is this physical presence of the worker in the shop, as well as the continuing emphasis upon an impersonal pecuniary interest, that explains a major part of the trade unions' activities. To the worker pecuniary stability—a regular income from good stocks and bonds in the owners' sense—depends upon the security of the job. To make the "job" secure has been, and has remained, the largest item in trade-union policy: to make it secure, first, and to force it to yield a high pecuniary reward, second. That these ends may be incompatible, that a high wage and "job security" may in any given case prove destructive of each other, is a bit of economic wisdom that is hard to learn.

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The drive for individual economic security is implicit in almost every trade-union demand. The current demands for an annual wage and for health, old-age and unemployment benefits to be derived from a tax upon production are merely newer phases of an older drive. Nor can this new development be separated from continuing pressure for the closed shop, the checkoff, seniority and the hundred other items, each of which is considered one more brick in the wall that would stem the tide of insecurity. In making the union the chief means toward these ends labor has created an institution of great power and expanding influence. From the small beginnings of a local union came the growth of other similar locals, and these in turn federated into national or international organization embracing all of the plants in an industry. The industry-wide organization was dictated by the needs of defense against the impact of a free national market. The drive in each instance may be local and individual but the sum of these local movements means a change in the relationship of man to his work and of men to each other.

The organization has increasingly replaced the individual; and, if the movement continues, there will be no individual bargaining left, and by implication no individual power, and little freedom of occupational choice within the economy. From the union's point of view, industry-wide organization became an essential of survival because it was the only means of protecting the organized worker, as well as the organized plants, from the competition of lower wages and prices. But the growth of trade unionism tended to strengthen the trend toward monopoly, by making it more difficult for the smaller concern with its lesser capitalization and higher production costs to meet the standard imposed nationally by the union. Thus, in its attempt to protect the "job security" of its members the union has tended to strengthen the very power of monopoly to which it presumably is opposed. It has, in an expanding cycle, imposed a standardization of rules, methods, wages and conditions of labor. The unions not only have taken over or encroached upon many of the functions previously enjoyed by management—such as hiring, firing, promotion, setting of wages, shop discipline, admission to the industry, train-

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ing for the job, influencing the introduction of new machinery, and affecting policies of sanitation—but also have acquired a whole series of controls and disciplines over their members, which in effect have changed the relationship of the individual to his job and his " freedoms ".

The worker cannot enter any job he wants to; he cannot even learn any trade he wants to because apprenticeship may be limited. His career in the job he does enter is circumscribed by seniority rules; the amount he can earn is defined for him; his freedom of movement is restricted by the fact that he may not be able to enter another industry, or the same in another place, and by the fact that if he leaves he may lose his seniority and his rights to promotion and higher wages. He cannot leave his union even if he wants to, because if he does he will lose his job. He must carry out union policies, even if he objects to them. His freedom of criticism and of speech is restricted by the fact that local leaders are in a position to do him injury in ways that he cannot escape, or for which he cannot find redress, because recognition of these grievances has not as yet become part of either the written or the common law. He has little influence over the policies of his national union, and that usually only through his own local. The union's constitutional requirements for elections of local officers may be inadequate; conventions for the election of general officers may be rare, and the delegates seated may not always be those chosen by the local.

These grievances may be unusual in the mass, but they are not rare instances. The expenses of the administration may be audited by the delegates to the convention, that is, by a committee appointed by the president from the members who are part of his machine. The officers of the union have, in certain instances, as is evidenced by repeated court proceedings, used their power for personal aggrandizement at the expense of either the employers or the workers. The organization exercises police powers in certain jurisdictional strikes and hires, or entertains, as was recently testified in court, " two thousand men " to keep the " wrong men " from entering the job. Violence, though a decreasing feature of labor controversies, is still not unknown either in strikes or in jurisdictional disputes. In addition, the

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worker is taxed by the union not only for admission into it by an initiation fee, but by a monthly or weekly due which he must pay, with or without his consent. In his efforts to regain security and "social identity" in an unstable economy and atomized society, the worker has raised a powerful and growing institution that increasingly restricts the industry he works in and the life of those who earn their living at it.

The essence of the conflict is union power because, without it, the union could not survive. The necessary logic of the situation requires that power be increased. This conflict over power within the economy has society-wide implications; for power is conditioned by an essential function and is evidenced in its use. And so it has been in this instance. The search is always for greater security, and the method is always increased power to set up standards of economic life that will stabilize the job, and by implication the economy. The effects have been an increasing limitation of freedom of action and an increasing trend toward equality of income.

The older range of competitive freedoms is incompatible with the trade union, and equally so with large-scale industry under monopolistic control. The free market of the economist, by constant pressure for lower costs or a secured price, tends toward monopoly. The free market for labor, by constant pressure for pecuniary security—the same kind of security business seeks—leads in the same direction, toward monopoly. This monopoly may not soon become "perfect", but the tendency toward its perfection is always there. Historically, the ideal of a free competitive world where each man by himself is a representative of the implicit harmony of the whole, has proved self-defeating. Both labor and capital, when given the choice, have "escaped from freedom" and bartered away their privileges for the hope of security.

VIII

With these basic structural changes in the economy a new pattern of industrial relations has developed. Collective bargaining has become the immediate instrumentality for adjusting the day-to-day issues between labor and management; and the question raised over and over again is whether collective bar-

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gaining is compatible with the protection of the consumer, the maintenance of " full employment ", the increase of production, the continuance of technological improvements, the narrowing of the swing between deflationary and inflationary tendencies, the defending of " job security ", and the protecting of the individual against the loss of those " freedoms " so essential to a democratic way of life. All of these issues, basic to our times, are now involved in any attempt of the individual worker to achieve " industrial economic security ".

That the trade-union movement is a vast and growing phenomenon can be seen in the 15,000,000 workers in the United States now embraced in its fold, and in the 50,000 collective labor contracts that cover some 10,500,000 employees. The Wagner Labor Act, passed in 1935, facilitated and speeded the growth of organization; but the readiness to organize was already there. If the movement, instead of being bitterly and violently resisted, had been permitted to follow its natural course, unionism would have grown more slowly over the last century, and would have had time to mature without the legal protection provided by the Wagner Act.

Whether slowly or rapidly, these new organizations of workers, functionally related, have acquired disciplinary power and influence over the lives and activities of their members; and, as they grow larger and more embracing, they tend to circumscribe and define the rights and privileges of men who are, under the law, equal to each other. There has thus come into being a new issue hitherto unsuspected: the rights of the worker within and against his own organization. The fact that over three hundred cases of seeming infringement of civil rights have already been taken to the courts by union members against their organizations is an indication of the power of a labor union to interfere with a member's right to bid for a job, or with his right of free speech, or with his right to see an accounting of how his money has been spent by the union officials. These questions are bound to become more insistent as the unions become more embracing; and a whole body of new law and tradition will in time have to come into being to protect the worker against arbitrary abuse of the powers that mere organization makes possible.

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If membership in a union is essential for an opportunity to work, and if every union has its own rules of admission, apprenticeship, dues, initiation fees, promotion, wages, retirement funds and social benefits, then every union becomes in fact a differentiated order within the community endowing its own members with rights and immunities shared only among themselves. It must be added that these organic structures are of such a nature that it becomes difficult or impossible to leave them because the penalties for desertion are severe—the loss of a job, the impossibility of securing other employment, the loss of seniority and of the right of promotion, and the surrender of accumulated retirement, sickness and old-age benefits. Consequently, a new system of human relationship has come into being which profoundly changes the very substance of a free society associated with a free-market economy. The gradual extension of collective bargaining, with the explicit commitment to a single bargaining agency, with a tax upon the worker collected without his consent through the checkoff, with union security established in one of its many forms, so that the worker must in fact end by being a member and paying his dues, means that we have the outlines of a new social design, where status rather than contract is the governing rule. The fact that in theory, anyway, this status is voluntarily assumed makes little difference in practice, for the penalties for not accepting the "voluntary" status become unavoidable. This institution is now to be found in a vast number of industries, occupations and professions—from barbers to steel workers, from musicians to airplane pilots, from chorus girls to sailors. Skilled and unskilled workers, professional and learned occupations, small and large plants, highly mechanized and semi-mechanized industries are being incorporated into and made part of this pattern. Nor is there any immediate end to the process in prospect; and, if the history of the trade-union movement means anything at all, we must assume that restrictive legislation, or other opposition, which proved ineffectual when the movement was new, will not bring a halt to the process now, for the growth of trade unionism is responsive to an organic need—that men who are grouped together functionally must have an instrumentality to express their common identity and interests as moral persons.

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It is noteworthy that these stratifications have been justified and defended in the name of freedom, equality and justice. But the freedom, equality and justice here spoken of have a functional, rather than a political or civil, context. Out of the individual worker's attempt to achieve "individual economic security" has come the gradual remolding of industrial society on the older pattern of status. The very forces of industrialism that destroyed the older order have laid the basis for the new one. Membership within a social group, so natural to man, was inevitable again when the workers were congregated into industries where a common setting made the strangers of yesterday the companions of today. The word "brother", used in common parlance by the unionists, is not just an accident. It spells out the common dependence imposed by the machine. And once thrown together and given this organic relationship, all that has followed in the structure, form and impact of the trade-union movement became inevitable. The last hundred and fifty years are a strange interlude in the history of man in the Western World—a period in which man was "freed" from one type of an age-old association and after a lapse gradually re-identified with another one. If there is anything to this view of the matter, the system of "estates" now being developed is a necessary and logical outcome of the Industrial Revolution and satisfies both a social and a psychological need of man.

IX

This trend is of so wide a range as to make possible in the foreseeable future an integration of the greater part of the working and professional population. A new type of group identification and loyalty is being developed, a new kind of discipline is being accepted, and a special kind of union power is making itself felt. These broad shifts in structure, loyalty and discipline are on the whole peculiarly unconcerned with ideological formulae, are but little influenced in their actual behavior or policies by "radical" doctrines, the "reactionary" union being just as self-centered, dogmatic, exacting and "revolutionary" as the "radical" one. Their historical significance

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lies in their impact upon social structure, and not in their public utterances.

One consequence of the spread of trade unionism has recently challenged public interest and concern—that is, the power of a single strategically placed union to disrupt the workings of our complex economy and to cast a shadow over the social structure as a whole. A national strike by the United Mine Workers, if it were to last long enough, would throw millions of workers out of their jobs, bring transportation to a halt, cast cities into darkness, stop our ships from plowing the seas, and condemn the citizens of thousands of small and large cities to starvation. This great power, accruing to one or a few men, is greater than that previously exercised by one person or group. It is greater than was claimed by the head of any state; and it was evidenced only in special areas as a result of a total war. This implied threat over a total society—for it would in addition affect our defense as well as our ability to carry on peaceful international relations—is in its nature absolute power. It is a consequence and not an intent of the original effort of the individual miner to find security and stability in what has for him been a very unstable and insecure economic order. One would suspect that even the leaders were but dimly aware of the threat to the nation as a whole contained in their ability to call a national strike.

There are many strategically vulnerable spots in our economy. A national railway strike would be of the same order as the one just described; a power strike that would still the power houses of the nation, and sometimes the strike of a small fraction of the working force of a great industry—the switchmen on the railroads—would have like effects for the nation as a whole. Similar powers are concentrated locally. The few tugboat men in the harbor of New York City could deprive it of food and coal; the 1,000 lathers could bring all building to a halt in that great city and throw thousands of other workers out of their jobs; while the milk-wagon drivers can endanger the sick in the hospitals, and elevator operators in the large public office buildings can disrupt vast national and international operations. The exercise of power under these conditions becomes irrespon-

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sible and in practice intolerable. But it needs to be repeated that the impact of these new powers is a consequence of organization and not of the original purpose. We have here a curious outcome of the free market that began by describing labor as an impersonal, fluid, pecuniary, unmoral commodity. The fact that the laborer was denied the morally associative relationship, which he needed, forced him to construct an instrumentality that in the long run has accumulated enough power to disrupt the very society of which it is a part.

The willingness of labor leaders to use this power lies partly in the fact that the significance of the power they hold has not fully dawned upon them, and partly in the definition of the situation: the balancing of a national union against a national industry. But even more important is the description of the issues at stake as profits on one side and wages on the other. This makes possible the cataclysmic and disruptive pattern of behavior, when no agreement can be reached. That the argument should take this pecuniary form is a hang-over from the day of a presumptively free, impersonal and fluid market for both labor and owners, when it was believed that in each seeking its own advantage, it would help achieve the implicit harmony. But the very existence of the corporation, the trust, the cartel, and the national or international union is evidence that the free market has been greatly circumscribed. That the ideas which it generated, and the motives which it sanctioned, are still operative on both sides is made evident by the fact that it requires such a dramatic threat to the society itself as that represented by a national coal strike to call to mind that the structure has now so changed that even the language of an older day no longer applies.

The description of trade unionism as "business unionism" is merely indicative that the workers adhere to the philosophy of the free market seriously enough to act upon it, that is, to get every bit of pecuniary advantage out of the situation that the "traffic will bear". They wanted more wages, more benefits, shorter hours of labor, less responsibility, less work, more security. They wanted an increasing share of the total product of industry without commitment to a greater responsibility for providing the product because, as they understood

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it, that was the " moral " and economic ethics of the time. Get as much as you can, give as little for it as possible. They attempted to operate in a " sellers' market " to enjoy the extra pecuniary advantages of a " monopoly ". The issue is not really their emphasis upon increased pecuniary reward for their labor; it is the insistence that this increase should go hand in hand with a lesser concern for the sources of production that made the increasing return possible. This divorce between a moral commitment to the thing worked at and the insistence that it provide an ever larger income has defined the situation now laden with catastrophic consequence for the economy itself.

One need not impugn the motives of the workers or their leaders. The " morals " of competitive business have lent themselves to the perversions of getting " rich quick ", to the notion of " making money " and of " having a good job ", good meaning easy and highly remunerative. The trade unions may not have taken over all of the implicit value judgments of the free-market economy, or been aware of all its sanctions, but they took over those that they understood and that they could use. The real danger in this situation lies, not in wanting an increasing share of the product, but in refusing to be responsible for producing the increased share. It lies in demanding an income from an industry without assuming a morally responsible relation to the industry. It lies in behaving in fact as fluid, impersonal ownership behaves which flows from industry to industry as the market dictates from hour to hour or from day to day.

X

Every activity of the trade-union movement could be shown to be a denial of both the theory and the practice of a purely free-market economy. We have here a reassertion of the necessary " sociability " of man, of the dignity of the human being as a laborer, and the insistence that man must in some degree be identified with his work, must be attached to it and must have an attachment for it. Every discussion of shop rules, of efficiency of work, of the definition of a grievance, or rights and duties, obligations and expectancies, carries by implication a concern about the industry; and the feeling, so

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evident in a thousand past references to " this is my job ", is but a pathetic restatement that the work and the man belong to each other.

The dramatic character of strikes, boycotts, mass picketing and public riots has obscured the less dramatic but continuous instances of coöperation between organized labor and management, and of the rôle of trade unions in creating a sense of identity with industry—through regulating discharges, promotions, layoffs, apprenticeship and the introduction of new machinery. Even if the activity has been restrictive, it has been so on the assumption that the industry is of concern to the union and to the workers. One could cite various attempts to specify responsibility and to set up systems of coöperation between labor and management. But these are merely straws in the wind; they are the less important because they are often overadvertised and deliberate. The important thing is the evidence that the union, as representing the workers, insists upon behaving as if it had a permanent stake in the industry. The quarrels over the division of the income are indicative of that fact. The very strikes, from this point of view, are a healthy and morally promising sign. If the workers are going to quarrel over the division of the income, then they must in time become concerned over the production of the yield over which they quarrel. The attempt to persuade the general public of the justice of their demands by laying before it laborious studies that purport to show that the industries are in fact able to raise wages, and that the demands of labor are neither excessive nor unjust, is but another bit of evidence of the same inner compulsion. It is in some measure a way of easing a bad conscience, or of establishing a moral right to larger immediate income from an industry which is presumed—even if not asserted—to " belong " to the workers as well as to the owners.

This is merely a generalization of the oft repeated statement of workers on strike—" This is my job." It is a different way of asserting an identity with the source of one's livelihood. And the claim that wages could be raised without raising prices —even if made for " propaganda " purposes only—is of the same order. It establishes a recognition of the fact that there

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is a relationship between wages and prices, and therefore between wages and the cost of production, and therefore with production itself.

The most significant of the many recent bits of evidence of this sense that the industry and the union are interdependent comes from the demands for an annual wage and for social benefits to be drawn from production. It is perfectly clear that an annual wage can be derived only from a stable and profitable industry, and such an industry can be maintained only if the workers take their share of responsibility for keeping it both stable and profitable, that is, if they share with management some of the burdens of reducing costs, improving quality and increasing production.

By far the most important of these manifestations was the dramatic request by John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers that for each ton of coal mined five cents be set aside to establish social security benefits for the miners. The demand involved a shift in avowed policy on the part of the miners — perhaps greater than the miners themselves had in mind—for it presumed that in the future the miners were to have a permanent interest in production, and it presumed that the worker instead of having just a day-to-day wage contract would now acknowledge a lifelong stake in the mines. If the union is to build a system of social security for its members—health, old-age and unemployment benefits, hospitals and a hundred other items envisioned in a broad social program to be derived from production—then interest in production must become a matter of primary concern with both the workers and the union. A conscious lifelong stake with accumulated benefits is something of a different order than a daily wage; and the texture of the total relationship is involved. It is in fact an avowal, even if an unconscious one, of a moral responsibility for production and for the industry from which the miners are to draw the substance of their lifelong security.

There is peculiar irony in the failure of the mine owners to recognize this demand as an offer to become concerned for the welfare of the industry upon which the miners proposed to build their life's interest. But the older definition of the situation persists in both ownership and management, as it has so long

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persisted among workers and their unions, and apparently continues among the proprietors even when there is evidence that the workers are prepared to redefine their position, that is, to move consciously from a negative to a coöperative relationship.

Social security institutions cannot be built on a conflict situation. If the workers wish to construct a system of security to be derived from a tax upon production,[1] then they must become interested in the factors conditioning production. One of these conditioning factors is the provision of capital, which in turn involves ownership. Only upon ownership can permanent responsibility be developed. The funds accruing to miners from the tax upon production would presumably have to be invested; and the industry that provides the funds upon which the security is to be built becomes a logical outlet for at least a substantial part of the funds it provides. What is really involved is the extension of the interest in the industry to include a growing participation of ownership in the industry. There is, in fact, no other equally satisfactory basis upon which lifelong interest and responsibility can be built.

It is predictable that this pattern of industrial relations will become a conspicuous feature of union-management relationship and that it will involve the investment of the funds, in part at least, in the industry from which funds are originally drawn in the first place. The process has already begun. It will be long in maturing. It took over a century for a free market to dominate the economy to a degree that it pulled a large section of the activities of men in the Western World into its orbit; though even here it never completely embraced all of the economic activities of the modern world. It may take just as long for the newer process to achieve a similar impact upon the mass of men. But the older division between labor and industry is

[1] The miners could have asked for a share in the profits, say five per cent, which would have made the demand consistent with profit-sharing notions of the past and from the industry's point of view would have for all practical purposes represented an addition to the tax burden. They chose, however, to stake their demands upon production instead, and unconsciously at least gave testimony to interest in the daily output and performance. It is at that level that the real issues in modern industrial life are to be found and not in quarreling over a division of the profits. Profits, which are an end product, are no substitute for a concern about the means of production.

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breaking down, and the growth of a lifelong integration between the worker and his job is visibly here, even if it takes generations to complete itself, even if it never fully embraces all men laboring for a living.

For their own members the trade unions have reëstablished the older head-tax dues, now collected as a matter of course under provision of collective agreements or, during the war, under sanction of the government. As a result, the unions have become repositories of large and continuously growing funds. They have in fact, like the insurance companies, become semipublic savings institutions. The miners are supposed to have $15,000,000 of such funds now in hand, and one of the clothing unions under a similar provision is said to have $27,000,000. It is logical and necessary that some of these funds should go back to the industry from which they are derived, for the very reason that a permanent concern for the industry's welfare can rest in the long run only upon a participating ownership.[2] It thus opens up a new source of industrial investment from semipublic agencies at the very time when a tendency to equalize incomes and reduce the great fortunes makes it less likely that great private funds will continue to be available for such investment.

XI

In broad outline the nature of the present drift of the economy is now visible. A system of contract made almost universal as a result of the Industrial Revolution has unwittingly evoked a reaction that has reëstablished an older system of "status". This unforeseen structural change is wide in its reach, affecting the Western World and all areas where similar

[2] The legal restrictions imposed upon the investment of fiduciary funds may place serious difficulties in this development. Should that be the case it would be an interesting example of one institutional requirement impeding the growth of another one, and it would force the unions to become heavy investors in government securities, would still further divorce them from an active concern about the industry, would shape their interest in government tax policies, would greatly influence their political ambitions and would lead to what in fact might become an attempt on the part of the unions to "capture" the government to protect their holdings of government bonds. One would hope that there might be enough wisdom in our democracy to permit water to run downhill rather than to force it to run uphill.

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influences have shaped similar human relationships. The industrial machine has acted like a vortex drawing men about it, casting them into a special mold, endowing them with special needs, interests and powers, and giving them a permanently organized relationship to each other, to the industry and to the society itself. In the process the pattern of the society has in fact been modified. The metamorphosis is reflected in a not only dual but contradictory movement — a gradual disintegration of the older pattern to fit the needs of a free market and the reintegration of a new pattern to escape the evils consequent upon the free market. These opposing tendencies went on together and at the same time. The first unions came into being almost with the first industries, as is evidenced by the bill passed in 1800 in Great Britain defining union activities as a conspiracy. The change is by no means complete and may well continue for a long time.

While this underlying social reorganization has been occurring, a great many political movements have drawn their inspirations from and, misconceiving their own importance, have attempted to stem, direct or ride the storm it has generated. The battles and the passions, on the whole, have been about side issues, because the nature of the social change was not visible and was not understood. In outline what is now perceptible is a society functionally organized, with men identified and integrated with their industries in a responsible relationship, with men confined in broad groups, having special rights, privileges and immunities that these groups make possible, and suffering from the special limitations and restrictions that are the natural outcome of such integrated relationships. One of the most important changes implicit in the growth of these organizations is the reëstablishment of a proprietary interest on the part of the unions in the name of the workers in the industries from which the workers draw their living. At least for the worker, the day of fluidity, impersonality and irresponsibility is drawing to a close. If he is going to have a pecuniary interest, he will also have to assume the moral responsibility that a pecuniary relationship has always involved, responsibility for the property he owns, the work he does, and the quality he produces for the rest of the community.

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There is nothing in law, morals or public policy which is contrary to the growth of proprietary interest by the workers through their organizations as a result of the changing relationship they have with the industry and the cumulative savings that are now accruing to them on an ever-increasing scale. It is not likely that these savings institutions—for so may the unions be considered—will ever own all of modern industry. But increasing ownership is a seemingly logical next step and with it increasing responsibility. These changes, implicit in the growth of the trade-union movement, carrying as they do growing concern with the nature and the rôle of the industries at which men earn their living, and implying a lifelong relationship to these industries, require the assumption of a reorganization of the educational system to make possible the intellectual and creative identity of the men at work with the industries in which they work. A new system of industrial education already envisaged in many incipient efforts both in industry and in trade unions is bound to be part of the process.

What is presumed in this development is that the union will gradually assume a rôle in the modern corporation by buying into it. This change-over will perhaps raise as many difficulties as it will eliminate. It will reëstablish in fact a society of status —the "estates" of an older day, with all of the restrictions upon personal mobility and personal freedom. But in a measure it has already done that. It will raise issues of civil rights and of the relationship of a democratic government to these new powerful semipublic corporations. In a measure too these already exist—the corporation versus the state, the cartel versus the state, the national union versus the state. The question of the relationship of these large bodies to each other and to the government will, of necessity, become the major source of both common and written law, the major problem of public policy. A matter of grave concern will be—as in a measure it already is—the relationship between the union-proprietary corporation and management. The problems of efficiency, of technical change, of free decision, of corruption, pull, pressure and interference are all bound to plague management. But there is no reason to assume these difficulties are insurmountable, or that they will create graver conflicts than those the industrial

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system has weathered in the last hundred and fifty years. Presumably the growth of proprietary ownership on the part of the unions will be slow and their part in the directorships will long remain a minority share, long enough if fortune is on their side for these new owners to acquire the necessary insight and restraint to accommodate them to the complexities and exactions of modern management. And it will prove something of a trial, but perhaps not an unwelcome one, for management to find itself responsible to a corporation where ownership and responsibility are united rather than divorced, and the organization of foremen and other "managerial personnel" is in fact narrowing the gap between management and labor.

XII

There is a seemingly normative quality in the latter parts of this essay—though the effort has been to stay within the visible trends and their obvious implications. There is no program of action suggested. This is the seeming outcome of the drift of our time. The present economy cannot rest for long on a system of fluid, impersonal ownership and fluid, impersonal labor. Labor in fact has already ceased to be in many instances either fluid or impersonal. If the presently implicit outcome is not in the cards, what is the alternative to what is here taken to be a nonenduring structure? The obvious alternative is state ownership—socialism, communism, state capitalism, expropriation, confiscation, revolution, or what not. But state ownership and control, under whatever guise—and the essence of the thing is the same regardless of the name it gives itself—is essentially a political solution. By its very nature a political solution is unstable. The rift between the organic groups in industries and the government will continue, as it has continued between the unions and the corporations, and between the unions and the government. To maintain its hold the government—just because the solution is unstable and political—will be forced to develop a series of policies or techniques arbitrary in their nature and dictated by political considerations.

All of the charges made against the Nazi and communist management will be made in time against any system of government

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control. Industrial life is too complex, many-sided, subtle and changeable to be handled by political dicta and for political considerations. The end result of any such system would be unstable, because the state can operate only through repression; and, in the end, either the organic groups now in unions will destroy the state or the state will stifle the industries and ultimately destroy them. Those who manage the industries must remain free in a functional relationship, or the industries will in the end prove inoperative. That is a lesson that folk bred on general theories find hard to learn; but a little acquaintance with the complexities of a modern industry, even a small one, will sober most men not wedded to an ideology.

The present drift is responsive to a technological organization of energy. Men have been massed into large industries in highly concentrated areas, in great corporate units because the form of the development of modern industry has been conditioned by a technology based upon coal, iron, and a system of railroad and sea transport. It is because the available energies are concentrated, the means of transport elaborate, and the basic structural materials and energy expensive and limited that we have the present form of economic organization. As long as there are the conditioning technological bases of modern industry, there will be large factories, masses of people in large cities, national industries and national unions as a natural consequence. It is however possible —and there are many signs in the air—that the movement toward decentralization has been going on for some time and is increasing. Such inventions as the automobile, the radio, television, the Diesel engine—especially of the present efforts to adapt it to fuels available on the farm—the development of plastics, the spread of the chemical industries in small units to areas where the raw materials are available, the use of windmills for the harnessing of electricity—an invention long in the making and now in use on a small scale [3]—the rapid spread of hydroponics, the freezing unit in which foods can be stored indefinitely—these and many other contemporary developments,

[3] The writer has himself seen small, two-paddled windmills used to generate enough electricity to light a small house and charge a battery for the radio in places as far apart as the Yaqui country in Sonora, Mexico, and in the Argentinian Chaco.

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not to mention the prospects of atomic energy, indicate the possibilities of a reversal of the last hundred and fifty years' trend toward concentration. If this should be the new development, and it would be imperturbable self-confidence to deny its possibilities or even its probabilities, the trend toward centralization and bigness implicit in the body of this essay would be reversed.

If within a reasonable time the typical industrial unit becomes small—say, employing less than five hundred people at the most—if it is located in the country, if the available energy and technology make possible short hours of labor, and the local plot of land provides alternative opportunities for employment during off hours or slack seasons, and if in addition the wide distribution of energy in homes is cheap through the newly developed Diesel engines or the electric windmill, so that skilled craftsmen can use power tools on a small scale in their own homes instead of in a factory, then it is predictable that a very different economy will be structured. Such a change will reduce the rôle of the national and international market, and reduce the importance of the modern corporation and the modern union. It will favor proprietary ownership so essential to moral and personal identity with the work which man does and will again re-identify the laborer with his job on a very different basis than that implied in the growth of the trade union.

The interesting and baffling prospect to contemplate is that within the next two or three generations we may well see the growth of the powerful union-proprietary corporation, overhanging state ownership, and decentralized industry with its return of man to the smaller, more intimate social unit, and closer to the soil, all developing at the same time. I would wish to assume, or perhaps confess a hope, that, of those three possibilities, it will be the last that will come to rule the lives of men and give them back that sanity and sense of values which man can find only in the intimacy of personal association within small groups about a common task, and in close contact with the infinite perplexities of the soil.

FRANK TANNENBAUM

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THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN: HEAVY VERSUS CONSUMERS' GOODS INDUSTRIES

I

AN outstanding feature of the Soviet industrialization drive before the war was the emphasis that was given to the expansion of heavy industrial as compared with consumers' goods production.* The Soviet government allotted most of its investments before the war to heavy industries, which as a result were built up at unheard-of rates to levels rivaling those in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe. The government limited severely its investments in industries producing consumers' goods, confining these mainly to the amounts required for the prosecution of the industrialization drive itself: that is, to mechanize the new large-scale collective farms and thus release labor needed for industry; and to house after a fashion and provide with manufactured consumers' goods the mushrooming urban population. This growth of the city population resulted partly from the influx of peasants, many of whom previously had taken care of their own needs for consumables (bread, shoes, etc.) by domestic production on the farm. Under the government's policy, it seems clear, the gains realized in the living standards of the population as a whole were modest indeed.

Speaking in the broadest terms, this was the Soviet government's policy on industrialization under each of the three five year plans that it promulgated before the war. What is its policy in this sphere under the ambitious Fourth Five Year Plan, which went into effect last year?

The facts assembled here on this much discussed question indicate that (contrary to a current view) the government has now reduced the tempo of its industrialization drive in order to alleviate the extreme shortages of consumers' goods arising from the war. However, considering the circumstances, there

* The writer is greatly indebted to Professor G. T. Robinson, Professor W. W. Leontief, Dr. Alexander Gerschenkron and Dr. Paul A. Baran for their valuable advice and criticisms. Needless to say, the full responsibility for all views expressed is his own.

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is little reason to believe that this represents any basic change in policy; rather it would appear that the main emphasis under the new plan is in fact still where it was under previous plans —on heavy industries.

While as between heavy industrial and consumers' goods the Soviet government thus seems to have chosen consistently in favor of the former in all five year plans to date, it has pursued a comparatively flexible course under these plans in allocating resources within the heavy industrial sector as between basic industries (steel, coal, machinery, chemicals, etc.) and industries producing finished munitions (planes, tanks, guns, etc.). At the outset of the industrialization drive most investments were allotted to basic industries. In the course of time, however, the share going to munitions was increased, and after Munich a great armaments program was undertaken. The munitions stockpiles created under this program were one of crucial factors enabling the Russians to stop Hitler.

Under the new five year plan, this trend in favor of munitions production has been reversed. As part of its program to put the economy on a peacetime footing, the Soviet government by all accounts not only is carrying out a large-scale demobilization of the Red Army but already has converted many munitions factories to the production of machinery and other reconstruction goods. Thus, the Soviet press announced some time ago a program to convert tank factories to the production of locomotives.

In accord with the Soviet practice of secrecy on military questions, the published version of the Fourth Five Year Plan contains no figures on current output or goals for munitions; but a general notion of how far reconversion and demobilization together have progressed up to the present time may be obtained from the Soviet budget for 1947, which recently was released. The appropriation for defense in 1947 amounts to 67 billion rubles. This compares with a corresponding appropriation for the same purpose in 1944 (the last full war year) of 128 billion rubles.[1] In addition to the defense appropriation the 1947

1 Judging by the general Soviet record of budget fulfillment, these appropriations may be taken as closely approximating actual expenditures.

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budget assigns 6.5 billion rubles for "research", which activity may possibly include atomic energy investigation.

In respect of the question of munitions and army strength, it is rather difficult to see how the Russians ever could have considered seriously the course which some in this country once supposed they would follow—that is, to maintain their military establishment on something like a wartime footing. For one thing, to produce munitions on a vast scale for stockpiling purposes and to maintain an unproductive army at anything like wartime strength would mean that so much less capital and labor would be available for the urgent task of reconstructing the economy of the devastated regions, including the heavy industries there. In the long run, this would mean military weakness as well as lower living standards. For another thing, the two great land armies that menaced the Russians before the war are now destroyed. Obviously, under present circumstances, a *relatively* high state of immediate preparedness for land warfare can be maintained without anything like the wartime military establishment.

Finally, there is the atomic bomb. No doubt the advent of this weapon also was a consideration from the Soviet point of view against the stockpiling on a vast scale of many of the conventional types of weapons. In view of Russia's geographic position, however, it would be quite wrong to think that such weapons no longer have an important place in Soviet thinking on military questions.

Whatever the reasons, the Soviet government evidently has decided against concentrating anything like the wartime effort on *immediate* military preparedness. Its outlook on *long-term* military preparedness is another matter, with which its policy on industrialization certainly is connected, though perhaps not quite as closely as is sometimes assumed. We shall return to this question.

The Fourth Five Year Plan was published in March 1946. Accordingly, it reflects the decisions on economic policies which the government reached shortly after the conclusion of the war.

There are many indications that Soviet prices generally have risen since the conclusion of the war. If this is true of munitions prices in particular, the reduction in defense expenditures in *real* terms from 1944 to 1947 would be greater than the budget appropriations indicate.

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At the time of writing (March 1947), there is no evidence that any basic revision of these decisions has been made.

II

The statistics. Unlike previous five year plans, the Fourth, which as yet has been published only in a highly condensed version, contains very few comparative figures on the current performance of the economy and the goals set for it.[2] The government sets forth in most instances only the goals for 1950 (the last year of the new plan); in other instances it shows the planned percentage increase from 1945 to 1950, without revealing either actual current figures or goals.[3] For this reason it is understandable that the plan has been subject to differing interpretations on the important questions considered here.

This study rests mainly on the figures in Table 1, which for the most part were compiled or calculated from information the government has published in the plan and elsewhere. The figures on the output of "heavy industry" in the table refer to the total production of all branches, including munitions as well as basic industrial products.[4] The figures on the output for "consumers' goods" industries refer to the total output of all branches of industry producing consumers' goods, including food processing as well as textiles, clothing, etc. A great part of the foodstuffs consumed in the USSR still is either unprocessed or is processed domestically rather than by industry. Hence the figures in the table on the industrial output of consumers' goods should be read together with those for agricultural production, in order to obtain a more complete picture of the changes in the aggregate output of consumers' goods. The

2 While the First Five Year Plan as published occupies four volumes, the Second two, and the Third one volume of 238 pages, the Fourth has the dimensions only of a pamphlet of 95 pages.

3 This is one of the many examples of the government's policy of withholding statistical information. As the reader will see, it does not always take the pains to make clear the exact meaning of the statistics it does publish. However, there seems to be a near consensus among students of Soviet statistics that the government does not deliberately distort what it publishes. The writer has stated elsewhere his own reasons for thinking that Soviet statistics are not falsified. See *Structure of Soviet Wages* (Cambridge, 1944), p. x.

4 Soviet statisticians generally are evasive as to their practice with regard to the treatment of munitions in their production statistics. However, the fact that munitions are included in their series on heavy industries may be deduced with reasonable assurance from a variety of indirect evidence. See the Appendix.

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figures on transport in Table 1 may be considered as a very rough index of the development of the economy as a whole.

TABLE 1

SELECTED INDICATORS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN

Item and unit	Absolute figures			Per cent change [g]		
	1940	1945	Goal 1950	1940 to 1945	1940 to 1950	1945 to 1950
1. All industry, gross value of production, billion 1926-27 rubles	138	127	205	— 8	+ 48	+ 61
(i) Heavy industry, gross value of production, billion 1926-27 rubles [a]	84	96	137	+ 14	+ 62	+ 43
(ii) Consumers' goods, gross value of production, billion 1926-27 rubles [a]	54	31	68	— 43	+ 26	+ 119
2. Agriculture, gross value of production, billion 1926-27 rubles	23 [b]		29 [b]		+ 27	
3. Railway, water and truck freight, billion ton kilometers	483 [c]		658 [c]		+ 36	
4. Population, millions	198 [d]	193 [e]	207 [f]	— 2.5	+ 4.5	+ 7.3

[a] See Appendix.

[b] Calculated directly from percentages in *Pravda*, March 16, 1946, p. 2, and pre-war official figures.

[c] *Pravda*, March 16, 1946, p. 2.

[d] Estimated on basis of figures in F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union* (Geneva, 1946).

[e] Soviet estimate, *Pravda*, January 22, 1946.

[f] Projection (rather than goal) based on pre-war population trends.

[g] Minor discrepancies between absolute figures and percentage changes are due to rounding.

In the table, the current production figures for 1945 and the goals for 1950 for heavy industrial and consumers' goods production had to be calculated from scattered official statistics. The calculations are explained in the accompanying Appendix. For reasons set forth there, the calculated figures as well as the corresponding data on production in 1940 must be considered as only roughly accurate.[5]

5 As is explained in detail in the Appendix, the main cause of the inaccuracy lies in the statistical procedure which Soviet statisticians use to evaluate production in terms of the price level prevailing in the base year, 1926-27. This understandably is a formidable statistical task in view of the fact that a host of new commodities has been introduced into the Soviet economy since that time. Many students of Soviet statistics, including the writer, consider that, as a result of the specific evaluation procedures used, the official production figures probably overstate to a signifi-

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It is believed that Soviet economic statistics for the year 1940 take into account the incorporation into the USSR of the Polish territories in 1939 (population, 12.5 millions), and possibly of some or all of the numerous territorial acquisitions of 1940 (population, 11.5 millions).[6] However, in so far as these gains as well as the minor additional acquisitions of more recent years (population, about one million) are not fully reflected in these statistics, the figures on industrial and agricultural production and transport for 1940 in Table 1 are understated to a small extent (perhaps 5 to 7 per cent) in relation to the corresponding figures for post-war years. The latter relate to the present boundaries.

In addition to the foregoing figures on the aggregate output of industry and agriculture, information is available on the actual production in 1940 and the goals for 1950 for a number of individual branches of industry and agriculture. The 1950 goals and the corresponding percentage changes from 1940 for some of the more important branches are as follows:

Steel: 25.4 million tons, 38 per cent above 1940
Coal: 250 million tons, 51 per cent above 1940
Electric power: 82 billion kilowatt hours, 70 per cent above 1940
Machinery: 100 per cent increase over 1940
Grain: 127 million metric tons, or 7 per cent above 1940
Sugar beets: 26 million tons, or 22 per cent increase over 1940
Cotton: 3.1 million tons, or 25 per cent increase over 1940

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cant degree the expansion in production under the five year plans. However, it is believed that this error materialized mainly in the pre-war period, and probably for the most part in the period of the First Five Year Plan. Hence, the official figures may be used to measure roughly the *changes* in production in the period considered in this study, 1940-1950.

On a number of occasions in this study, the rate of expansion of production projected under the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) is compared with that realized under the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37) and that projected under the Third (which was interrupted by the war). In view of the possible inaccuracy in the statistical measures of production, these comparisons may in one case exaggerate or in another case minimize the differences between the current and pre-war tempos, but it is believed that in no instance is the possible error of such magnitude as to affect the essentials of the relationship.

6 See the Appendix.

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The planned increases in production from 1940 to 1950 for the four different branches of heavy industries listed may be compared with the increase projected for all heavy industry, 62 per cent (Table 1); and the planned increases for the three different agricultural products listed may be compared with the increase projected for all agriculture, 27 per cent, and for all consumers' goods, 26 per cent (Table 1). In the case of agriculture, the planned increases for the three products listed evidently are on the average below the planned increase in the total output of agriculture as a whole. Presumably the planned increases in other agricultural products not listed, such as potatoes and other vegetables, are greater.

The population figure for 1940 in Table 1 relates to the boundaries existing at the end of the year 1940, which for all practical purposes may be taken as comparable to the present ones. The figure for 1945, 193 millions, a Soviet estimate, will probably surprise many readers in view of the fact that it shows a decline of only 5 million from 1940. If the population growth from June 1940 to June 1941, the time of the Nazi attack, is taken into account, the wartime decline comes to a few millions more than this. But this still is a small figure in relation to popular notions on this subject. It should be observed, however, that this calculation shows only the actual decline in population due to the war. If there had been no war there would have been a large natural increase instead of a decline in the population. If account is taken of this fact, it becomes clear that the total loss due to the war greatly exceeded the actual decline. With reference to the total loss in population, the frequently cited figure of 20 millions seems quite plausible.

III

Heavy industrial and consumers' goods production in 1945. While our information evidently is not all that one might wish, in terms of both completeness and accuracy, it seems to establish clearly enough the essentials of the Soviet economic position on the eve of the Fourth Five Year Plan as well as the main outlines of the plan for reconstruction.

Probably more than two fifths of Russia's fixed capital was in invaded areas. While the government managed to evacuate

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considerable quantities of critical types of machinery from these regions before they were overrun by the Germans, it is safe to say that the larger part of the pre-war capital of the invaded areas was lost.

By their all-out war effort the Russians managed, in the case of heavy industries, fully to offset these vast losses by 1945. The total output of heavy industrial goods in that year exceeded to a small extent the pre-war figure (Table 1). For industry as a whole, the gross value of production in 1945 amounted to 127 billion rubles (in terms of 1926-27 prices). This is only 8 per cent below the pre-war output.

This remarkable feat was accomplished partly by working longer hours, which during the war ran up to 60 and more a week, but these hours were in effect generally only until the middle of the production year 1945. The government began shortly after V-E Day to restore the pre-war working week of 48 hours.[7]

The progress made in reconstruction as the invaded areas were reconquered also was a factor in the wartime recovery of industry. But probably most important was the wartime expansion of capacity in the Urals and Siberia. From 1941 to 1945, the total output of all industries in the Urals increased 260 per cent and in Siberia 180 per cent. In the same period, production of metal fabricating plants in the Urals increased 5.7 times and in western Siberia twelvefold.[8] The new plan reveals the net result of these developments for the country as a whole in the case of one basic industry: electric power. Here, capacity in 1945 already was as large as it was before the war.

Necessarily, in the all-out war effort the Russians concentrated mainly on the expansion of munitions industries and on the basic industries needed to serve them. Other basic industries, particularly those producing machinery for consumers' goods industries and agriculture, were converted on an extensive

7 This working week of 48 hours was first put in effect in June 1940, a year before the Nazi attack. Previously, the usual working hours were five seven-hour days out of six, which is equivalent to about 41 hours on a seven-day-week basis.

8 *Pravda*, August 28, 1946; G. Kosiachenko, "Preduprezhdenie disproportsii v narodnom khoziaistve" (Prevention of Disproportions in the National Economy), *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (Planned Economy), 1946 No. 4, p. 10.

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scale to the production of munitions. Thus, while the Russians succeeded by 1945 in reattaining the pre-war level of production in the case of heavy industrial goods as a whole, the output of munitions in that year was substantially greater and the output of basic industrial products less than before the war.

Necessarily also, consumers' goods were very much neglected. The production of such goods by industry in 1945 was still 43 per cent below the pre-war level. Agriculture also suffered a serious setback, though as a result of a limited increase in production in the East the decline probably was not as great as in the case of processed and fabricated consumers' goods. According to many accounts the farmers did not fare as badly in wartime in respect of foodstuffs as those dependent on state supplies. Since a considerable amount of the reduced output of consumers' goods, processed and unprocessed, was needed to provide comparatively high rations for the Red Army, the actual reduction in supplies available for civilians was even greater than the production figures would indicate.

In this way, the war changed radically the structure of the Soviet economy. A similar change in structure in favor of heavy industries occurred in most belligerent countries. However, in contrast with the American experience, the change in structure in the USSR was based not so much on an over-all expansion of heavy industries beyond the pre-war level as on a drastic cut in consumption.

IV

Heavy industrial and consumers' goods production under the new plan. Essentially, what the Soviet government now proposes to do under these circumstances with regard to the development of its heavy and consumers' goods industries is this:

(i) *Heavy industries.* As was mentioned above, the government is cutting down on the production of finished munitions (planes, tanks, guns, etc.). It plans, however, a great expansion in the output of basic industrial products (steel, coal, chemicals, machinery, electric power, etc.). This expansion will be based in part on the conversion of munitions industries to the production of machinery and other basic industrial goods. Beyond this, basic industrial capacity will be increased both by

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the reconstruction of capacity in the invaded areas and by extensive new construction in the East. Probably the rate of expansion of basic industries under this program will compare favorably with that attained under pre-war five year plans. The total output of basic industrial products in 1950 will be much greater than before the war.

Under the contemplated expansion program for basic industries, the total output of these industries will rise much more than that of munitions is being cut. As a result, the total output of all heavy industrial products, comprising basic industrial goods and munitions together, is to rise far above the pre-war level. The goal for 1950 is a total output 43 per cent above the 1945 level and 62 per cent above that for 1940 (Table 1).

While the heavy industrial sector as a whole (munitions and basic industries together) thus will expand substantially, the *rate* of expansion now projected in the total output of all heavy industries is much less than was realized before the war. Under the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37), the total output of heavy industries increased by 139 per cent. Under the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42)—the plan which was interrupted by the war—the government proposed to expand this sector by another 103 per cent. Under the new plan (1946-50), the increase is to be only 43 per cent (Table 2).

(ii) *Consumers' goods.* Under the new plan, the rate of expansion projected for consumers' goods industries and apparently for agriculture over the present extremely low levels far exceeds the rate of expansion projected for heavy industries. The goal for the consumers' goods industries for 1950 is an output 119 per cent above that for 1945 (Table 1). This percentage rate of expansion exceeds that realized under the Second Five Year Plan (100 per cent) and that planned under the Third (69 per cent) (Table 2).[9]

9 These figures for the pre-war period must be interpreted in the light of these facts: first, the increase in the supply of consumers' goods produced by industry went to a very great extent to meet the needs of the urban population, which grew at a remarkably high but declining rate under the pre-war five year plans; second, to a considerable but declining extent the production of consumers' goods by industry increased at the expense of domestic production on the farm and in city households. These considerations must apply also to the period of reconstruction, but they do not seem to be of comparable importance here. As far as can be judged from the avail-

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TABLE 2

PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT OF VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY UNDER THE FOURTH FIVE YEAR PLAN, COMPARED WITH REALIZED DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE SECOND AND PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE THIRD [a]

Item	Percentage Increase		
	Realized 1932-37	Planned 1937-42	Planned 1945-50
All industries, total output [b]	121	88	61
Heavy industries, total output [b]	139	103	43
Consumers' goods industries, total output [b]	100	69	119
Cattle, number of head	40	40 [d]	39
Sheep and goats, number of head	56	110 [d]	75
Hogs, number of head	163 [c]	100 [d]	200

[a] *Sources:* Realized changes 1932-37, from Gosudarstvennaia Planovaia Komissiia (State Planning Commission), *Itogi vypolneniia vtorogo piatiletnego plana razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza SSR* (*Results of the Fulfillment of the Second Five Year Plan of Growth of the National Economy of the USSR*) (Moscow, 1939), p. 76; A. Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 325; planned increases under the Third Five Year Plan from Gosudarstvennaia Planovaia Komissiia, *Tretii piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza SSR, 1938-1942* (*Third Five Year Plan of Growth of the National Economy of the USSR, 1938-1942*) (Moscow, 1939), pp. 197, 221; percentage increases projected under the Fourth Five Year Plan, in the case of industrial production, are calculated in the Appendix, and in the case of livestock are taken from *Pravda*, March 21, 1946.

[b] See *supra*, p. 199, n. 5.

[c] For the period 1932-36. A large decline in hog numbers occurred in 1937, for reasons unknown to the writer.

[d] January 1, 1938 to January 1, 1943.

These large percentage gains, however, will raise the total output to only a comparatively limited extent above the pre-war level, and in per capita terms only a small gain over the pre-war position will be realized. According to the figures in Table 1, the goal of consumers' goods industries and of agriculture for 1950 is an output in per capita terms about 20 per cent above the 1940 figure. In the case of housing, as is explained below, the norms in 1950 undoubtedly will be below those of 1940. Account must be taken here also of the possible statistical errors that arise in these comparisons as a result of boundary changes and other factors.[10] In general these errors would tend to result in some overstatement in the 1950 goals as compared with the production levels of 1940.

able information, the further shift of consumers' goods processing from farm and household to industry will be comparatively limited in magnitude under the new five year plan.

10 See *supra*, p. 200 and the Appendix.

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(iii) *Housing.* It would be interesting but would take us beyond the scope of this study to speculate as to just what the Russians could do to extricate themselves from their chronic housing difficulties, now tragically enhanced as a result of the war's destruction. Briefly, what the government now plans to do is to devote one seventh of its total investments to urban housing construction and to provide credit assistance to private individuals wishing to repair or build their own homes, both in the city and in the country. Under these arrangements, it expects 84 million square meters of floor space to be built in the cities by 1950. At the incredibly low pre-war housing norm, this new space would provide for the needs of about 16 to 20 million people. Reportedly, about 25 million persons were made homeless during the war.[11] Of these, it might be supposed that at least 15 million lived in cities.[12] When one considers also that Soviet cities absorb most of the natural growth of population (estimated in Table 1 at 9 millions from 1940 to 1950), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the present housing program even if fulfilled will not meet the current emergency, let alone make any contribution to the solution of Russia's long-term housing problem.

Evidently the Soviet government's post-war program for heavy and consumers' goods industries reverses the wartime pattern of development. Munitions production which increased during the war is now being curtailed sharply. Basic industrial production declined in wartime. The government now proposes to expand this branch substantially. The production of consumers' goods which fell off drastically will now be raised the most rapidly.

But it is also clear that the economy which the government proposes to bring into being by 1950 will still differ markedly in structure from that of 1940. According to the plan, basic

11 *Soobshchenie Cherezvychainoi Gosudarstvennoi Komissii po ustanovleniiu i rassledovaniu zlodeianii nemetskofashistkikh zakhvatchikov* (Communiqué of the Extraordinary State Commission on the Ascertainment and Investigation of the Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders) (Moscow, 1945), p. 2.

12 This is about one fourth of the total urban population of the USSR prior to the war, and would mean that about the same share of urban housing was lost as of fixed capital.

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industrial production and heavy industrial production as a whole in 1950 will be far above the pre-war level, while the output of consumers' goods in 1950 will exceed by only a little that of 1940.

The Fourth Five Year Plan contains little concrete information of any value on the allocation of resources that it requires. It is easy to perceive in a very general way, however, what the plan implies in this respect. Undoubtedly the resources released by the curtailment of munitions are being converted for the most part to the production of machinery and other basic industrial products and only to a very limited extent directly to the production of consumers' goods. At the same time, of the total resources already in *basic* industries or to be invested there, part will be devoted to the production of goods needed for the further expansion of the basic industries themselves and part to the production of " means of production " for consumers' goods industries, agriculture and housing construction—textile machinery, tractors, metal products for the production of housewares, etc. Under the pre-war five year plans, an increasing part of the resources in basic industries was devoted to the expansion of munitions capacity and production. Under the current five-year plan, very possibly both the share used to expand the basic industries themselves and the share used to expand consumers' goods production will increase at the expense of that used for the expansion of munitions. No doubt it is partly on the basis of an increase in the share of resources in basic industries that is devoted to the production of " means of production " of consumers' goods that a relatively higher rate of expansion of consumers' goods production is now projected.

V

Post-war foreign trade. The foregoing remarks relate to Russia's post-war goals for production. For a complete account it is necessary to reckon also with the fact that the total available supply of basic industrial products and of consumers' goods in the USSR will differ to some extent from domestic output as a result of foreign trade operations. The Soviet government does not publish its plans for foreign trade, so that the goals of the Fourth Five Year Plan in this sphere are highly conjectural.

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Some notion of what the government is aiming at here, however, may be gathered from the generally known facts about the development of Russia's foreign trade before the war and her present capabilities and interests with respect to foreign trade.

As is generally known, the Russians participated only to a very limited extent in world trade before the war. Under their established policy of striving for "technical-economic independence", the counterpart in the foreign field of their policy of industrialization at home, the Soviet leaders limited severely Russia's imports, restricting purchases abroad mainly to small quantities of machinery of the latest western types and other metal products that would contribute to the industrialization drive. At the same time, they shipped in exchange only enough goods, mainly lumber products, furs, petroleum, grain and other little fabricated goods, as well as some gold, to pay for these imports. On this basis Russia in 1938 imported $268 millions' worth of goods and exported $251 millions' worth—about one-tenth the total volume of United States foreign trade in the same year. The net effect of this trade, so far as the supplies of basic industrial goods and of consumers' goods in the USSR are concerned, probably was to augment the former to a very small extent while reducing the latter.[13]

To what extent will the Soviet leaders continue to limit Russia's foreign trade by the same policy in the future? At the time of writing, the outlook for any radical change in Soviet foreign trade policy from that followed before the war does not seem as bright as many in this country once supposed. At any rate, our findings with regard to the post-war policy on industrialization would seem to suggest that no such change is now contemplated.

Clearly, the Russians will modify their pre-war trade policy in applying it to certain areas, particularly eastern Europe. Their total trade with the eastern European countries under the post-war trade agreements already far exceeds the pre-war volume, and probably now amounts to about $200-250 millions

13 For a detailed review of Soviet foreign trade developments in the inter-war period as well as an analysis (which now seems rather overoptimistic) of Soviet post-war trade prospects, see A. Gerschenkron, *Economic Relations with the USSR* (New York, 1945).

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a year each way.[14] From the scraps of information available on these agreements, it is not clear what pattern of exchange of goods is emerging.

Furthermore, without any basic change in their foreign trade policy, the Russians are now importing a considerably larger volume of goods than before the war, mainly in the form of reparations from the ex-enemy countries. The Russians already have taken from these countries many hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of goods, in the form of foodstuffs, raw materials and machinery. At the time of writing, the total amount of Russia's reparations bill to Germany has not yet been settled finally. Her total bill to the satellites has been fixed under the peace treaties at $900 millions, to be paid in the case of all countries but Italy by 1952 or 1953.[15]

Naturally, under present conditions, the Soviet leaders do not regard increased imports of necessary reconstruction goods financed by credits as in any way inconsistent with their policy of striving for "technical-economic independence". However, the only large-scale credit they have been able to obtain to date is that from Sweden for one billion kroner (about $278 millions). This will be used in the period up to 1951 mainly to buy from that country high-quality steel, machinery, precision instruments and power equipment. Negotiations still seem to be pending on Russia's application for a reconstruction loan of $1 billion from the United States.

The USSR is said to have on hand at the present time a total gold stock of $2 billions or so and to be producing currently upwards of $200 millions' worth of gold a year.[16] Contrary to expectations in this country, the Russians apparently have as yet used only small amounts of this gold to buy reconstruction goods abroad. Possibly, they are still awaiting a post-war recession in the American economy, and an accompanying cheapening of the goods they need. Predictions to this effect

14 Unpublished estimate of Dr. Alexander Gerschenkron.

15 The payments are to be made over a period of eight years from September 1944, in the case of Finland and Rumania; eight years from January 1945, in the case of Hungary; and seven years from the time the peace treaty goes into effect, in the case of Italy.

16 See Gerschenkron, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

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still seem to play a prominent part in Soviet thinking about this country.

In so far as imports are increased in the foregoing ways, the Russians will be aided materially in making good their vast war losses. The increased imports are of particular value because they enable the Russians to avoid many bottlenecks that otherwise might arise in their reconstruction work.

Despite the expansion in imports above the pre-war level, however, it seems safe to say that at the conclusion of the Fourth Five Year Plan the total volume of Russia's foreign trade still will be comparatively small in relation to domestic production. It seems entirely possible that, apart from whatever reparations are being received from Germany, Russia will be importing then two to three times as much goods as in 1938, or $750-1,100 millions a year in terms of post-war prices, while maintaining exports at something above the 1938 figure. At the same time, the total value of all goods and services produced in the USSR, according to the writer's own rule-of-thumb calculation, very likely will exceed $75 billions a year.

For basic industrial products, the excess of imports over exports probably will be considerably greater at the conclusion of the Fourth Five Year Plan than before the war. Even for consumers' goods, mainly as a result of reparations receipts in kind, there may now be an import balance whereas before there probably was an excess of exports. However, in neither case can the net foreign contribution to the total available supply be very substantial in relation to the domestic output.

VI

The policy of industrialization under the plan. Contrary to the view expressed at the beginning of our discussion that under the Fourth Five Year Plan, as in previous plans, the Russians are emphasizing heavy industries, some say that in this plan the Russians are now concentrating on consumers' goods. The brief outline of the plan that has been presented might seem to allow either of these two interpretations. On the one hand, in favor of the view that the Russians still are emphasizing heavy industries, one might observe that these industries will be far larger in 1950 than they ever were before, while living standards at that time will be little higher than

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those of a decade earlier (when they already were below the better pre-war levels). On the other hand, in favor of the view that the Russians are concentrating on consumers' goods, one might observe that a comparatively high rate of expansion is projected for consumers' goods industries, while that projected for heavy industries is far below the rate realized before the war. When the comparison is made between 1940 and 1950 the main emphasis still appears to be where it was before the war—on heavy industries; when the comparison is between 1945 and 1950, the emphasis may seem now to be on consumption goods.

Our reasons for favoring the view that the government still is concentrating on heavy industries are mainly these:

First, considering the terrible privations the Russians have suffered, it is very doubtful that the government is doing much more for consumers than was necessary and sufficient in the circumstances. Obviously, a considerable percentage increase over the present low levels of consumption was required, if only in the interests of efficiency and the further progress of industrialization. Soviet press reports indicate that the shortage of housing in the devastated areas even now is impeding the work of reconstruction. It will take some years under the current program for consumers to replenish fully their stocks of clothing and housewares that were depleted or destroyed during the war.

Second, the slowing down in the tempo for heavy industries in the current plan is due only in part to the speeding up of the tempo for consumers' goods industries. On the eve of the plan, a major part of the capacity of heavy industries was being used to produce munitions, and could be used for basic industrial development purposes only after the work of conversion was completed. This, too, was a factor in the reduction in the rate of expansion of heavy industries as a whole.

Third, the rate of expansion projected for basic industries alone under the new plan probably compares favorably with the corresponding rates realized under previous plans. The capacity of basic industries is being increased currently not only by reconversion and reconstruction but also by new construction on a considerable scale.

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Finally, the government very likely could have done a great deal more in respect of consumers' goods (particularly housing) than the plan provides. In the last analysis, the possibilities of converting the Soviet war economy in any short period to the production of consumers' goods would be limited by technological and economic factors. The wartime experience has shown, however, that the modern industrial economy is in fact rather flexible, much more so than previously had been supposed. Also, two important sources of flexibility are new investment, which is being undertaken in large volume in heavy industry, and foreign trade operations. The government might relax its established policy of economic self-sufficiency and use available foreign exchange in order to import raw materials for the production of consumers' goods. This would release the consumers' goods industries to some extent from dependence on agriculture, a very basic limitation in the USSR.

In brief: it appears that the Soviet government is limiting consumption in the reconstruction period much as it did before the war, in order to build up heavy industries. It is open to question whether under the present circumstances it would have been expedient for the government to have done much more than it now plans in respect of heavy industries—at the expense of consumers' goods. Very probably, however, it could have done a good deal more than it now plans in respect of consumers' goods—at the expense of heavy industries.

Thus the government's policy on industrialization seems to be essentially the same in the new five year plan as it was in previous ones. The changes in tempos would not seem to represent any basic change in policy. Rather they appear to represent a more or less unavoidable adaptation of the pre-war policy to the special circumstances of the reconstruction period, particularly the drastically changed structure of the economy.

Short- and long-term goals for heavy industry, compared with United States production in 1941. The avowed long-term objective of the Soviet leaders in pressing forward their industrialization drive is to "overtake and surpass the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically." This is the famous slogan proclaimed long ago by Lenin. In his report to

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the Supreme Soviet on the Fourth Five Year Plan (March 1946), N. Voznesenskii, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, affirms that this is still the cardinal aim of Soviet economic policy.

From all indications the Soviet leaders mean to overtake and surpass the advanced capitalist countries first in respect of heavy industries. On fulfilling the Fourth Five Year Plan, the Russians will be producing more electric power and more steel than Greater Germany did in 1939, and about as much coal; but they will still be far behind this country. When the plan is completed, Soviet production of steel, 25 million tons, will be about one third, and Soviet production of coal, 250 million tons, about one half of that of the United States in 1941.

In an election speech of February 1946, Stalin fixed the long-term goals for industry which the Russians must strive to fulfill in order to assure the country " against any eventuality ". The goals are to be fulfilled within a span of " perhaps three new five year plans . . . if not more ", that is, by 1960 or some time thereafter. Stalin's goal for the yearly production of steel is 60 million tons, of coal 500 million tons, and of petroleum 60 million tons. When these goals are fulfilled the Russians will be producing 80 per cent as much steel, about as much coal, and less than one-third as much petroleum, as the United States produced in 1941.

VII

" *Guns* " *versus* " *butter* ". In respect of its tempo, the great emphasis on heavy industries and the associated heavy sacrifices in consumption, the industrialization of the USSR under the pre-war five year plans represents a unique chapter in history. In retrospect, one cannot but be impressed by the unimaginable boldness of the men who undertook this grandiose policy in a backward country only ten years after their revolutionary seizure of power, and by their unimaginable ruthlessness in prosecuting this policy against all odds thereafter. From their own point of view the policy was completely vindicated by recent events.

The Soviet leaders on numerous occasions, in party debates and in public pronouncements, have discussed the considerations

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which prompted them to take and maintain this course. The main considerations, as they expressed them in these discussions before the war, may be stated readily in a very general way.[17] All three of the pre-war five year plans were launched under Stalin's leadership; the purges of lesser party figures that occurred in the period of these plans do not appear to have resulted in any major changes in the official ideology on this policy.

Declaredly, the Bolsheviks were interested both in the improvement of living standards and in building up military potential—in both "butter" and "guns". The expansion of heavy industries was to establish the material base for an ultimate radical rise in consumption, and thus make possible in one country a transition to the Marxian goal of communism. To this goal the Soviet leaders again and again reaffirmed their loyalty. The expansion of heavy industries was to establish a rising military potential, and thus strengthen the country's military position against the risks that were implicit in the "capitalist encirclement". Against this the Soviet leaders again and again warned their people.

Declaredly, the Soviet leaders had in mind also a third important consideration in pressing for accelerated industrialization, at least at the outset. This was the fact that industrialization would bring with it an increase in the numbers of the social class on whom the Bolsheviks relied mainly for political support—the proletariat.

Whether one credits the Soviet leaders' own declarations as to their motives, and in particular just what impression one has as to the actual importance of "butter", in their thinking on industrialization, will depend to some extent on one's general outlook on Soviet political and ideological trends. The writer, for one, does not happen to subscribe to the view, so often ex-

17 As far as the writer is aware, no detailed study has yet appeared in English of the Soviet ideology on the policy of industrialization. Perhaps the best single source in Russian on the official views on this question is a compendium of resolutions and decisions of the Communist Party, published by the Party itself—Institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina pri TSK VKP (b) (Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin), *Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (b) v rezoliutsiiakh i reshcniiakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TSK (1898-1935)* [*All-union Communist Party (bolshevik) in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences, and plenums of the TSK (1898-1935)*], Fifth Edition (Moscow, 1936).

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pressed nowadays, that the present Soviet leaders have abandoned Marxism. Nor does he consider, as some do, that the present Soviet leaders were the sole guardians of this philosophy in the Soviet Union. As he sees it, any attempt to get at the truth on this large question must begin by recognizing that Marx and Lenin left only the roughest sort of blueprint for socialism, and that in Russian conditions any of many alternative courses of action might have been more or less consistent with this blueprint. But this is not the place to embark on a discussion of this subject.

From any point of view, "guns" certainly were a main, if not *the* main, concern in the industrialization drive. So much is suggested by the declarations of the Soviet leaders themselves. It would be difficult to understand the government's pre-war policy on industrialization in any other terms. To repeat: under this policy, the government invested enormous sums in heavy industries at the expense of current consumption. In view of the extreme poverty of the Russian people, such investments out of current income certainly would have been much smaller, if the only objective had been to raise consumption at some future date.

The facts on the Fourth Five Year Plan assembled in this study appear to indicate that military considerations must still be a major factor in the Soviet government's thinking on industrialization. Certainly it would be difficult to conclude from the plan that there has been any radical change in the government's outlook in favor of "butter". While consumption is now far below even the poor pre-war standard, the government is continuing to build up heavy industries on a great scale.

The Soviet leaders themselves do not take any pains to conceal that they are still greatly interested in "guns". Stalin's election speech of February 1946 is sufficiently clear on this score. In his report to the Supreme Soviet on the Fourth Five Year Plan, Voznesenskii reminds his listeners that "monopolistic capitalism can still give rise to new aggressors". Accordingly, the Russian people must "unflaggingly concern themselves . . . with the further expansion of the military-economic power of the Soviet state."

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VIII

Fulfillment of the annual plan for 1946; prospects for the fulfillment of the new five year plan. The Fourth Five Year Plan was promulgated in March 1946, with its period of operation dated from the beginning of the year. As a supplement to our discussion of the policy implications of the plan, this section presents a brief review of the progress of work on it in its first year of operation, and considers on this basis the prospects for the fulfillment of the new five year plan.

In a communiqué of January 21, 1947, on the fulfillment of the annual plan for the year 1946, the State Planning Commission released for the first time some details on a most momentous event of the earlier year: a remarkably severe drought which dealt a heavy blow to agriculture. According to the communiqué, the drought, in terms of the area affected, was more severe than that of 1921 and approximated that of 1891. It is declared that the grain harvest in 1946 nevertheless was incomparably greater than in 1921, as a result of the present superior organization of agriculture. But this comparison cannot be very reassuring to the Russian people in view of the fact that possibly five million persons lost their lives in the famine that followed the earlier drought. The communiqué states that the harvest of grain, sunflower seeds and sugar beets in 1946 was "significantly" less than in 1945. Generally, agricultural production in 1945, of course, was far below the pre-war level.

Reportedly, in respect of grains, the fodder crops (barley, oats and corn) were affected more severely than the bread grains (rye and wheat), which are largely winter grown in the stricken areas.[18] Because of the shortage of feed, some liquidation of livestock must already have taken place, with the result that the meat supply temporarily may have increased. This is borne out by the fact that the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Products is reported to have exceeded its production quota for 1946 by 10 per cent. The initial impact of the drought in the USSR was alleviated also by the large-scale requisitioning of foods of all sorts in occupied countries.

18 U. S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, *Foreign Agricultural Circular, World Food Situation,* March 3, 1947, pp. 5-6.

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TABLE 3

FULFILLMENT OF PLAN FOR 1946 IN INDUSTRY [a]

Ministry	Production as per cent of quota for 1946
Ferrous metallurgy	99.5
Non-ferrous metallurgy	99.
Coal industry of western districts	105.
Coal industry of eastern districts	97.
Oil industry of southern and western districts	103.
Oil industry of eastern districts	105.
Electric power stations	99.7
Chemical industry	105.
Electrical equipment industry	106.
Communications equipment industry	103.
Heavy machinery	105.
Automobile industry	92.
Machine tools	98.
Agricultural machinery	77.
Transport machinery	81.
Machinery and instruments	98.
Pulp and paper industry	110.
Rubber industry	96.
Construction materials industry, USSR [b]	105.
Lumber industry, USSR [b]	98.
Textile industry, USSR [b]	103.
Light industry, USSR [b]	99.6
Meat and dairy industries, USSR [b]	110.
Food industry, USSR [b]	98.
Confectionery industry, USSR [b]	102.
Fisheries of the western districts, USSR [b]	100.6
Fisheries of the eastern districts, USSR [b]	85.
Local industry and local fuel industry of the union republics [b]	102.

[a] *Pravda,* January 21, 1947.

[b] These are the so-called union-republican ministries. To a greater or less extent, the operating plants in these industries are managed by all-union ministries through corresponding ministries of the sixteen union republics. The "USSR" appears in the names of these ministries in the communiqué. Possibly this is to make clear that the all-union ministry is referred to rather than the corresponding republican ones.

On these accounts and possibly because procurements of farm products were increased in areas not affected by the drought, the food-processing industry managed, despite the drought, to fulfill 98 per cent of its production quota for the year 1946, and to increase the output of bread and bakery products by 24 per cent over that of 1945.[19] Understandably, however, the government has postponed the derationing of cereal products,

19 The production reports for the food-processing industry cover only the foods processed by industrial establishments and omit the foods processed at home or on the farm. Quite possibly, as a result of the drought, the volume of the latter declined in 1946.

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which the Fourth Five Year Plan promised would take place in the fall of 1946.

While the drought resulted in a serious decline in the harvest in 1946, a rapid recovery of the Soviet plant economy might still be effected, given normal weather. In the case of livestock, however, the increased slaughter resulting from the lack of feed will be more difficult to make good. Here, whatever the outlook was initially, the prospects of fulfilling the high goals fixed for 1950 in the Fourth Five Year Plan would now seem to be dim. Necessarily, the long-term outlook for the fulfillment of the plan for consumers' goods industries based on animal raw materials (leather goods, woolens, meat, butter, etc.) also is now adverse.

The communiqué presents figures on the degree to which the twenty-eight ministries managing Soviet industry fulfilled their production quotas for 1946. These are shown in Table 3.

Here, the record of fulfillment on the whole seems most impressive, particularly when it is recalled that 1946 was a year of reconversion as well as of drought. Altogether 24 of the 28 ministries fulfilled their quotas to the extent of 96 per cent or better, and 14 went beyond their goals. Generally, the ministries in charge of the consumers' goods industries seem to have done about as well as those in charge of heavy industries.

Significantly, in view of the difficulties in agriculture, the least successful ministry in terms of the fulfillment of the plan was that in charge of agricultural machinery. This ministry produced only 77 per cent of its quota. However, it managed to achieve a very large percentage increase in output over 1945; for example, the output of tractors increased by 72 per cent and of combines by 349 per cent.

The actual percentage increase in production realized in 1946, as compared with 1945, varied widely in different branches of industry. Among fifty products listed in the communiqué, the only one for which no increase is shown is sugar, the output of which was the same as in 1945. For a great many products, such as fertilizer, electric motors, paper, etc. (most of them presumably produced in small quantities in 1945), increases of 50

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per cent and far more are listed. The increase registered for steel was 9 per cent, for petroleum 12 per cent, for coal 10 per cent, for cotton cloth 17 per cent, and for leather shoes 28 per cent.

According to the State Planning Commission, the total housing constructed by state organizations in 1946 was 6 million square meters, measured in terms of floor space. The corresponding goal for 1946 is not stated, but the amount actually constructed is only one twelfth of the housing these organizations are called upon to build under the Fourth Five Year Plan. Under the circumstances the prospect that even the minimal housing program set in the plan will be realized hardly seems bright.

To sum up: in the light of the progress to date, the prospects that the Russians will achieve the ambitious goals of their Fourth Five Year Plan would seem to be brighter in the case of heavy industrial products as a whole than in the case of consumers' goods. This forecast must be qualified, however, to take into account the possibility that the Soviet government will feel impelled to slacken further the tempos fixed for heavy industries in order to bring about a more rapid recovery of consumers' goods, particularly housing.

The theory still seems to be entertained seriously in some quarters that Soviet plans are only bolshevik propaganda, designed merely to mislead the world as to the true situation in Russia. Needless to say, if this theory is correct, the present essay is entirely irrelevant.

It would seem to be sufficient, however, to refer to the record of fulfillment of the annual plan for the year 1946, just sketched, to make clear that any sweeping generalization as this must be rejected. Making due allowances for the effects of the drought, which presumably was unanticipated, one might possibly conclude from this record that the goals for the year had been on the high side to begin with. But, making due allowances for the effects of the drought, one must conclude also that the economy did operate during the year more or less in accord with the plan.

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A careful study of the record of fulfillment of the pre-war plans, including the five year plans, the writer believes, would lead to much the same conclusions. The Soviet planners certainly tend to be overly ambitious. Perhaps this is by design, in order that the population may be induced to exert a maximum effort. Nevertheless, the plans are operational. As such, their implications must be pondered seriously the world over.

APPENDIX

A. Calculation of figures on industrial production in Table 1. The figures on the total output of all industry in 1940, 1945, and 1950 were obtained as follows:

(i) The figure for 1940, 138 billion 1926-27 rubles, and the corresponding goal of 1950, 205 billion rubles, are taken directly from the text of the Fourth Five Year Plan.[1] Unless otherwise stated, all figures on the goals of the Fourth Five Year Plan cited in this Appendix are taken from this source.

(ii) According to Voznesenskii,[2] the output of all industry is to increase at an average rate of 15.6 billion rubles a year in the course of the plan. Hence, the output in 1945 can be computed as 127 billion rubles.

(iii) The figure on the total output of industry in 1940 given in the text of the plan, before rounding, was 138.5 billion rubles. This is 1.0 billion rubles greater than the figure on the total output of industry in 1940 given in an earlier report of Voznesenskii.[3] The upward revision of the earlier figure may have been made to take into account the additions to Soviet territory since 1940.[4]

The breakdown of the total output as between heavy and consumers' goods industries for 1940 was determined on the basis of the breakdown given in the report of Voznesenskii just cited.

The corresponding breakdowns of the total industrial output as between heavy industrial and consumers' goods for 1945 and for 1950 are calculated on the basis of one rule-of-thumb estimate and one further item of information.

1 *Pravda*, March 21, 1946.

2 *Pravda*, March 16, 1946.

3 *The Growing Prosperity of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1941), p. 4.

4 See *infra*, p. 227.

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What is estimated is the goal for 1950 for consumers' goods industries as a whole. This is not revealed in the Fourth Five Year Plan, although the goals for many important industries in this group have been published. For purposes of this essay, the goal for the total output of consumers' goods industries is taken to be 68 billion 1926-27 rubles, or the same as the goal fixed for 1942 for these same industries in the Third Five Year Plan.[5] This estimate is based on a consideration of the following facts:

(i) The goals in the Fourth Five Year Plan for a number of individual consumers' goods industries, including the two most important, flour and cotton textiles, are very close to the corresponding goals in the Third. In the case of a few consumers' goods industries, the goals of the new plan are much lower than those of the previous one. For example, for meat the goal for 1950 is 81 per cent of that for 1942; for sugar, 69 per cent. On the average, taking into account the relative importance of the different items, the goals for 1950 for the industries listed in both plans appear to be some 5 per cent below those for 1942. However, most of the industries considered in this comparison are based on agricultural raw materials. The Russians generally have had much more success in raising the production of consumers' goods based on industrial raw materials, that is, mainly semi-durable and durable goods (household utensils, furniture, etc.). With respect to agriculture, the goal for the gross value of production in the Fourth Five Year Plan is 29.4 billion rubles (in terms of the 1926-27 prices), or 96.5 per cent of that in the Third Five Year Plan.[6]

(ii) Taken at 68 billion rubles, the goal for 1950 for consumers' goods is 26 per cent above the output of 1940. According to the

5 Gosudarstvennaia Planovaia Komissiia (State Planning Commission), *Tretii piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza SSR, 1938-1942 (Third Five Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR, 1938-1942)* (Moscow 1939), p. 197. Unless otherwise stated, all figures on the goals of the Third Five Year Plan cited in this Appendix are taken from the tables on pp. 197 *et seq.* of this source.

6 The validity of the foregoing argument as a basis for calculating the 1950 goal for the output of consumers' goods industries is not affected by the fact that the goals of the Third Five Year Plan relate to the pre-1939 boundaries of the USSR while those of the Fourth relate to the present boundaries. All that is assumed here is that the relation of the goals for individual industries in the two plans may be taken to indicate the relation of the goals for the total output, of which the individual industries listed comprise a good part. However, since the goal for total output for 1950 in the Fourth Five Year Plan is no larger than that projected in the Third Five Year Plan for 1942, while the population will have increased, the per capita supply of consumers' goods now aimed at is below that aimed at earlier.

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Fourth Five Year Plan, the total retail turnover, in terms of comparable prices, will be 28 per cent greater in 1950 than in 1940. In his report on the plan to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,[7] Voznesenskii, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, indicates that the marketed share of consumers' goods will increase as a result of the reduction in the rate at which these goods are stockpiled for military and other purposes.

(iii) The 1950 goal for agriculture, on which so many Soviet consumers' goods industries are based, is 29.4 billion rubles, or 27 per cent above the agricultural output for 1940.

The further item of information referred to above is this: According to Voznesenskii,[8] the total output of consumers' goods will increase at an annual rate of 17 per cent in the period of the new plan. This means that the 1950 goal for consumers' goods industries is 119 per cent above the 1945 output. Accordingly, having estimated the 1950 goal, it is possible to calculate at once the corresponding 1945 figure. The output of heavy industries in 1945 and the corresponding goal for 1950 are calculated as residuals.

The goals of the Third and Fourth Five Year Plans, by the way, are close also in the case of several branches of heavy industry. However, in the case of machinery, which constitutes the larger part of the total output of heavy industries, the goal in the later plan appears to be some 60 per cent higher than that in the earlier one. Significantly, in the case of oil, the goal for 1950 is fourteen million tons below that for 1942.[9]

B. Question of the inflationary bias in Soviet official production statistics expressed in terms of 1926-27 rubles. The foregoing calculations establish the probable magnitudes of the measures of the actual production in 1945 and projected production for 1950 for heavy and consumers' goods industries, corresponding to the figures on production in these sectors published by the Soviet government before the war. It now remains to observe that, quite apart from any errors in our own calculations, these magnitudes are subject to a margin of error because of certain shortcomings of the Soviet official measures themselves, resulting particularly from the methods used by Soviet statisticians in evaluating production in terms of the so-called "1926-27 rubles".

7 *Pravda*, March 16, 1946.

8 *Ibid.*

9 See Solomon M. Schwartz, "How Much Oil Has Russia?", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1946.

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In general, according to Soviet statistical procedures, evaluation of output in these terms means that in aggregating the output of different industries to obtain a total for all heavy industries and for all consumers' goods industries, the products are valued in terms of the ruble prices prevailing in the fiscal year 1926-27. However, this procedure necessarily could not be applied in the case of new commodities produced for the first time after that year. Soviet statisticians adopted the expedient of evaluating these commodities in terms of the prices prevailing at the time of their introduction.[10]

When it is considered that a host of new commodities has been introduced under the five year plans and that furthermore there has been a great price inflation since 1926-27, it is evident that this evaluation procedure may have led to a considerable overstatement of the increase of the physical volume of production. Many students of Soviet statistics, including the writer, have concluded that this was the result in fact, in the period of the pre-war plans.

For a number of reasons, however, the writer is of the opinion that the additional errors arising on this account must be comparatively limited, so far as the period studied in this essay is concerned, and accordingly that the official production statistics may be taken as rough measures of the *changes* in production for this period. The reasons are as follows:

(i) In general, new commodities might be presumed to be of less importance than formerly in the total output, certainly far less than in the First Five Year Plan;

(ii) Undoubtedly many new types of munitions were introduced during the war, but the Russians already were producing munitions on a vast scale in 1940;

(iii) The prices of munitions and heavy industrial products apparently remained rather stable during the war.[11]

(iv) In so far as recently introduced commodities are overvalued in comparison with old ones, there would be an element of bias in the official production statistics even though no new commodities were introduced in a given period. As a result of the comparative overvaluation of recently introduced commodities, the changes in the output of these commodities would receive an unduly high weight in the index of changes in total output. However, the output of one major

10 See A. I. Rotshtein, *Problemy promyshlennoi statistiki SSSR (Problems of Industrial Statistics of the USSR)* (Leningrad, 1936), pp. 16 *et seq.*

11 See H. Schwartz, "Prices in the Soviet War Economy", *American Economic Review*, December 1946.

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category of recently introduced commodities, machinery, moves in the opposite direction from that of another, munitions, in the period 1940-45 and again in the period 1945-50. Hence, the net effect of overweighting both categories of goods might be comparatively small.

One of the facts that has led to the view that the Soviet official figures on aggregate output in terms of 1926-27 rubles for pre-war years are subject to an upward bias is the tendency for these figures to show greater percentage increases than those shown by figures that are available on the output of such basic branches of industry as steel, coal, etc., expressed in physical terms. Needless to say, this discrepancy in any particular situation might be a result of many factors other than an inflationary bias in the index of total output, for example, an increase in the degree of fabrication of steel. But it is of interest nevertheless to extend this comparison to the period considered here.

Below are tabulated the percentage changes in the aggregate output of heavy industry as shown by the official statistics, and the average percentage change in the output in physical terms of three basic industries, coal, steel and power, realized or planned under the various five year plans:

	Percentage increase in total output of heavy industry	Average of percentage increases in output of steel, coal, power
Realized, 1929-32 [12]	112	66
Realized, 1932-37 [13]	139	156
Planned, 1937-42 [14]	103	82
Planned, 1940-50 [15]	62	53

As might be expected, the discrepancy is greatest under the First Five Year Plan, while interestingly the average increase for the three industries is greater than the increase in total output in the Second Five Year Plan, and, for the period 1940-50, the percentages are relatively close.

12 Calculated from figures in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo (Planned Economy)*, 1939, No. 8, pp. 150, 155; and in State Planning Commission, *The Second Five Year Plan* (New York, [date ?]), pp. 547, 548.

13 Calculated from figures in Gosudarstvennaia Planovaia Komissiia (State Planning Commission), *Itogi vypolneniia vtorogo piatiletnego plana razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza SSR (Results of the Fulfillment of the Second Five Year Plan of Development of the National Economy)* (Moscow, 1939), pp. 76-78.

14 See *supra*, p. 221, n. 5.

15 Percentage increase in total output of heavy industry from Table 1; average of percentage increases for three industries calculated from figures in Voznesenskii, *The Growing Prosperity of the Soviet Union*, pp. 13, 15, and in *Pravda*, March 21, 1946.

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On the basis of similar findings with respect to the comparative development of production in all heavy industry and in particular branches under the First and Second Year Plans, Alexander Gerschenkron suggests that, to whatever extent that the pre-war figures on total heavy industrial output are biased, the bias materialized mainly under the First Five Year Plan.[16] On the same reasoning, the findings with respect to developments in the period 1940-50 tend to support the view expressed above that the upward bias currently is of limited significance.

Another feature of Soviet production statistics that has been of concern is that, in the case of consumers' goods industries, the production figures necessarily do not take into account home processed goods. The increase in the production of consumers' goods industries, under the five year plans, which is shown by the official statistics, undoubtedly reflected in good part only a transfer in processing activity from the home to factory, consequent on the great shift of population to the cities, and accordingly does not indicate by any means a corresponding increase in the total supply of consumers' goods. However, this consideration, too, would seem to be of importance chiefly with regard to the pre-war period, particularly that of the First Five Year Plan, and only of limited significance for the period studied here. It should be noted in this connection that in Table 1 the production of consumers' goods by factories increases by about the same percentage from 1940 to 1950 as the total output of agriculture.

C. *Inclusion of munitions industries in "heavy industries"*. The two major classes of industry distinguished in this study, "heavy industries" and "consumers' goods industries", correspond to two categories of industry usually referred to in Soviet production statistics as industries producing "means of production" and industries producing "articles of consumption". It is clear that the category "means of production" includes all basic industrial products (electric power, coal, chemicals, steel, machinery, etc.). The writer's reasons for believing that this category, despite its name, also includes munitions are briefly as follows:

(i) In Soviet statistics, the sum of the output of "means of production" and of "means of consumption" consistently is referred to as comprising the output of "all industry". No third category, munitions output, is ever distinguished.

16 "The Rate of Industrial Growth in Russia" (Unpublished MS dated October 1946), pp. 29 *et seq.*

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(ii) The most important branch of industry listed in Soviet statistics as producing "means of production" is the "machinery and metal-working industry". As of 1940, this industry is listed as producing 48 billion rubles' worth of goods,[17] while the total output of all "means of production" is listed as 84 billions. In view of the magnitude of the former item, it would seem entirely possible that it includes munitions, which already were being produced on a considerable scale in 1940.

(iii) If munitions were not included in "means of production", and our category "heavy industries" referred only to basic industrial products, one would be compelled to conclude from the figures in Table 1 that, despite their war losses and the extensive conversion that had taken place, the Russians were producing more basic industrial products, including civilian machinery, in 1945 than in 1940. This hardly seems possible.

(iv) While munitions were produced on a great scale in 1945, the output is being cut sharply under the Fourth Five Year Plan. If munitions were not included in "means of production" this would mean that the total output of basic industrial goods and munitions together would increase little if at all in the period of the plan. In view of the fact that great increases are projected over present levels (which probably are below or little above pre-war) for steel, coal and electric power, it would seem to be difficult if not impossible in this case to explain how the latter goods would be consumed.

(v) According to the State Planning Commission's communiqué on the fulfillment of the annual plan for the year 1946,[18] the "civilian production" (*grazhdanskaia produktsiia*) of all industry rose 20 per cent in 1946, and the "civilian production" of the "machine-building" plants rose by 18.4 billion rubles. From the context and the specific term used, it is quite clear that by "civilian" here the communiqué refers to "non-military" goods, and not merely to consumers' goods. This is the only instance of which the writer is aware where reference is made in Soviet statistics to the output of "civilian" goods in this sense. The fact that the reference is made seems to offer strong confirmation for the view that Soviet figures on the output of "all industry", and on the total output of the "machinery and metal-working industry", may be taken to include munitions. Interest-

17 According to Voznesenskii (*op. cit.*, p. 42), the output of the machine-building and metal-working industry in 1940 was 78 per cent above that for 1937. The corresponding figure for 1937 as stated in the Third Five Year Plan is 27.5 billion rubles (see above, p. 221, n. 5).

18 *Pravda*, January 21, 1947.

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ingly the government has published no such figures for 1946, and it is easy to guess why. Considering that reconversion was carried out on a large scale in 1946, the total output of heavy industry and of the "machinery and metal-working industry", including munitions, probably increased little if at all in 1946. On the face of it these are less appealing facts to report than the ones cited in the communiqué.

Boundaries to which the official economic statistics for the year 1940 relate. For the following reasons it is believed that the figures in Table 1 on industrial and agricultural production and transport for 1940 take into account the incorporation in the USSR of a good part, if not all, of the territory it has acquired since 1939:

(i) It is known that the figures on the grain-sown area and harvest for 1940, made public by Voznesenskii in February 1941 [19] must take into account at least the incorporation in the USSR of the Polish territories in 1939 and possibly also the additional areas acquired in 1940. His figure on the grain-sown area for 1940, 110.9 million hectares, is some 10 per cent greater than the corresponding figures published earlier for 1939. Prior to 1939, the general trend in the grain-sown area was downward.

(ii) The figures on industry, agriculture and transport for 1940 in Table 1 either are taken directly from post-war Soviet publications or are calculated from information in such publications. In several instances where comparisons can be made, it appears that the statistics for 1940 appearing in post-war Soviet publications have been revised upward as compared with statistics for the same year published in 1941. These revisions may be designed to take into account whatever territorial gains were not already reckoned with in the statistics for 1940 published in 1941. Some of the revisions are as follows:

	Figures for 1940	
	From Voznesenskii report of February 1941	From *Pravda* March 16, 21, 1946
Gross production of all industry, billion 1926-27 rubles	137.5	138.5
Railway freight, billion ton kilometers	409.	416.
National income, billion 1926-27 rubles	125.5	128.3

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19 *Op. cit.*

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FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN SUPPORT OF SCIENCE*

THIS government of ours has not been a stranger to proposals for the support of science. The first proposal to this end was made, it seems, to General Washington by Benjamin Rush. The vehicle proposed for carrying on research was a University of the United States. Except for the years 1829 to 1869 a bill of some kind designed to accomplish this purpose was discussed before or reported to the Congress at every session.[1] The debates were carried on by many experienced and responsible men. But no bill has yet been passed into law. The series of bills, ending with Senate Bill 1850 [1a] and growing out of Dr. Vannevar Bush's *Science: The Endless Frontier*,[2] opens a different universe of discourse. Discussion of that bill is the purpose of this essay.

When, as a wise and learned man has noticed, a proposal takes on towering dimensions, a problem in quantity ceases to be merely that, but becomes a problem in quality and takes on new significance. A new outlook is what we have now to contemplate. We are told that the needs of the country for research in science have become so great as to make desirable the provision of new forms of organization and of relatively vast sums of money.

A new bill must naturally be scrutinized with great care so that the plan to which it conforms is well understood. That scrutiny involves, in this instance, a number of varied aspects:

* This article was read at a Symposium on Science Legislation and Problems of Federal Aid, sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and by Pi Gamma Mu, in Boston on December 28, 1946.

[1] E. B. Wesley, *Proposed: The University of the United States* (Minneapolis, 1936).

[1a] This Bill became S. 525 in the 80th Congress.

[2] Washington, 1945.

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1. The nature of the contemplated organization and the form of its direction;
2. The source of money and the method of its expenditure, in short, finance;
3. The relation of invention to discovery, since invention is equivalent to advance in technology and discovery is the great concern of fundamental, disinterested science;
4. The psychological attributes of scientific men;
5. An examination of the structure of the existing educational and intellectual establishment; and
6. The influence of the new and untried measures upon the old arrangements.

Since all these issues must ultimately be taken into consideration, it makes little difference where one begins—except that, since the core of the business is scientists, there is symbolic value in beginning with them.

In a democracy a man is two persons: he and his calling constitute one; his rôle as a citizen with the responsibilities of citizenship constitutes the other. As a citizen he is like other citizens, contributing his special knowledge to the general pool. Not he, but all the people together and their representatives decide *what* to use and *how* to use their conjoined scientific and indeed other possessions. This very brief statement on the responsibility of special groups—scientists or any other—must for the moment suffice, for this problem is too complicated for full treatment now. No group of specialists may constitute itself a pressure group (and scientists are, of course, and fortunately, specialists) without careful reflection on the communal value of their proposals. It has been well said that specialists should be on tap, but not on top. Scientists by nature are not politicians, though crossings over have fortunately, or unfortunately, been observed.

Scientists, for the current purpose, would be men devoted to the advancement of scientific learning. What kind of man contributes to this advance is not altogether clear. We should understand his chances of doing this better if adequate biographies of great scientists were available, to provide a good insight into the psychological nature and development of scientists.

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It might then be possible to infer how scientists are to be selected and made. Without adequate knowledge of how to create genius, nothing is left that can be done but to provide suitable conditions and environments for those men who select themselves, or who are selected, for this calling, so that their spirits may flourish. At least they should not be impeded and so wither. Some men function better in the market place; others in the seclusion of ivory towers in universities or in research institutes. No one who has lived long with scientific men of all stamps but will know that, whatever else may be correctly or incorrectly arranged, this provision must be carefully heeded. Otherwise, futility may result. I emphasize therefore the psychological needs of scientific men before and beyond all desiderata.

It is from this angle, perhaps especially, that the current bill is so easily open to criticism. This bill attempts to legislate into existence a profoundly disturbing set of administrative devices. It goes as far as one can perhaps go in ignoring the habitus of scientists. It fails to recognize that, in science, close intimacy with, and feeling for, natural phenomena has decisive advantage and is perhaps indispensable.

This bill proposes to create and manage what cannot be otherwise than a scientific adventure, through the instrumentality of an Administrator, appointed by the President, on the recommendation of a National Science Board. This Board (of nine members) is also appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate and, one fears a little, with its advice. The scheme is like the House that Jack Built: the President appoints the Board; the Board recommends the Administrator to the President, both by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The degree to which the activities of the Administrator are limited by the Board is neither clear nor specific. What *is* clear is that all power, all appointments, all financial and salary arrangements are in the hands of the Administrator.

The core of the system is to make grants by contract. The problem of how to administer grants is peculiarly difficult. These grants, let it be remembered, are provided for periods, it

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seems, of not more than five years. That makes of this enterprise—jobs, not vocations. Any device which provides grants-in-aid, whether in this bill or in any other governmental provision which permits a Division of Research Grants, may turn out to be a way of destroying, not of creating, scientists. On the assumption that any concentration of authority can be made to function, the proposal in this bill that authority be concentrated in an Administrator is, of all the possibilities, probably the least advantageous.

This bill has come a long way from a warning in Dr. Vannevar Bush's Report, however faulty in other ways, that a National Research Foundation " must leave the internal control of policy, personnel, and the method and scope of the research to the institutions themselves. This is of the utmost importance." [3] Dr. Bush, when he lifted the lid of this Pandora's Box, could not have foreseen what he was permitting to escape.

Surely, this is not the only conceivable type of organization suitable for this purpose. Compare with it the plan adopted by our British cousins and described by Sir John Anderson:

> . . . . the principle of a permanent grant is now accepted. . . . Government grants to universities are made through, and on the recommendation of, the University Grants Committee . . . . It is left to each university to allocate its grant as it thinks fit, subject, of course, to any general understanding between that university and the Committee.[4]

I take this to mean that the University manages its own intellectual business. When it comes to special things called " projects ", this is what is done: " Grants earmarked for specific researches are made not by the Committee but by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, with the approval of the Treasury."

I shall speak later of a different scheme, but this is enough to indicate that what S. 1850 puts in the control of an Administrator is a highly evolved bureaucracy and arbitrary power, not

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 27 (4).

[4] Sir John Anderson, " Science and Reconstruction ", *Nature*, December 22, 1945, p. 733.

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really necessary and obviously not fashioned to the function to be served, and so certainly not desirable. I think I have not exaggerated. The further details of this bill need detain us no longer.

Clearly it was the war, the urgencies which it created, the successes which it occasioned that—perhaps it is not too strong a word to use—intoxicated many careful men with the belief that a mechanism which was devised *ad hoc* could and should be indefinitely extrapolated. Secrecy, size, power, limited objectives, limitless money, patriotic fervor, closing the critical faculty, devoted self-sacrifice—all these formed a background which encouraged the acceptance of them, as if they formed a natural state of being. Sight was lost of the fact that, great as were the technical accomplishments, right down, or up, to penicillin and the atomic bomb, technical accomplishments are not discoveries on which foundation building can be done. Achievements like these are picked up along a road already surveyed.

During war, disinterested science can no doubt be conducted, but it is, in fact, difficult in the general atmosphere of compulsion generated by war. That war is an instrument of destruction needs no argument. War comes when debate, reason, accommodation cease to play a directing rôle. This atmosphere is not hospitable to the temper of reflection, or the mood of good will. Men, history, and past scientific successes can be, indeed need to be, and are, mobilized. Many men of understanding have insisted that the science generated in the war was built of accumulated scientific capital and did not proceed beyond this. What moves forward in war is a juggernaut, but scarcely the luminous spearhead of thought or insight. War ploughs everything under. It does not necessarily open new vistas.

There are those, Hessen [5] for example, who have seen in war the occasion for discovery. In a sense which needs carefully to be understood, this may be correct. It was Hessen's idea that interests growing out of war accounted for Newton, that bal-

[5] B. Hessen, "The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's 'Principia'", in *Science at the Cross Roads*, Papers presented to the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology, London, 1931 (London, 1931).

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listics lay behind the law of gravitation, and that earlier it was the need for transport on waterways that paved the way for conceptions of hydrostatics. But perhaps at least as satisfactory a way of looking at discoveries in these domains is that usual peacetime living is enough to account for such thinking. Life having been what it was, with wars always in prospect, science kept making contributions. Whether wars ultimately step in to accelerate the process of discovery, or specifically aid in realizing whatever are the general social objectives, is an important speculation which has not led to an unequivocal conclusion. Social struggle for betterment—has this led ultimately and unavoidably to enterprise and success? The answer, I think, is Yes; but war as an *immediate* occasion for basic scientific discovery, No. The beneficent motives operating during peace are generally at work. That was apparent at the height of the Renaissance in Italy, when the learned societies were created, and in England in the events that led to chartering The Royal Society. What could be more natural than that the compelling urgency toward improvisation, stimulated by the greatest of all emergencies, should have discolored after its own nature the texture and slow methods of basic scientific thinking? But we move now into quieter waters. There is time again for reflection.

A powerful motive for advocating aid to science, of the kind offered in S. 1850, was born of the difficulties—some men thought the impasse—that were reached in the period before the war and projected beyond the war, into the present. Social advance, social security, social better-being were obviously drawing resources away from private philanthropy. The great fortunes were being, so it was thought, taxed away. Where was money to come from, to continue what the great givers began? The flight to government for aid was obvious and easy. Everybody was doing it. Why not science as well? The President of one of the great American universities has viewed the current proposals in this fashion:

> Now that it seems likely that the Federal Government will offer subsidies for university research, especially in science, we must

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> recognize the need of making grave decisions in policy. Together with a number of our faculty I share an inherent dislike and suspicion of government subsidies. It may be that in fields of scientific research, especially in medical science, the costs of the future will be so great that they cannot be carried by the independent educational institution. In that case it remains to be seen whether plans can be evolved which will avoid certain obvious dangers. It would be disastrous for our academic morale, if the universities became involved in a scramble for the contents of a research pork barrel. If, in order to secure a share of government grants, a university were compelled to yield its independence of decision as to how it would conduct its research it would be much better to abandon the type of research which it could not finance from its own funds.[6]

This surrender—yielding its independence—is precisely what an independent university cannot escape from doing, under the restrictions imposed by this bill. Men with a sense for freedom have resisted before now. I take the following quotation from the 1922 Report of a Royal Commission on Oxford and Cambridge Universities:

> [The intellectual independence of the universities] . . . is a precious part of our intellectual and moral heritage as a nation. If there were any danger that grants of public money would lead to State interference with opinion in the Universities, it might be the less of two evils that they should decline in efficiency rather than lose their independence in order to obtain adequate means. But the ways of thought and feeling of the modern British community are hostile to any development in the direction of State control of the academic spirit, and the public grants already enjoyed by the old Scottish and new English Universities have not led to State interference with opinion and tendency in those institutions.[7]

The year 1922 may seem a long time past but, as you have heard, Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council in Mr. Churchill's government, took the same position on December 6, 1945 in his address before the Manchester Joint Research

[6] Report of the President of Yale University to the Alumni, 1944-45, p. 19.

[7] Royal Commission on Oxford and Cambridge Universities, Report, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 1922, p. 14.

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Council. And more recently still, from the other side of the House, now the Socialist majority, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, spoke on November 30, 1946, to the Royal Society, at the 284th Anniversary dinner of that scientific organization:

> One thing is to my mind quite certain, and that is that there must be absolute freedom for the researcher to wander over the field of knowledge wherever his will and his genius take him. The discipline and carefully estimated economy of production methods are wholly out of place in the matter of pure research. That is why it is quite impossible for a state or a government to plan fundamental research.[8]

I have expressed the opinion elsewhere that a "hearing" before a Congressional Committee is probably not the best way of securing light on so intricate and professional a problem as this, how to stimulate thinking. I suggest that a better way of arriving at sound insights into such problems is through reports. This method is employed both in Great Britain and in the United States. In Great Britain these are made by Royal Commissions and also by parliamentary and departmental committees. The Report of the British Interdepartmental Committee on Medical Schools (the Goodenough Report) is a shining example. It was published in 1944, having been prepared *during* the war, after two years of preparation. The section on procedure alone (p. 6) repays study. Our Congress authorizes such reports and then holds hearings on them, a very happy combination of two forms of inquiry. Dr. Bush's was a Report to the President. So was Professor Wesley Mitchell's, to President Hoover. Recently the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, though this was not a Congressional report, achieved a high level of distinction. Some Congressional reports are, so I understand, equal to the British. But read the 1210 pages of *Hearings on Science Legislation.* I venture to believe that much that is set forth in these volumes is not relevant and that some things that are so remained unregarded. The vast amount of evidence collected is not a wholly satisfactory basis for a perspicuous report.

[8] *New York Herald Tribune*, December 1, 1946.

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Too little time has elapsed since the close of the war to examine all the relevant facts, either concerning the methods of research as these have developed in inductive-deductive reasoning, or the present situation which encouraged the advocacy of these bills. In the six parts of testimony taken before the Senate subcommittees—and a mass of testimony and writing besides—little if any evidence was collected on what provisions exist or can still be fostered to finance research in science. The time has come to study in great detail whether moneys not known to be available before can now be tapped.

In point of fact neither the great American fortunes nor the great American Foundations have alone supported our private philanthropy including institutions of learning. They have assisted or they have served as stimuli. The statistical tables on income tax published by the Treasury of the United States are mines of revealing information. The contributions deducted from income, if studied, would yield a shrewd insight into how much money is given away and by whom and by persons in what income brackets. There is no way of knowing now what the social services of all kinds, including education, science and research, hospitals, homes of one kind or another, cost in this country; what the universities cost, and what the research institutes, scientific and industrial and medical, cost. These institutions are divisible into governmental—federal, state, municipal—and private. Nor is it known what is spent on religion or through religion on services the churches claim for their own.

It is estimated, however, that in 1944 private philanthropy spent $2,706,000,000. What comes as something of a surprise is that all the Foundations together spent only $72,000,000. The story is this: of every dollar spent, 63 cents came from individuals and families with incomes of *less* than $5,000; only 13 cents from individuals with incomes of *more* than $5,000. That accounts for 76 cents. The other 24 cents came from bequests (4 cents), corporation contributions (2 cents), endowments (other than Foundations) (15 cents), and Foundations (3 cents). Notice, if you please, that the Foundations contributed 3 cents—not more—in the dollar.

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What these computations show is that, with a national income of 150 billion dollars, less than 2.0 per cent (1.8 per cent or $2.7 billion) were spent for philanthropy. Gifts of 2 per cent surely cannot be exhausting the national philanthropic reservoir. The data, in so far as they are known, are admitted to be far from complete. They cannot be made complete now, without great and expert labor. That labor could profitably be expended. What the total establishment costs, what it should cost, who should pay, philanthropically, whether contributors give wisely or, if not, whether they can be encouraged to do so—these are all basically important matters and subjects for further exploration. What they suggest though is that the flight to government for aid may not yet be necessary. There are still great private sums, possessed in the aggregate by private citizens of moderate means—not owned by the Foundations or by the great fortunes—which have not been mobilized.

This, furthermore, is a democracy. We have paid heavily to become one. Science which, by universal consent, flourishes best when it is free—that has been the plain teaching, of well on 300 years—need not yet, let us hope, put its neck under the yoke of bureaucratic administrations. If individualism is not dead, and if it does not propose to commit suicide, here is a region in which initiative, thought and organization will yield unprecedented results—and control by bureaucrats may be avoided. Here is an opportunity for democracy to become self-educated.

A Proposal

As this democracy moves away, politically, from the laissez faire of rugged individualism into an area in which government aid becomes necessary and acceptable, it will still be essential to maintain a democratic structure in the scientific establishment. This is what Sir Stafford Cripps, a minister in a Socialist government, maintains must continue to be the method of procedure in Great Britain.

There remains then to be presented briefly a proposal for a democratic plan for the management of science—provided an

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appeal for government moneys becomes unfortunately and unavoidably imperative.

What can be sounder than to follow the general plan of self-government developed in this federal republic? This model has in fact been proposed and is being followed in UNESCO. The plan to handle its own moneys, moneys voted by Congress, has been permitted to the TVA. It is not necessary that the plan now to be described, any more than the reflections and pieces of evidence and suggestions already adduced, should be complete and already in a state of perfection. Much is unknown, much needs to be ferreted out and then studied before a finished scheme can be submitted for judgment. But the stage of improvisation, necessary perhaps under the urgency and duress of war, should be put behind us. We should approach the solution of this problem resolutely and with determination and intelligence as befits responsible men of learning.

The scheme is this. The institutions of learning devoted to disinterested or fundamental research and those conducting applied science as well—governmental, private and industrial—should appoint and send delegates to a constituent assembly of scientists. Preparation for this assembly should be undertaken by a preparatory commission. There will be much to do. We have in the past two years again become familiar with such devices. The constituent assembly, once organized, will be the body of authority in the scientific world. Executive and other committees will be necessary. An officer, possibly the presiding officer, is to be appointed by the President of the United States on recommendation by this Scientific Assembly. Appointment by the President establishes the tie necessary, it seems, in order that the organization may function as a quasi-governmental organ entitled to receive funds secured by taxation. This functionary would receive his instructions from the Scientific Assembly through an Executive Committee. He may be, perhaps he should be, a rotating officer. In addition to other duties, he would prepare and defend the budget before appropriate committees of Congress, representing, or in company with, the Executive Committee.

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It is unnecessary to enter now into a further description of details. The points of importance are that the plan provides proper liaison with government; that it keeps power in the hands of the scientific people who peculiarly understand the conditions favorable for promoting scientific inquiry; that the powers are delegated by the institutions to representatives, and ultimately to an Executive Committee and a Manager. It avoids dictatorship. What takes place is with the consent of the governed. Because power remains at home in the institutions where scientific people stay and dwell, selections of personnel can take place intelligently at home, where men with promising careers are known personally to their colleagues and seniors—not by a central bureaucracy removed far away from contact with inconspicuous but at the same time very competent young men and women.

No matter how good the intentions of administrators and governmental boards, it is not likely they can know what scientific grapes are nearing maturity nor, unless they are in the immediate neighborhood, whether they are ready to be picked. The atomic bomb was not conceived in Washington. It was brought there. To cite penicillin and atabrine is misleading. They are not in this category. The whole world knew that infectious diseases and malaria existed. Penicillin needed merely to be put into mass production—and was. For malaria, drugs already available required only to be tested. These were voices crying out, but no further away than the wilderness. But there *were* voices. They *could* be heard. All that was necessary was that they should be heeded.

The general administrative plan I have suggested is not untried. It is the plan of a non-profit membership corporation, thoroughly familiar in many kinds of organization.

I turn finally to another point—not minor. In any general plan, no form of science, whether physical, medical or social, should be omitted. To omit the social sciences is, on the worst showing, to omit from the most intelligent management those very enterprises from which the country, composed of persons, not soulless mechanisms, stands most to gain. The more rudi-

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mentary, if the social sciences *are* rudimentary, the greater their need to be fostered in the sunlight of scientific discipline and methodology.

It is almost shocking to learn from S. 1850 that the social sciences may enter the sacred precincts of science no further than to make clear how "social science research shall be limited to studies of the impact of scientific discovery on the general welfare and [to] studies required in connection with other projects supported by the Foundation." It is as if the interest of a physician were limited to observing the ultimate effect of poisons administered to his patients, but were not permitted to take part in studying their bodies.

The agitation to secure financial support from government now may yet turn out to be a blessing. So many aspects of the scientific enterprise and of the scientific life need exploration and ventilation. Now they may be. As a by-product of war, this may not be an inconsiderable gain.

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SCIENCE LEGISLATION AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES *

THE object of this brief paper is to present the case for inclusion of support of research in the social sciences in any federal program for support of scientific research in general. There are two principal aspects of the question: first, whether social science should be supported at all and, second, whether it should be included in the same legislation and in the same National Science Foundation as the natural sciences. I should like to answer both questions strongly in the affirmative.

No considerations on the level of political expediency seem to me to be cogent enough to necessitate the explicit exclusion of support of social science research from the functions of a National Science Foundation. A very modest opportunity to prove their place is all that the social sciences should need or request, but there is every reason both in principle and on practical grounds why the door should be opened to them in a modest way. There seems to be no need for a special division of social science in the Foundation, but the function of divisions—both basic science and in applied areas such as public health, public welfare or national defense—should be so defined as to call for the mobilization of all the nation's scientific resources in whatever fields, which can contribute to the purposes of the legislation. But let us return to the question of principle.

There are three fundamental interrelated aspects of the broadest question. In the first place, the urgency of the practical needs for rational control of social processes is so great and so obvious as scarcely to need discussion. Most scientists, as well as other intelligent citizens, would agree that the great problems of our time are not those of the control of nature but of the stability and adequacy of the social order. It is not the urgency

* This paper was given at a Symposium on Science Legislation at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston, December 28, 1946, and has been published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1947.

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of social problems; it is the question of whether the scientific method is capable of making a significant contribution to their solution which needs discussion.

Secondly, science is not a mere isolated technical tool in modern Western society. Its roots penetrate to the deepest levels of our cultural and moral motivations. The understanding of nature in the broadest sense of the total world we live in, including ourselves and our place in it, and the control of natural processes in terms of rational understanding, are values which have been realized in the Western World to a higher degree than anywhere else in history. These values do not apply only to one segregated aspect of our world and life experience—to nature in the narrower sense. In the nature of these values and of their place in society they cannot be so segregated. Our civilization as a whole is deeply committed to the great adventure of rational understanding of man and society, as well as the physical and biological world. Science as a body of technical knowledge and procedures is the most highly developed expression of this fundamental system of attitudes and values of our civilization. The fact that it has developed earlier and farther in such fields as physics, chemistry and biology is more a matter of the inherent difficulties and obstacles in the field of human behavior, than it is of our fundamental interests and values. But the same fundamental motives which make many of our finest minds devote their lives to research in physical science are equally applicable to the social field. The challenge in the latter is even greater because of the greater difficulties and, in certain respects, the greater importance to human life of the consequences.

Thirdly, this fundamental unity of value and attitude toward rational understanding of our world is expressed on the actual level of scientific endeavor. In fact, all science is a fundamental unity. It simply is not possible to draw sharp clear-cut lines between the natural and the social sciences. The unity is not only a unity of fundamental method and outlook, it is a unity of actual shading off of knowledge and its application, of problems and their solutions. There have been in the history of scientific thought and its philosophical border lines many at-

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tempts to extend the specific thought patterns and conclusions of physical and biological science to the social field. These attempts have for the most part failed. It is always dangerous to reach conclusions without careful specific investigation of the facts of the particular field in question. Nevertheless, the justified insistence on the autonomy of the social sciences in this sense —that they have their own empirical subject matter which can be understood only through direct study and not through transfer of conclusions from other fields—should not obscure the equally important fact that this autonomy is relative, that man is an organism, that his behavior is in fact partly, though only partly, understandable in biological terms, and that the senses in which it is biological and those in which it is psychological and sociological are so closely interdependent that it is not in the interest of science to attempt to set up watertight compartments between these different aspects. Each side needs the contributions of the others, and many of the most important problems fall across the line.

There is a further aspect of the unity of the social and the physical sciences in their practical relations to society. We are all familiar with the fact that we live in a technological age. It would be absolutely impossible to operate the complicated technology of modern industry or medicine, for example, without the services of scientifically trained personnel. Furthermore, problems are continually arising which can be solved only by the techniques of scientific research with the personnel and equipment necessary for their use. Over against this, it is a widespread idea that the common man is his own social scientist; that any ordinary intelligent person is qualified to understand the operation of social processes. Even so far as the current situation is concerned, this is very far from the truth. To a very substantial and rapidly increasing degree, the actual functioning of our social order is dependent on a social technology which is in fact applied social science. Technically trained persons are playing a larger and larger part, for instance, in the administrative process, in the adjustment of industrial relations, in the field of communications, in the control functions of the economy as through the central banking system, in the operation

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of foreign trade, and various such fields. Great as it is, the difference between the two aspects is one of degree—not of kind. Furthermore, we live in the kind of society which it becomes increasingly evident can be effectively operated only by more efficient applied social science, not by less or even by letting the present situation stagnate.

It follows from the fundamental unity of natural and social science that their basic needs are equally of the same fundamental order. There seems to be an American tendency in both fields to emphasize the practical and the applied to the detriment of the fundamental development of scientific theory. Adequate support for and motivation of work in the fields of fundamental theory is perhaps the greatest need of science, natural or social. This type of work is the subtlest and most difficult, and cannot be called into being by financial grants alone. It is, however, almost certainly responsive to a general climate of high valuation of its achievements. A society which is afraid of public support of social science is by that token less likely to attract the type of intellectual ability into these fields on which the most fundamental theoretical development of the field will be dependent.

But so-called basic science, with special reference to theory, cannot fruitfully develop in a vacuum; it must be in continual and fruitful interaction with empirical work on many different levels and in many different fields. It may well be that the most important support of basic theoretical work should not come from public sources, but should be primarily the responsibility of the universities. This point of view is not, however, incompatible with the view that the large-scale support of empirical work, shading into many applied fields, should be carried on from public sources. This will give the atmosphere of activity and the large-scale resources for empirical testing and verification of theory which are essential to the further development of theory itself.

Without question the social sciences have been behind the natural in many of their most fundamental aspects of development. One of the most conspicuous symptoms of this has been the extent to which until recently social science has been essentially a library discipline. The last generation has seen a notable

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change in this situation. To a rapidly increasing extent, social scientists have emerged from the library and taken up the direct empirical study of the phenomena about them. The fact that the social sciences have reached this stage of development has created a need for facilities which have the same function as laboratory equipment in the natural sciences. In order, however, to study the larger-scale social phenomena in a significant way, it has become necessary to have facilities even more elaborate and expensive though of a different character from those used in the other fields.

One important recent development of this kind may be cited. Much social generalization is overwhelmingly dependent on adequate statistical information. Most statistical information available to the social sciences in the past has been a by-product of other interests such as those of the census for purposes of determining the voting population, of taxation policies and control policies in the economic field. The significance of the available material for scientific purposes has been sharply limited by the conditions of and the nonscientific interests dictating its collection. Recent developments of sampling technique, however, have made it possible to generalize about large and complex populations from relatively small samples. This in turn has for almost the first time made it feasible to collect statistical data for the specific purpose of testing scientific hypotheses as such. Though sampling has enormously reduced the cost of securing adequate data, nevertheless it remains an exceedingly expensive operation and requires support on a very substantial scale. The possible fruitfulness of this type of work in the social fields increases the need for financial support to a notable degree.

It further follows from the view of the unity of all science which has been stated earlier, that the social, as well as the natural, sciences should, if they are genuine and solid disciplines, produce practical applications of great significance to social welfare. Is there in fact substantial evidence that this is the case? There undoubtedly is, though it must be freely admitted that the results produced are as yet by no means so dramatic nor on an over-all basis so substantial as those in the natural sciences. The war, however, produced a rapid acceleration of significant work

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of practical usefulness, and a few examples of what has been done may help to make the point.

The fact that during the war there was no social science equivalent of the O.S.R.D. has meant that the work done has been much more scattered, and has on the whole not been widely brought to public attention. The first example which may be cited is one which, though it had important wartime applications, has been by no means confined to usefulness in that connection. It is that of the analysis of economic processes in terms of income flow, and the understanding of fluctuations in the state of economic activity as a result of disturbances of this flow. In the period of the great depression, this type of analysis opened the door to intervention in the economy through the supplying of additional purchasing power from government sources. Conversely, in the war and early post-war period, it has provided the theoretical basis of price control policy, without which we would unquestionably have had a much more severe inflationary spiral than has in fact developed. It should be noted that the scientific basis of suggestions for public policy in this field is a matter not only of theoretical analysis, associated particularly with the name of the late Lord Keynes, but also of elaborate statistical analysis of the relevant quantitative factors in the economy, the most significant work being that done in the National Bureau of Economic Research by Dr. Simon Kuznets and his associates.

The opinion of the most qualified economists is that the fundamental barriers to stabilization of the economy do not lie so much in lack of knowledge of the essential economic processes involved as in the difficulty of implementing these through the available political machinery, which again is a human and social problem.

A quite different field of practical application of social science analysis is that of the understanding of the significance of social and cultural differences in adjusting the relationships of peoples whose background is different in this respect. One of the most significant enterprises in this field was the study of Japanese military morale, conducted by Dr. Alexander Leighton, Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn and their colleagues, in the Office of War Informa-

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tion in coöperation with the armed services. These studies formed a basis, in the latter period of the war in the Pacific, for a psychological warfare policy, which had begun before the end to have important practical results, and which certainly could not have been arrived at on the basis of common sense. They also unquestionably had a good deal to do with the policies toward working out the surrender of Japaneses forces without incurring the serious last-ditch resistance so many feared.

Still another important and large-scale example of applied social research was the work of the research branch of the Information and Education Division of the War Department. Their extensive studies of attitudes in the army, using the techniques of statistical sampling and attitude and opinion study, played an important part in solving many practical problems of army administration. Two examples may be cited. On the one hand, this work helped greatly in understanding what measures would be effective and necessary in getting troops in the Southwest Pacific to accept the rather drastic measures which were technically necessary to control malaria. Without this control, it is very doubtful whether American military operations in that area could have succeeded, and securing it was, given the state of medical knowledge, a social not a medical problem. Secondly, it was primarily the studies, by this group, of attitudes toward priority of discharge which were responsible for the major policies of the point system. It was these studies which convinced the General Staff that for morale reasons it was essential to give combat veterans priority in discharge, even though it had seemed to be a great military advantage to utilize European veterans in the Pacific war after conclusion of the war in Europe.[1]

Another most important field in which psychological and social science was of practical use during the war was in selection of personnel for highly specialized functions. Outstanding examples of successful work in this field were the aviation personnel selection studies of the Army Air Corps, and the selection procedure which was adopted in the latter period of the war by

[1] For a fuller discussion of this example, see S. A. Stouffer, "Government and the Measurement of Opinion", *Scientific Monthly*, December 1946.

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the Office of Strategic Services for the selection of personnel for dangerous missions. Many more examples could be cited, but these are sufficient to demonstrate that competently planned and directed social research is in fact capable of producing results of first-rate significance to many practical fields of great importance.

In comparison with the tremendous needs, the results may appear very modest, but this is not the most important fact. The essential fact is that, given competent direction, that is, selection of the best people who are now available, to do the work, and given sufficient resources in the way of personnel and organization, the social sciences can deliver in certain fields results which are of direct and fundamental practical importance. Performance of this character is not as yet typical of the social sciences, but it has appeared in a sufficient number of instances and sufficiently widely distributed over a number of fields so that there can no longer be any doubt of the authenticity of claims that social science is established as a genuine scientific discipline which can produce results far beyond any from common-sense sources.

The essential case for support of the social sciences thus does not rest on their previous record or their present state; it rests on their potentialities. The relevance of the previous record and the present state is in its demonstration that a point has been reached where the potentialities are a matter not merely of hopeful speculation, but of demonstrated actuality. We can be as certain as we can be of anything in this world that, if genuinely able talent and adequate resources are invested in the further development of the social sciences, they have potentialities of development which are far beyond anything which has been concretely imagined.

This is, of course, not in the least to say that there are no dangers in the way. From many points of view, the dangers are serious and, if they are not carefully guarded against, might well prove to be crippling. Too rapid and indiscriminate increase in resources available to these fields might prove more of a handicap than a help. Avoiding embroilment in political issues is certainly more difficult than in the case of the natural

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sciences. The task of developing the potentialities of social science is thus by no means an easy one, but its very difficulty is part of the challenge. A certain modesty, indeed humility, should be central to the whole scientific point of view, and is certainly shared by the best of social scientists as of those of other fields. But with all due humility, many will feel that there is no other path to improvement in our social situation, to the mitigation of conflict, to reducing the danger of war, to the increase of prosperity and welfare, than through the application of careful empirical observation and careful theoretical analysis to the solution of social problems. The scientific point of view is probably the greatest hope of modern society and, if this hope is to be realized, it cannot be confined to one sector of the total field of science.

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UNITED STATES OCCUPATION POLICIES IN JAPAN SINCE SURRENDER*

TO treat adequately the question of United States occupation policies in Japan since surrender, it is necessary to revert to the method by which the United States has determined and continues to determine its general policies for Japan and Korea. A good starting point is February 1944 when the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Occupied Areas Section of the Navy Department requested the Department of State to prepare answers to more than twenty fundamental questions which would arise from our occupation of Japan and Korea, such as the meaning of unconditional surrender, the extent, duration and type of occupation, the position of the Emperor and the abolition of State Shinto. Preliminary studies had already been prepared in the Department of State on many of these subjects, but as a result of the above inquiries definitive departmental policies were required on those fundamental issues with which the United States and its allies would be confronted at the moment of Japan's surrender. The basic policy papers were prepared by the Department of State and submitted to the War and Navy Departments, but preliminary discussions between representatives of these three departments soon revealed that all problems connected with the occupation had not only important political aspects but also military aspects, and that the three departments did not necessarily agree with each other. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (referred to invariably in government circles as SWNCC), composed of an Assistant Secretary from each of the three departments and responsible for coördinating and formulating general policies of this government of concern to those three departments, had already been organized, and on

* This article was prepared as a paper read before a meeting of the American Historical Association in New York, December 30, 1946.

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January 5, 1945 appointed a Subcommittee on the Far East, with representatives from each of the three departments, to formulate policies on the various post-hostility problems in the Far East and, when necessary, to reconcile divergent views within the government. This Subcommittee immediately undertook the task of preparing the basic policy papers on questions arising out of the war with Japan, which after approval by the Subcommittee were then submitted to Top SWNCC and after its approval became United States government policy, unless some paper was of sufficient importance to require the President's concurrence.

In beginning its important and arduous task, the Subcommittee on the Far East relied heavily on the documents referred to above which the Department of State had already transmitted to the War and Navy Departments. Since that time, however, many new problems have arisen, with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and its Subcommittee on the Far East still responsible for the formulation of the policies of this government in reference to the occupation of Japan. When problems arise of special interest to another department, such as Treasury, it is consulted by SWNCC. Consequently, the policy of the United States government toward Japan is the result of a coördinated effort on the part of all concerned departments of the government. The present chairman and State member of SWNCC is General John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas; the War member is Assistant Secretary Petersen; and the Navy Department member is Under Secretary Sullivan.

The occupation policies themselves have followed the lines laid down in the following basic documents:[1] first, the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which defined the terms of surrender; second, the Instrument of Surrender of September 2, 1945, which stipulated complete acceptance and fulfillment of the Potsdam Declaration, unconditional surrender of Japan's armed forces, the carrying out by Japan of all of the Supreme

[1] See "Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress", prepared by the Public Liaison Division of the Department of State, for a complete collection of basic documents relating to the occupation of Japan.

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Commander's orders, and acknowledgment that the Emperor and the Japanese government were subject to the Allied Commander; third, "United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan" of August 29, 1945, which was a consolidation and projection of all previous planning for Japan; and, finally, the Moscow Declaration of Foreign Ministers of December 27, 1945, which provided machinery for Allied participation in the control of Japan, notably the Far Eastern Commission. Instead of describing the contents of these basic policy statements and other subsequent and more detailed policies on the occupation of Japan, we shall attempt to set forth some of the more difficult and basic problems with which our government was confronted in formulating these policies, and to point out the passages in the policy statements pertinent to those problems.

It should be realized at the outset that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and its subcommittees have been responsible for the formulation of policy statements, as distinct from determining how policy should be carried out. Thus, it has been necessary to distinguish between the responsibilities of this government for formulating over-all policy and the responsibility of General MacArthur in Japan for the implementation of policy.

One of the most important and basic problems was the question of how a formula could be developed which, on the one hand, followed our clearly stated policy of unconditional surrender and which, on the other hand, would give the Japanese people and government some indication as to what surrender would mean, so that they would be able to surrender if they wanted to do so. While unconditional surrender did mean the complete capitulation of the enemy, it did not mean the annihilation of the Japanese as a people and the destruction of Japan as a country. So long as the Japanese were unaware of this fact, there was little chance that they would cease fighting until their armed forces had been annihilated as a result of a costly frontal attack against their home islands. If, on the other hand, the Japanese were given a clear indication as to just what unconditional surrender would mean for them, there was

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a chance that they would accept capitulation, and that we and our allies would obtain our objectives while avoiding further heavy casualties.

A second basic question which had to be answered was whether unconditional surrender should be interpreted for Japan, as it was being interpreted for Germany, to mean that we would not recognize the existence of any central governmental machinery or authority. As a practical matter the Allies, and particularly the United States, could not supply the necessary number of trained and qualified personnel to govern Japan effectively after surrender; and the only way to avoid creating a myriad of insoluble problems for our occupational authorities seemed to be to retain the administrative structure of the Japanese government but to place it under our complete control. This solution was possible providing a way could be found by which the purely executive and administrative personnel within the Japanese government could be persuaded to continue in office and to carry on their non-policy-making functions after Japan had been completely defeated.

The Potsdam Declaration was the answer to the first basic question of how we could reiterate our stand of unconditional surrender and at the same time define what this would mean in exact terms. It will be recalled that the Declaration begins with the statement that the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain had met and agreed " that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war ". They then, in the last sections of the Proclamation, stated the terms from which we would not deviate but on which we would accept Japanese capitulation. In further clarification of what was meant by unconditional surrender, the Potsdam Declaration stated that " the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation . . . ." On August 10, 1945, when the Japanese offered to surrender with the understanding that

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Potsdam did not prejudice the prerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign, it was clear that the purpose of the Potsdam Proclamation was going to be achieved.

The United States had decided that it was necessary, as a matter of administrative expediency, to retain the Japanese government and work through it. Consequently, the Potsdam Declaration provided specifically that "the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people", and the Instrument of Surrender was also based on the concept that we recognized a central governmental authority in Japan. The surrender instrument specifically provides that the Japanese government, as a government, shall carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and shall be responsible for carrying out the terms of surrender.

The Japanese administrative structure was kept intact, and individual Japanese coöperation was obtained by use of an Imperial Rescript of September 2, 1945 announcing surrender to the Japanese people. In this rescript the Emperor stated: "We command all our people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out all of the provisions of the Instrument of Surrender and the general orders issued by the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters." This sentence referred particularly to the fifth paragraph of the Instrument of Surrender, which reads: "We hereby command all civil, military and navy officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority." The groundwork was thus laid for the continuance of the Japanese administrative structure and yet at the same time for the possession of supreme authority by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, thus assuring the unconditional surrender of Japan. It will be recalled that in the exchange of notes through the Swiss government on the Japanese request for a clearer definition of the prerogatives of the Japanese Emperor, Secretary Byrnes replied on August 11 that "from the moment of surrender the authority of the

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Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these surrender terms."

Having established the broad policies under which Japan was to surrender, and having determined that the Supreme Commander, while retaining supreme authority, would carry out his task in the occupation of Japan through the instrument of the Japanese government, it became necessary to elaborate more fully the basic initial post-surrender policies of this government for Japan. As intimated above, these were contained in a document prepared by SWNCC, transmitted in substance to General MacArthur on August 29 and approved by the President on September 6, 1945. This document defines the ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, namely, that Japan shall not again become a menace to us or to the peace and security of the world; that eventually there shall be established a peaceful and responsible government in Japan which will respect the rights of other states and which will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; and that, while we desire the Japanese government to conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government, it is not the responsibility of the Allies to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. To obtain these objectives, Japan's sovereignty was to be limited to the four main Japanese islands and such minor outlying islands as might be determined. Japan was to be completely disarmed and demilitarized, and the Japanese were to be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for the fundamental human rights. Furthermore there was to be an opportunity for the evolution of an economy adequate for the peacetime requirements of the Japanese population. The statement contains an amplification of the Potsdam Declaration with reference to Allied authority in Japan and the relationship of the Supreme Commander to the Japanese government, the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan as primary tasks of military occupation, the trial of war criminals, the establishment of individual liberties, the demilitarization

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and democratization of Japanese economy, the resumption of peaceful economic activity, the extraction of reparations, restitution, and the control of international trade and finance. This document has been and still is the basis for our policy toward Japan and serves as the basis for the directives under which General MacArthur has operated.

Another question with which the United States was confronted was how we could share with those of our allies who had actively engaged in the war against Japan the formulation of policies for Japan, and at the same time place the command and control of Japan under a single state to avoid the difficulties and confusions of multiple command. In view of the fact that the United States had borne by far the greatest share of the military and naval operations against Japan, it was obvious that the Supreme Commander should be an American and that he should be directly responsible to the United States government.

This problem was resolved in the first instance by a proposal by the United States of August 21, 1945 for the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission, which should be responsible for making recommendations to the participating governments on the formulation of the policies, principles and standards by which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Instrument of Surrender might be accomplished. This proposal was submitted to the governments of China, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics but was not agreed to by the last named, with the result that the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was established without the participation of the Soviet Union. Agreement was reached, however, by the Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission, with specific policy-making functions, to supplant the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. Composed of eleven nations, namely, China, the USSR, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United States, and meeting in continuous session since February 26, 1946, the Far Eastern Commission is charged with the formulation of " the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obli-

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gations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished", and with the review of directives issued to the Supreme Commander by the United States government or action taken by him involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Under the terms of reference of the Commission, policy decisions of the Commission are transmitted to General MacArthur by the United States government as directives. After the formation of the Commission, therefore, our policies in Japan ceased to be established unilaterally by the United States but came to be subject to the scrutiny of our allies, and, following action by the Commission, became international policies rather than purely American policies. To allow for the fullest possible exchange of views among the eleven participating governments the Commission has met in closed session. Many of the original policies of the United States, however, have been adopted by the Commission.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, whereas at the end of the war and immediately following the surrender of Japan this government was free to establish its own policies for Japan, it is now confronted with the practical task of obtaining approval of the ten other nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission for any change in policy or for any new policy. This situation has necessitated delays in obtaining agreement on such basic questions as peacetime levels of industry for Japan and the reparations issue, but at the same time has had the inestimable value of making the formulation of occupation policies for Japan an international responsibility. Difficult though it may be at times to attain international agreement on complicated questions connected with the Japanese occupation, it would be even more difficult and disastrous for the United States to ignore the desires and wishes of our allies.

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IV REVINDICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL EQUALITY OF STATES, 1871-1914 I*

THE claim of European statesmen, representing the Great Powers, to act on behalf of Europe, goes back to the diplomatic negotiations anteceding the Congress of Vienna. At the meeting of the Congress of Chatillon, February 5, 1814, the representatives of the four allied Powers declared that they acted not "*comme uniquement envoyés par les quatre cours de la part desquelles ils sont munis de pleins pouvoirs, mais comme se trouvant chargés de traiter de la paix avec la France au nom de l'Europe ne formant qu'un seul tout. . . .*"[1]

It has been one of the most important components of the traditional conception of legal equality of states that international legislation obligates states which are affected only with their consent, and that votes of all sovereign states in international legislative procedure are equal in law.[2] After the downfall of Napoleon I, this right of smaller states to participate in international legislation—particularly on territorial but also on other problems such as navigation on the Danube, passage through the Dardanelles, protection of religious minorities, recognition and neutralization of states—was persistently violated by actions of the Great Powers acting as a group (European Concert). These actions were accompanied by the expressed and widely held, although not undisputed, conviction of many contemporary statesmen that the decisions of the Great

* This is the third in the series on the equality of states. The first appeared in December 1945, and the second in March 1946.

[1] Karl Strupp, *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechtes und der Diplomatie* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1924-1929), I, 699; Charles Dupuis, *Le Droit des Gens et les rapports des Grandes Puissances avec les autres états avant le Pacte de la Société des Nations* (Paris, 1929), p. 44.

[2] L. Oppenheim, *International Law* (5th ed., edited by H. Lauterpacht, London and New York, 1935-1937), I, 221 *et seq.*

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Powers, considered as "mandatories of Europe",[3] were legally binding upon the smaller states. As late as in 1859, the Earl of Malmesbury, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, referred to the claim of Sardinia, as one of the antagonists, to sit in the Congress, which had been proposed to settle the affairs of Italy:

> . . . Your Lordships will recollect that the *Russian* government proposed that the five great Powers (Austria, England, France, Prussia, Russia) should alone sit in Congress. This has been the *custom of Europe for a great many years, when questions affecting the great public law of Europe* have been discussed; and there appeared to none of us any reason why we should depart from the usual practice, and make an exception on the present occasion by calling in any other power to assist us. But, my Lords, it at the same time seemed to me, inasmuch as we are going to discuss social and political questions of the greatest interest to Italians that the Italian States ought somehow or other to be heard in the Congress . . . . I therefore proposed that they should be invited and admitted whenever *we wished* to hear them. . . . [4]

The French statesman, G. Hanotaux, went even so far as to declare in the French Chamber that the Great Powers as European Concert were "*Le seul tribunal et la seule autorité devant lesquels tout le monde peut et doit s'incliner.*" [5]

What in 1814 had been a legal *usurpation* became later a widely held, though not generally accepted, legal opinion. It is only natural that such a persistent practice of the Great Powers, implying a legal position superior to that of the other members of the international society, caused a few international lawyers to doubt the validity of the traditional principle of legal equality of states. T. J. Lawrence stated that "the six Great Powers have by modern International Law an authority superior to that of other states . . . a primacy among their fellows."

[3] The Earl of Granville used the term in 1880 in referring to the occupation of Lebanon in 1861. *British and Foreign State Papers* [hereinafter cited: *B. & F. S. P.*], LXXII (1880-1881), 301, 310.

[4] Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, Third Series, CLIII (1859), col. 1836-1837.

[5] Strupp, *op. cit.*, I, 700.

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He also predicted that the European Concert was probably destined to develop into a Supreme Court of International Appeal.[6] James Lorimer was even more opposed to the principle of legal equality of states than Lawrence. He wrote that "the equality of States and their absolute independence have been steadily repudiated by history" and that "it is a chimera as unrealisable as the union of the head of a woman with the tail of fish."[7] The German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, expressed similar ideas, giving them a coloration in conformity with his Prussian brand of conservative political philosophy: "The system of the society of nations assumes more and more an aristocratic nature."[8] The nearly unanimous opinion, however, of writers on international law of this period strongly upheld the principle of legal equality of states.[9]

At the time of the First World War the literature on international law had retained its old positive attitude toward the principle of the legal equality of states.[10] Even T. J. Lawrence, who—as has been shown—was one of the opponents of the principle of legal equality of states, had moderated his view.[11]

It is often very difficult to decide *when* certain usages in the practice of states become international law. That may partly explain why the literature on international law, which is generally more favorable to the legal principle of equality of states than are the actions of governments, refused to draw the conclusions accepted by Lawrence and Lorimer from the practices of the European Concert. But the predicted perfection and continuation of the assertion by the Great Powers, in the decades

[6] T. J. Lawrence, *Essays on Some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law* (Cambridge, England, 1885), pp. 230, 232, 233.

[7] James Lorimer, *The Institutes of the Law of Nations* (Edinburgh and London, 1883-1884), I, 28, 44; II, 194.

[8] Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politik* (Leipzig, 1897-1898), I, 42.

[9] Shortage of space makes inadvisable the citation of twenty-three textbooks on international law written between 1847 and 1887, which were examined and have borne out this statement.

[10] The examination of about twenty standard works on international law, which were written between 1903 and 1916, but not cited here because of shortage of space, upholds this evaluation of the relevant literature.

[11] Compare T. J. Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law* (6th ed., Boston, 1915), pp. 268, 269, 275, 277, 278, with p. 242 of the 1895 edition.

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between the Franco-Prussion War and the First World War, of rights superior to those possessed by the smaller states would have made nearly impossible any further resistance on the part of international jurists to the recognition of the superiority of the Great Powers as based on customary international law. A practice of states, uniformly adopted for a period of a hundred years, would have rendered rather general the conviction of statesmen like the Earl of Malmesbury and of others, that the European Concert was performing its prerogatives on the basis of existing international law, thereby establishing beyond any doubt the two factors (clear and continuous practice of states and conviction that this practice is legally obligatory or right) which create customary international law.[12] But the prediction of Lawrence was not realized.

In the years before the outbreak of the First World War, hardly any statesman, no matter how much his policy was opposed to the principle, dared to come out openly against the doctrine that all states were legally equal.[13] Available expressions of opinion on the subject by contemporary statesmen either affirm the principle of legal equality of states or at least pay lip service to it. Elihu Root, in expressing his belief in the legal equality of states, only followed the traditional American viewpoint, going back to the Declaration of Independence.[14] The numerous contemporary statements on the subject, by representatives of smaller states, vigorously espousing the principle of legal equality,[15] may be explained away as dictated by self-interest but this would overlook the fact that they had become more frequent, as well as more outspoken, than the rather timid protests of the smaller states in the earlier period.[16]

[12] Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, I, 25.

[13] Max Huber, *Die Gleichheit der Staaten* (Stuttgart, [1908 ?]), pp. 90, 100, 101.

[14] U. S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1906 (Washington, 1909), I, 129; Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York, 1938), I, 481.

[15] See for example, the statements at the second Peace Conference at The Hague. James Brown Scott (ed.), *The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1907* (New York, 1920-1921), I, 587; II, 14, 15, 153, etc.

[16] France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques* [hereinafter cited: *Documents Diplomatiques*], *Affaires d'Orient, Congrès de Berlin* (Paris, 1878), pp. 70, 92, 135, etc.

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The international atmosphere had changed since 1859. This was evident in the fact that assertions by smaller nations of the legal equality of states were not contradicted by the delegates of the Great Powers and that whenever the latter expressed their viewpoint on this question, they at least paid lip service to the principle of equality.[17] Indeed, the principle of legal equality of states had become so popular at the time of the First World War that both sides in this conflict referred in diplomatic papers to the principle as part of their war aims.[18]

The Decay of the European Concert in the Period Between the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the First World War

To begin with, one has to admit that the difference in power, which is most frequently mentioned as an objection to the existence of legal equality among states, not only distinguishes the great from the smaller states, but creates divisions among the latter as well. Only the relationship between the Great Powers and all the other states will be dealt with here, because, if the Great Powers are not legally superior to the other states as a result of their *immensely superior* strength, no legal inequality can possibly be based on the much smaller differences in strength between other classes of countries. In addition, many other factors will be omitted from our investigation such as civilizational level, religion of population, faithfulness to international obligations, and so on, which may, and at times did, affect the legal position of states. Furthermore, the diplomatic history of the western hemisphere will be left out, not only because it has been the subject of a recent study,[19] but also because it had been removed by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine from the influence of the European Concert. Europe,

[17] See for example, the speech of Leon Bourgeois of October 5, 1907, at the fifth meeting of the First Commission of the Second Peace Conference at The Hague. Scott, *op. cit.*, II, 90.

[18] Reply of German Government of September 21, 1917 to the Pope's Peace Appeal, *American Journal of International Law*, XI, supplement (1917), 219; Reply of the United States of August 27, 1917 to the Pope's Peace Appeal, *ibid.*, p. 217.

[19] Roberto Herrera, "Evolution of Equality of States in the Inter-American System" in POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, March 1946, LXI, 90-119.

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Africa and Asia, with little stress on the Far East, where, at least from the end of the nineteenth century on, the influence and strength of the vitally interested United States formed a strong obstacle to the full effectiveness of European Great Power politics, establish the geographic limits of our investigation. The actions of the European Concert practically never reached beyond the limits of Europe and the Turkish possessions in Africa and Asia.

What might be called the decay of the European Concert did not become conspicuous until after the Congress of Berlin of 1878; but, for our purposes, not that year but the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 has been accepted as an historical mark dividing the period of the growth of the Pentarchy (which at the end had become a Hexarchy) from the epoch of its decay. This war, which, to the surprise of many contemporaries, had revealed an important change in the European balance of power, brought about by the unification of Germany, simultaneously set in motion political convulsions which necessarily weakened the European Concert and which at least partially were responsible for splitting Europe into two armed camps. It is, however, readily conceded that historical developments can only very unsatisfactorily be delimited or divided by any single event or definite date.

As a matter of fact, historical forces—like modern nationalism, leading to the unification of Germany and Italy and the destruction of the Austrian and Turkish empires, which were at the root of the disturbances of the European equilibrium on which the European Concert rested—were already very active throughout the whole period from the Congress of Vienna to the Franco-Prussian War.

Legal Equality of States in International Legislation

Equal participation in, or at least consent to, international legislation by which they are to be bound is one of the most essential features of the usual conception of the legal equality of states as derived from their sovereignty. Bilateral agreements are outside of the scope of our examination, because hardly any jurist or statesman of this or the preceding period claimed that any one state, no matter how powerful it was,

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could impose any new obligations—in contradistinction to making claims on the basis of already existing international law—on any other fully sovereign state, no matter how small it was, without its consent. It was, however, irrelevant by what means the agreement has been obtained.[20] Nevertheless, at least limited rights to legislate for the European community of states, with binding force on states which were either not called upon to consent or not admitted to full and equal participation in the legislative process, have frequently been claimed by statesmen and jurists for the European Powers *acting as a group*. An analysis of international congresses and conferences as to the application of the principle of legal equality of states is, therefore, necessary.

The international conferences (congresses), in terms of functions they were called upon to perform, may generally be divided into three groups: (1) *Political Conferences;* (2) *Conferences called to codify international law*, such as the two Peace Conferences at the Hague of 1899 and 1907; (3) *Conferences dealing with economic questions*, including shipping on rivers.

Only three important factors will generally be scrutinized: (1) Which states were called upon to participate in a given conference (congress) and why were they chosen? (2) How far was the procedure of the conference (congress) consistent with the principle of equality of states? (3) Were the treaty obligations resulting from the decisions of the conference equal for great and small Powers alike?

A. *Political Conferences (Congresses)*

According to the opinion of some writers equal representation of all interested states was recognized in only a few of the political conferences in contradistinction to the state practice followed in the case of nonpolitical conferences.[21] For our observation, the following three conferences (congresses) were selected as representing different types of international diplomatic meetings: the Congress of Berlin, 1878; the Conference of Berlin, 1884-85; the Conference of Algeciras, 1906.

[20] See, however, Hans Kelsen, *Peace through Law* (Chapel Hill, 1944), p. 38.

[21] Edwin De Witt Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law* (Cambridge, 1920), pp. 281, 282.

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1. *The Congress of Berlin, 1878*

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 offers one of the most extreme cases of the concerted action of the Great Powers, taking and carrying out decisions affecting smaller nations without their consent.[22]

The formal invitation to the Congress, which was issued by the German government, expressly described the participating Powers as the *signatories of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871.* Prince Bismarck, at the opening session on June 13, 1878, also referred to this legal basis of the selection of the participating Powers.[23] In fact, the limitation of participation in a congress for the amendment of a multilateral treaty to its signatories can, by itself, hardly be considered a violation of the legal equality of states. But a closer observation of the opinions of the contemporary statesmen of the Great Powers, as well as of the small states, shows that, in determining the participating countries, the principle of equality was of no particular importance. On the contrary, the Great Powers repeatedly expressed their conviction that they legitimately represented Europe and that *in this capacity* they were entitled to decide the political problems that arose as a result of the Russo-Turkish war. Several diplomatic documents of the Austrian and British governments contain this idea. Austria desired "*un mandat de l'Europe*", to be granted by the Great Powers, for the reëstablishment of the equilibrium in the Balkans by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lord Beaconsfield calls the view of the Congress "*les vues de l'Europe*" and the French Foreign Minister Waddington refers to the Congress as "*les Représentants de l'Europe*".[24]

Prince Bismarck reserves to the Great Powers, identifying them with Europe, the exclusive rights "*de sanctionner l'indépendance*" of states, which with reference to Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania was an important subject on the agenda of

[22] Dickinson calls congresses and conferences of this type "supernational" because they have "several marks of a rudimentary supernational authority." *Op. cit.*, p. 292.

[23] *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Orient, Congrès de Berlin* (1878), pp. 53, 65, 67.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 33, 40, 41, 50, 205, 143.

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the Congress of Berlin. The Russian representative, Count Shouvaloff, shared in this respect the opinions of his colleagues. In a more general way, Alexander Caratheodory Pasha, the principal Turkish representative at the Congress, recognizes "*l'ouvre de paix et de conciliation*" as a proper mission of the Great Powers. In addition, the delegates of two smaller states, the Rumanian Cogalniceano and the Greek Delyannis, who were admitted to the Congress only to present their opinions on problems of particular concern to them, also considered Europe and the "Great Powers" as interchangeable terms.[25]

At the first session, the Marquis of Salisbury raised the question of admitting Greece, which at that time Great Britain tried to build up as counterweight against Slavic expansion. This incident, although accompanied with very limited success, clearly shows that the interests of the Great Powers themselves are very often opposed to the exclusion of smaller Powers from participation in international legislation, and thereby frequently form an important force in favor of the principle of equality of states.[26]

In addition to the signatories of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, who alone enjoyed full participation in the Berlin Congress, three smaller states were permitted to express their views on questions of interest to them "*toutes les fois que les Plénipotentiaires* [of the Great Powers] *le jugeront opportun.*" No distinction was made between Greece and Rumania, who were admitted under the same conditions, although Count Shouvaloff pointed out the legal difference between Greece, an independent state, and Rumania, whose independence had not yet been recognized by the Great Powers. Persia, at her request, was granted practically the same right as Greece and Rumania, although her position as a non-Christian state in the system of international law as conceived at the time of the Berlin Congress was at least very doubtful. On the other hand, states vitally affected by the decisions of the Congress, such as Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro, were not even permitted to appear before

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 166, 78, 237, 245, 135, 162, 165, 152.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

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the Congress and express their views.[27] While Bulgaria was created by the Berlin Congress and Serbia undoubtedly had been under the suzerainty of the Sultan before 1878, Montenegro for a long period had claimed her independence, which had been recognized by a "firman" of 1799[28] and maintained against all Turkish attempts to enforce claims of suzerainty. The Treaty of Berlin (Article XXVI) gave the sanction of the European Concert to the independence of Montenegro, thereby again asserting the claim of the Great Powers to the exclusive right "*de sanctionner l'indépendance*".

Prince Bismarck, at the first session of the Berlin Congress, was elected president in accordance with a diplomatic usage providing that the office of president devolves upon the principal delegate of the country where the congress or conference meets. The appointment of the secretariat of the Congress also followed the usual diplomatic practice, according to which the president made the appointments, which were then approved by the Congress. As in our case, a member of the diplomatic staff of the nationality of the president usually became principal secretary, and a French official "*adjoint au secrétaire*" to insure the grammatical correctness of the diplomatic documents, which were drawn up in the French language.[29]

The commissions of the Congress were equally composed of representatives of all fully participating states.[30]

The rule of unanimity of decisions was not disputed. But Prince Bismarck, at the first session, while he expressly recognized that the minority was under no obligation to accept the decisions of the majority, suggested, and the Congress unan-

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 76, 155, 156, 209.

[28] "Montenegro", Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Peace Handbooks* No. 19 (London, 1920), pp. 13, 18; Jean Vaclik, *La Souveraineté du Montenegro* (Leipzig, 1858), p. 125.

[29] *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Orient, Congrès de Berlin*, pp. 66, 67; Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Peace Handbooks*, No. 151 (London, 1920), pp. 16, 62, 64.

[30] *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Orient, Congrès de Berlin: Commission de Rédaction*, pp. 119, 130; *Commission de Délimitation des Frontières*, pp. 150, 151.

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imously assented, that a decision of the majority should on minor questions of procedure ("*concernant la procédure, sans toucher au fond*") be considered as valid as long as the outvoted minority did not register a formal protest.

The protocols of the Congress were signed in the usual order of the French alphabet.[31] While each Power retained one original of the Treaty of Berlin, each plenipotentiary, in accordance with established diplomatic procedure, signed his own copy first, while the other plenipotentiaries signed in the French alphabetical order of the names of the countries they represented.[32]

The consent of the states not participating in the Congress, but affected by its decisions, was not requested. The president was, however, authorized to cummunicate *officiously* to interested states Congress decisions which had been taken in regard to them, after the treaty had been signed by the six Powers and Turkey. Its full context was *officially* to be sent to all affected countries only after the exchange of ratifications had taken place.[33]

Particularly by adherence to the rule of unanimity of decision, the Congress of Berlin upheld the *equality* of all fully participating states (equality of status), while it denied the equality of all other states which were affected by the Congress decisions but were not called upon to take part in or even to consent to the agreement resulting from the Congress.

In the case of Turkey, however, the principle of unanimity of votes, although formally not violated, was repeatedly stretched. At the Berlin Congress the Ottoman Empire was definitely not a political equal of the six Great Powers. Prince Bismarck several times cut short the Turkish representatives. On one occasion he reminded Caratheodory Pasha that it was not in the interest of Turkey "to create difficulties in the progress of the discussions." When the Turkish delegates, on the basis of their instructions, refused their consent to the occupation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar by

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 80, and *passim*.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 295. Austria-Hungary, K. u. K. Ministerium des Äussern, *Actenstücke in orientalischen Angelegenheiten* (Wien, 1878), p. 165.

[33] *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Orient, Congrès de Berlin*, pp. 266, 155.

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Austria, they were reminded that the Congress decisions form one entity and that the Porte could not accept the advantages while rejecting the disadvantages accruing to her from the work of the Congress. Bismarck expressed his conviction that the Turkish government would send new instructions to its delegates. He ended by saying that "*le Protocole reste ouvert pour les recevoir.*" A strict application, in this case, of the principle of unanimity would have meant the rejection of the proposal on the occupation of the Turkish provinces by Austria-Hungary.[34]

The Congress of Berlin imposed various obligations on Bulgaria, which remained under the suzerainty of the Sultan, as well as on Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania, whose independence was recognized without providing for corresponding obligations on the part of the six Great Powers. Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania and Turkey were bound to grant equal civil and political rights to their religious minorities and guarantee freedom of religion, while Russia, which acquired Bessarabia, undertook no such obligation in regard to the inhabitants of her new province.

Consular jurisdiction was retained in Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia, Serbia and Rumania. The choice of a prince by the Bulgarian people was to be confirmed not only by the Sultan but also by the Great Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the six Great Powers could be chosen. Turkey's sovereignty over her territory was restricted in various other ways. Several boundary commissions were provided for, without allowing for participation of immediately interested states. Montenegro was subjected to several restrictions in favor of Austria-Hungary.[35]

2. *The Conference of Berlin, 1884-1885*

The African explorer, Henry M. Stanley, acting as agent of the *Association Internationale du Congo,* which had been organized in Brussels in November 1878, founded stations on the Congo and its tributaries and made treaties with numerous native chiefs. By 1884, twenty-two such stations had been

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 92, 140, 142.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 275-295.

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established, and the territory within the great bend of the river was largely acquired for the *Association Internationale du Congo,* which organization, in fact, was for all practical purposes identical with Leopold II, King of the Belgians. These activities, naturally, aroused the jealousy of various European Powers interested in Africa. France extended her influence along the northern banks of the Congo, and Portugal had advanced claims to the Congo on the ground of its discovery centuries ago. England, which for a long time had been unwilling to accept Portuguese claims, because of the inefficiency and corruption of the Portuguese colonial administration, changed her policy and concluded a convention with Portugal on February 26, 1884, recognizing Portuguese sovereignty over both banks of the river. On April 22, 1884, the United States recognized the *Association Internationale du Congo* as a sovereign state. Germany became the first European Great Power which followed the American example, on November 8, 1884. Before the Berlin Conference closed its sessions (February 26, 1885), Great Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Netherlands, Spain, France, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Denmark, Belgium and even Portugal had granted recognition to the new African state. King Leopold II very skillfully exploited the jealousies of the European Powers to his own advantage. He won over France by conceding her the right of preëmption "if through unforeseen circumstances, the Association was compelled to sell its possessions."[36] But Germany, which already in May through its ambassador in London had announced its objections to the Anglo-Portuguese agreement on the Congo Basin, succeeded in inducing France to join in exerting pressure for a settlement of the Congo problem by an international conference. At the end of June 1884 Great Britain gave in and informed the Portuguese government that "it would be useless" to proceed to the ratification of the agreement of February 26, 1884.[37]

[36] Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty* (London, 1909), III, 1004; II, *passim.*

[37] Great Britain Parliament, *Parliamentary Papers* [hereinafter cited: *Parliamentary Papers*], 1884-1885, LV, "Africa", No. 4, p. 9, and No. 7, pp. 1, 2, 3. *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires du Congo et de l'Afrique Occidentale* (Paris, 1884), p. 58.

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Germany, in agreement with France, in October 1884 issued an invitation to the Conference in Berlin to deal with the problems of the Congo Basin; the invitation was addressed to the governments of Belgium, Spain, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Portugal and the United States. Three Great Powers (Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary) were not included in the original invitation, which, however, expressed the need for participation of all the Great Powers and of the Scandinavian countries to secure general consent to the resolutions of the Conference. In addition to the countries included in the original invitation, all other European countries with the exception of the smallest (dwarf) states (for example, Liechtenstein, Monaco), of the Balkan countries (but not excepting Turkey), and of Switzerland, which traditionally did not take part in political conferences, were *later* called upon to participate in the Conference.

The list of the countries which were originally invited included all those primarily concerned with the commerce of West Africa and the Congo Basin. Italy had, only a few years before, begun to be interested in colonial policy by acquiring territory in East Africa. In fact, at the second meeting of the Conference, on November 19, 1884, Count Launay, the Italian representative, expressly declared that "Italy has no territorial possessions on the West Coast of Africa," that "her careful attention is directed rather in other directions," and that her "commercial and maritime connections in the districts of the west and of the centre of Africa are only commencing." [38]

As is clearly seen, no distinction was made between great and other Powers in their right to take part in the international legislation dealing with problems on the agenda of the Conference. The exclusion of the European dwarf states (Liechtenstein, Monaco), Switzerland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and the Latin American countries can easily be explained by their complete lack of interest in the matters in question and also by their lack of sovereignty (Bulgaria). The failure to invite other African and Asiatic countries would at that time hardly have been considered a violation of the principle of equality of states, which, according to the prevailing

[38] *B. & F. S. P.*, LXXV (1883-1884), 1018, 1019.

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conception of international law, applied only to states within the sphere of European-Christian civilization.[39]

All states which were invited took part on an equal footing. Whenever any distinction was made at all, between them, it was based on the *degree* of their interests and not on their qualification as great or small Powers.

The formal constitution of the Conference, at its first meeting on November 15, 1884, followed established diplomatic usages, but, in contradistinction to the procedure adopted at the Congress of Berlin, a Frenchman was appointed as secretary in the first place and not merely as "*adjoint au secrétaire*".[40] The rule of unanimity of votes and the principle of equal voting rights (one vote for each state) for all participating states was strictly adhered to.

Only a few deviations of very small importance from the otherwise strictly observed principle of equal participation of *all* invited states can be noticed. At its second meeting, on November 19, 1884, a commission was appointed by the Conference to define the meaning of the phrase "*territoires constituant le Bassin du Congo et ses affluents*", as used by the draft of a "Declaration relating to Freedom of Commerce in the Basin of the Congo and its Mouth," the commission to be composed, "in addition to the German Plenipotentiaries, of all the Plenipotentiaries accredited by the States *most directly interested*, who were comprised in the first invitation to the Conference; that is to say, the Representatives of Germany, Belgium, Spain, United States of America, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, and Portugal." The member states of the commission were selected by their *interest in the problem* on the agenda of the Conference and not by their position as great or small Powers. In fact, one half of the excluded states were Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia). The plenipotentiaries of the eight members of the commission alone were to have *the right of discussion* in its meetings, their assistant delegates and one of the assistant delegates of each Power, not represented on the commission, being entitled to be *present*

[39] Exception for Turkey, Art. VII of Paris Peace Treaty of 1856; L. Oppenheim, *International Law* (London, 1908), I, p. 33.

[40] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1884-1885, LV, "Africa", No. 4, p. 9.

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at its sessions. At the third meeting of the Conference, however, on November 27, 1884, the distinction between states most directly interested and other states was dropped in the composition of the commission, and it was decided that every member was to have an equal right to be present at the meetings if he liked or to send a representative to it. This change of mind was due to the fact that difficulties arose in the acceptance of the recommendations of the commission by the plenary meeting of the Conference, and a part of them had to be referred back to the commission. On another occasion the "Commission charged to examine the Projects of Acts of Navigation for the Congo and the Niger" appointed a subcommittee consisting of delegates of Germany, France, Belgium, England, Portugal, for a "previous elaboration" of the two drafts, "on account of the *technical* and often delicate nature of the subject." All five countries serving on the subcommittee were among the eight originally invited states. The three other states (Spain, Netherlands and the United States) not included in the subcommittee were definitely less interested in the problems of the Congo Basin than the countries which were represented on the subcommittee.

One may therefore distinguish: (1) *states with major interests* in the problems of the Congo Basin: France, Germany, England, Portugal, Belgium; (2) *states less interested* than the former countries but still with important interests in the problems of the Conference: Spain, Netherlands, and the United States; (3) finally, *states which had only relatively unimportant* interests in West Africa and were therefore not originally invited, but were included in a later stage of the preliminary diplomatic negotiations: Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and Turkey. The first two groups were included in the original invitation because they were "most directly interested." But these distinctions were of little legal importance.[41] Participation in international affairs in accordance with the degree of interests of the states involved can be considered reconcilable with the legal equality of states.

Otherwise, the principle of equal participation of all conference states was strictly adhered to. The protocols were signed

[41] *Ibid., passim.*

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in the alphabetical order of the French alphabet; but the representative of Germany, as host country, always signed last, in contradistinction to the Congress of Berlin where the German representatives signed the protocol first in accordance with the order of the French alphabet. Each plenipotentiary, however, signed his own copy first.[42]

The idea of equality of rights of all commercial nations in the Congo Basin, as expressed by the Conference president, Prince Bismarck, in the opening session and by the British representative, Sir Edward Malet, at the same meeting, actually dominated the decisions of the Conference which were formulated in the *Acte Général* and signed on February 26, 1885.[43]

3. *The Conference of Algeciras, 1906*

At the end of the nineteenth century Morocco was the last independent state of North Africa. The weakness of the Sherifian Empire, its geographic position together with its economic opportunities made it a natural object of international diplomatic conflicts. England and France, as well as Spain, had old and important interests in Morocco, while the newer colonial and commercial ambitions of Germany and Italy caused them to become very active in the diplomatic intrigues which developed over the Moroccan question. France had been a neighbor of Morocco since its military expedition to Algeria in 1830. Great Britain had the largest share of Moroccan trade, and her policy required that Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, should not be occupied by a strong European Power. France, which planned an economic and political penetration, succeeded in buying off all rivals except Germany.

In 1902, France and Italy arranged not to interfere with each other in Tripoli and Morocco.[44] An agreement of April 8, 1904 brought a settlement of the British-French antagonism in Morocco and Egypt (*Entente Cordiale*). While the published articles of this compact bound the two governments not to "alter the political status" of either Egypt or Morocco, secret provisions, not made public until 1911, promised mutual assis-

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 13 and *passim*; *B. & F. S. P.*, LXXVI (1884-1885), 20.

[43] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1884-1885, LV, "Africa", No. 4, pp. 9, 11, 304 *et seq.*

[44] André Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algéciras* (Paris, 1909), p. 61.

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tance in seeking reforms in either country if England and France were to find "themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco." Article III of the secret part of the agreement said that "Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta and other présides should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain."[45] By a secret convention of October 3, 1904, France and Spain described the line of demarcation between the French and Spanish spheres of influence in Morocco.[46] Germany, however, was ignored, France even failing to communicate officially to Germany the public convention of April 8, 1904.[47] When the international position of France was weakened by the defeats of Russia in Manchuria, the German emperor made his well-known visit to Tangier on March 31, 1905, challenging French policy by his famous speech: "*J'espère que, sous le* souveraineté *du Sultan, un Maroc libre restera ouvert à la concourrence pacifique de toutes les nations, sans monopole et sans annexion sur le pied d'une égalité absolue.... Je suis décidé à faire tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir pour sauvegarder efficacement les intérêts de l'Allemagne au Maroc....*"[48] One cannot help noticing how clearly this case shows that the dissensions of the Great Powers are frequently important factors in favor of the equality of states. By the German action the Sultan of Morocco was encouraged to reject French proposals for reforms and demanded that they should be placed on the agenda of an international conference. France had to give in. After preliminary diplomatic negotiations, Germany and France agreed on the program of the Conference, and in October 1905 the Sultan accepted the program and Algeciras in Spain as the meeting place. After all the other Powers to be invited had consented to the agenda, the Conference, on January 16, 1906, met on invitation of the Sultan of Morocco,[49] addressed to all signatories

[45] *B. & F. S. P.*, CI (1907-1908), 1058.

[46] *B. & F. S. P.*, CII (1908-1909), 432, 433.

[47] *Das Staatsarchiv*, LXXIII (Leipzig, 1907), 196.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 189, 190, 191.

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of the Convention of Madrid of 1880 for the Settlement of the Right of (diplomatic) Protection of Morocco.[50]

This reference to the signatories of the Madrid Convention of 1880 had the effect that all states which already at that time had diplomatic relations with the Sultan of Morocco, and thereby qualified as interested in the affairs of the North African country, were included in the invitation. Actually, all five countries which had major interests in or showed important ambitions in regard to Morocco were invited: France, Germany, Spain, Great Britain, Italy and *Morocco.* In addition, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United States, in their status as parties to the Madrid Convention, took part.

The United States, at any rate, had small direct interest in the solution of the Moroccan question, except in so far as it touched upon the problem of preserving world peace.[51] Two parties to the Madrid Convention, however, did not take part: Norway, which shortly before (October 1905) had dissolved its union with Sweden, and Denmark.

The selection of a meeting place outside of the territory of the inviting Power (Morocco) was not usual. The contemporary civilizational level of the Sultanate may explain this. A further element in the selection was the proximity of Algeciras, which is located on the Bay of Gilbraltar, to Morocco. As usual, the Spanish First Plenipotentiary, Duke of Almodovar del Rio, as delegate of the host country, was elected president of the Conference at its first meeting on January 16, 1906. The appointment of the secretariat followed the procedure and principles outlined in our discussion of the Berlin Congress, and therefore was in accordance with diplomatic practice.[52]

The principle of unanimity and equality of votes was not contested. On one occasion, at the plenary session of March 3, 1906, the British delegate, Sir Arthur Nicholson, acting in accord with the French delegation, proposed to place the question

[50] *B. & F. S. P.*, LXXI (1879-1880), 639 *et seq.*

[51] Jessup, *op. cit.*, II, 59; Allan Nevins, *Henry White* (New York, 1930), p. 263.

[52] Austria-Hungary, K. u. K. Ministerium des Äussern, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke und Documente über die Internationale Konferenz von Algeciras* (Wien, 1906), pp. 41 and 42.

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of the organization of the Moroccan police on the agenda of the committee meeting to be held on March 5, 1906. Because of German objection to the British proposal the president of the Conference asked each delegation for its opinion on the subject. A *majority* of the delegations expressed themselves in favor of the British motion, while the German and Austrian representatives opposed it. On the basis of this majority vote the British proposal was considered as accepted. The German and Austrian delegations did not protest.[53] This incident seems to show that the voting rules, followed by the Congress of Berlin, were considered valid by the participants in the Conference of Algeciras. But apart from the case just described, no voting in a technical sense took place at the Conference,[54] although the protocol (*procès-verbal*) refers to several recommendations, for example, on religious tolerance and on the gradual abolition of slavery, as *unanimously* adopted by the Conference.[55] At any rate, the procedure adopted to ascertain the opinions of the Conference delegates, no matter whether it is called voting in a technical sense or not, does not show any special privileges for the Great Powers.

The Moroccan delegates, although no one openly disputed their rights, were under permanent pressure to give in to the wishes of the Conference. When finally they refused to sign the *Acte Général*, the signatory Powers engaged, on April 7, 1906, by an additional protocol, to unite their efforts to obtain the ratification (*intégrale*) of the entire Act by Morocco and charged the Italian Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Tangier to undertake the "necessary" *démarches* to this effect. These diplomatic steps, of course, proved successful when the Sultan by imperial rescript of June 18, 1906 ratified ("*intégralement*") the *Acte Général* of Algeciras.[56]

The committee of the Conference charged with the preliminary examination of the questions on the agenda was a committee of the whole composed of *all* delegates. At its first

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-169.

[54] Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Peace Handbooks* No. 151, p. 5.

[55] Austria-Hungary, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke ... Konferenz von Algeciras* pp. 273 *et seq.*

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 443, 448.

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meeting it appointed a drafting committee, which consisted of delegates of Spain, France, Germany, Italy and Morocco. All countries which had shown greater interest in the diplomatic intrigues about Morocco were represented on this committee, excepting Great Britain, which had the most important commercial interests; but no preference was shown for the Great Powers as such. The drafting body was enlarged at the second meeting of the full committee to include a Russian, a Belgian, and a second Moor; at its fourth meeting, by addition of a Portuguese delegate; and at its sixth meeting, to include delegates of all states.[57]

The plenary meeting of the Conference, on March 31, 1906, appointed a special commission composed of delegates from Spain, France and Germany, to revise the text which had been adopted and to consolidate the provisions in an *Acte Général*.[58]

There can hardly be any doubt that the composition of the committees (commissions) in every case where all conference states were not represented reflected the varying degrees of interest of the participating countries in the conference problem, and that the Great Powers as such were not privileged. In fact, when the addition of a Portuguese delegate to the drafting committee was proposed, that nation's particular interest was given as the reason.[59]

Generally speaking, Morocco was treated as *formally* equal. It was even included in the original drafting committee together with the more interested states. Its exclusion from the special commission was certainly motivated by a fear of delay in view of the apparent opposition of the Moroccan delegation to some adopted provisions, to be included in the *Acte Général*, which in the end led to the refusal of Morocco to sign the Act.

The protocols, being of a less formal nature (*procès-verbaux*), were not signed by all delegations, but only by the president and two secretaries.[60] Formalities of signature of the of the General Act and Additional Protocol of April 7, 1906

[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 293, 300, 327.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 318.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 104, 131, etc.

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were in accord with routine precedent.[61] In contradistinction to the *Acte Général* of Berlin of 1885, the Algeciras Act contained no accession clause, in conformity with its generally more restrictive character.[62]

Although the determination of the participating countries and the procedure of the Conference itself followed the principle of equality of states in its broadest sense, the *Acte Général* by no means granted equal rights to the conference countries. No obligation was imposed, however, without the expressed, although in the case of Morocco unwilling, consent of the state in question; the grant of such rights, therefore, cannot be considered to be inconsistent with the principal of legal equality, except probably in regard to Morocco. At any rate, the principle of equality, emphasized by the German emperor in his Tangier speech, appears in the preamble of the General Act, where it is asserted that the proposed Moroccan reforms are based on the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, on the integrity of his dominion, and on economic liberty without any inequality (for nationals of any country).[63]

One has to admit that general principles, expressed in diplomatic documents, are frequently not borne out by specific provisions. This is particularly true, in this instance, of the statement concerning the "sovereignty and independence of the Sultan." But lip service paid to principles in a preamble is often an indication of their strength.

There are many provisions restricting the sovereignty of Morocco and granting privileges to the Diplomatic Corps in Tangier;[64] but no section of the General Act, whatever unequal contractual rights may be created, gives privileges to any Great Power as such. Spain, the country which, after France, was

[61] *Das Staatsarchiv*, LXXIII, 275, 305; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1906, CXXXVI, "Morocco", No. 1, pp. 47, 48. For example, *B. & F. S. P.*, XCIX (1905-1906), 141; Austria-Hungary, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke . . . Konferenz von Algeciras*, pp. 441, 444.

[62] Austria-Hungary, *Diplomatische Aktenstücke . . . Konferenz von Algeciras*, pp. 440, 441.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 413.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 416 and *passim*, Art. 3, Arts. 7, 8, 9 of the General Act, Arts. 59, 61, 64, 65, 96, 77 *et seq.*; particularly Art. 104; also Arts. 112, 114, 117, 66, etc.

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most favored by the Act, was neither at the time of the Algeciras Conference, nor for a long period before that event, considered a Great Power. In this place one may mention that agreements between the most interested Powers, not all belonging to the Hexarchy, formed the political and *legal* basis for the final establishment of the French protectorate.[65]

Of the three political conferences (congresses) selected for detailed discussion, the Congress of Berlin shows no respect for the legal equality of all sovereign states, either in the selection of participating states or in its procedure and decisions. The Conference of Berlin, on the other hand, seems to have been permeated by the idea of equality of states. In all three of its aspects subjected to our examination (participation, procedure and decisions), the participating states, and all other sovereign states, are considered legally equal. In the case of the Conference of Algeciras the selection of states to be invited and the procedure at its meetings are in conformity with the principle of legal equality, but its decisions are in conformity only when one adheres to a very narrow definition of the principle and assumes that even far-reaching inequalities of contractual rights are reconcilable with legal equality.

It would, however, be wrong to conclude that the principle of equality of states was of no importance at the Congress of Berlin. As was shown, the Great Powers *among themselves* applied the principle and even strictly observed all the formalities required by the idea of *political* equality, but no such consideration was shown to the smaller Powers, not even factually to Turkey. The idea of legal equality the statesmen of the Great Powers might have had in mind in 1878 was the idea of equality of the Great Powers (equality of status).[66] But in a sense the most broadly conceived principle of equality of states excludes the nonsovereign states and therefore applies only to a status, the status of sovereignty.

[65] *B. & F. S. P.*, CII (1908-1909), 435, Franco-German Declaration of February 9, 1909; CIV (1911), 948, Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911; CVI (1913), 1023, Franco-Moroccan Treaty of March 30, 1912; CVI (1913), 1025, Franco-Spanish Convention of November 27, 1912.

[66] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

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Of the three international political meetings under scrutiny, the Conferences of Berlin and Algeciras, both determining the participation of states on their interest in the agenda—although the first applies a broader and the latter a more narrow view of "interest"—are more characteristic of the period between the Franco-Prussian War and the First World War than is the Congress of Berlin, which grounded the right of a state to participate on its status as a Great Power. The latter typifies an approach to the solution of international problems more usual in the period between 1814 and 1871.

The Congresses (or Conferences) of Chatillon in 1814, Vienna, 1814-15 (special conferences of the four Powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia; and of the five Powers, the four allied Great Powers and France),[67] of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, Troppau, 1820, Laybach, 1821, Verona, 1822, London (on the affairs of Greece), 1827-32, London (on the affairs of Belgium), 1830-33, Vienna (on peace proposals for termination of the Crimean War), 1855, Paris, 1856, Paris (on Danubian principalities), 1858, Paris (on the pacification of Syria), 1860-61, London (on Denmark), 1864, London (respecting Luxembourg), 1867, and Paris (on Cretan affairs), 1869[68] were either exclusively composed of Great Powers, who claimed to speak in the name of Europe, or gave them a privileged position. Only the *most interested* smaller states were at any time invited, sometimes without right of full participation. In the later part of this period it became customary to invite them on a more or less equal footing. Furthermore, the conference method for the solution of political questions was much more used than in the period of 1871-1914. For this there were political and legal reasons, since the contemporary political order of Europe was based on the Congress of Vienna. Territorial, constitutional questions, intervention against popular uprisings, imposition of reforms, neutrality, recognition, and so on were the problems taken up by the diplomatic meetings.

[67] Genevieve Peterson, "Political Inequality at the Congress of Vienna" in POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, December 1945, LX, 532 *et seq.*

[68] Sir Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (London and New York, 1917), II, *passim*.

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In the following period of 1871-1914 *not one conference* dealing with political questions took place which might be classified as "supernational",[69] with the exception of the diplomatic meetings dealing with problems of the so-called Near Eastern question. The equal representation of all interested states was recognized in all other cases. The Turkish problem, however, was politically and legally (Paris Peace Treaty of 1856) inherited from the preceding period. In addition to the Congress of Berlin, several other conferences of the Great Powers affirmed their traditionally alleged authority over Balkan affairs; for example, the London Black Sea Conference of 1871, Conferences of Constantinople in 1876-77 [70] (the preliminary conference excluding even Turkey) and 1881. As late as 1897 in the Greco-Turkish war the Great Powers assumed authority to conclude peace for Greece with Turkey. A preliminary peace treaty was signed by the six representatives of the Powers, acting on behalf of Greece, and by the delegate of Turkey, on September 18, 1897. The final article of the treaty provided that its clauses, after their approval by the Sultan, to be given within a week, should be brought to the *knowledge* of the Greek government and then become executory.[71] Although the assertion of legal authority by the Great Powers, even over Balkan affairs, became rarer and weaker, as late as the crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 it was recognized that political changes in the Balkans, being amendments of the Treaty of Berlin, legally required the consent of its signatories, that is, of the Great Powers in addition to Turkey.[72]

This development became manifest in various forms. More and more frequently "recommendations", rather than binding decisions, were accepted by representatives of the Great Powers. Often, however, these were accompanied by more or less effective diplomatic pressure. When, in 1885, the revolution in Eastern Roumelia brought about the proclamation of its union

[69] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

[70] *B. & F. S. P.*, LXI (1870-1871), 1193. *Das Staatsarchiv*, XXXI (1877), 269 *et seq.*, 317 *et seq.*; XXXII (1877), 1 *et seq.*

[71] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1898, "Turkey", No. 2, pp. 261, 264.

[72] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Die Grosse Politik* (Berlin, 1922-1927), XXVI, Part 2, No. 9506, p. 746.

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with Bulgaria, both Serbia and Greece started war preparations, demanding equivalent enlargements of their own territories. At the suggestion of the Russian government, an informal conference of six Powers met in Constantinople on October 4 and 5 and adopted a declaration regretting the violation of the Berlin Treaty and *recommending* a peaceful solution.[73] Similarly, when the belligerents in the first Balkan war finally accepted the proposals made by the conference of ambassadors of the six Great Powers and signed the treaty of peace in London on May 30, 1913, the treaty was *legally* an agreement of the Balkan states based on *recommendations* of the Great Powers.[74]

Neither in 1885 nor in 1913 was the advice of the Great Powers carried out. In 1885 Serbian-Bulgarian hostilities started in spite of the request of the Powers for a peaceful solution. On the demand of Austria, in agreement with Russia and Germany, a *formal* conference of the six Powers and Turkey met in Constantinople for the settlement of the Bulgarian dispute. But antagonism between England on one side and Russia and Austria on the other prevented common action of the Powers, and at its eighth session the conference adjourned *sine die*.[75] In 1913, after acceptance of the peace proposals of the Powers, the second Balkan war broke out. It was concluded by legal instruments of the belligerent states and not by a treaty of the Great Powers (Peace Treaty of Bucharest on August 10, 1913 and Peace Treaty of Constantinople on September 29, 1913).[76]

After the spring of 1898, when Germany and Austria withdrew from participation in the blockade of Crete, carried out by warships of the six Great Powers, the European Concert was rarely an active force in Balkan affairs.[77] In 1908, suggestions to submit the problem of Bulgarian independence to a European conference failed to obtain the agreement of the Great Powers because Austria as well as Russia was eager for Bulgarian

[73] *B. & F. S. P.*, LXXVI (1884-1885), 1243, 1244, 1250, 1251, 1256.

[74] *B. & F. S. P.*, CVII (1914), Part I, *656 et seq.*

[75] *Das Staatsarchiv*, XLVI (1886), 326, 322, 335, 347.

[76] *B. & F. S. P.*, CVII (1914), Part I, *656 et seq.*, and *706 et seq.*

[77] *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Orient, Autonomie Crétoise* (Paris, 1898), pp. 11, 18.

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friendship, Austria desiring to enlist eventual Bulgarian help against Serbia, and Russia planning to create a Balkan alliance directed against Austria.[78]

In the same way disunity of the Powers prevented the realization of a Russian suggestion to bring the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 before a European congress.[79]

Once more, during the first Balkan war, the European Concert seemed to come to life in the Albanian question. In order to prevent the otherwise unavoidable outbreak of war, the Great Powers united their efforts to persuade the Balkan states to consent to the establishment of an independent Albania. But this was not a *legal* revival of the European Concert. The Great Powers did not base their decisions on the Albanian question on their traditional authority over Balkan affairs, but rather on powers granted to them by the Balkan states, particularly Turkey, which was the sovereign Power on Albanian territory, by Article III of the Peace Treaty of London on May 30, 1913.[80]

While the political climate of the period between 1871 and 1914 undermined the authority of the Great Powers in Near Eastern affairs, which had been asserted at the beginning of the period, outside of these affairs, no attempt was made by the Powers to establish a supernational authority for their meetings. In Europe itself, outside of the Balkans, peace prevailed.

At any rate, the few strictly European territorial questions outside of the Balkans, which had to be taken up by the European states, do not offer any examples of the type of Great Power activity which was usual in the preceding period and which was considered by some writers as a growth of international *legal* custom. Even the diplomatic events concerned with the territorial problems in Asia and Africa, resulting from the rapid expansion of European colonial territory in our period, offer no evidences of the superior legal status of the Great Powers. The Conferences of Algeciras, Berlin and Brussels[81]

[78] *Die Grosse Politik*, XXV, Part 2, No. 9294, pp. 514, 515; No. 9292, p. 513; No. 9297, p. 520.

[79] *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, Part 1, No. 9009, p. 134; No. 9014, p. 140.

[80] *B. & F. S. P.*, CVII (1914), Part I, 657.

[81] *Documents Diplomatiques, Conférence Internationale de Bruxelles* (Paris, 1891).

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provide no precedent for the assumption that the mere fact of being a Great Power confers any *legal* privileges for participation in international legislation. On the contrary, the *interest factor* is considered decisive by the contemporary statesmen.

Even problems relating to Egypt, which in the former period had been the concern of *Great Power* authority (Convention of London, signed July 15, 1840, and protocol of the same day),[82] were settled by legal instruments of the *interested* states. The Conference, which met in Paris on March 30, 1885, to deal—unsuccessfully—with the problems of the Suez Canal, was composed of representatives of the six Great Powers, Turkey, Netherlands, Spain, and Egypt, which was not a sovereign Power, but a vassal of the Sultan.[83] The Convention on the Canal of October 29, 1888 was signed by the representatives of the same countries, excluding Egypt. Although the states which were parties to the treaties were the ones most interested in the Suez Canal, Article 16 of the Convention invited all the other sovereign members of international society to accede.[84] The agreement of April 8, 1904, which politically, although not legally, settled the Egyptian problem, was signed by the main contestants, England and France.[85] The numerous other territorial questions in Africa, which arose during our period, show no trace of assertion of supernational authority by the Great Powers as was claimed for them by the Earl of Malmesbury. A study of the questions of Tunis,[86] Madagascar,[87] Zanzibar-Heligoland,[88] the Boer War [89] and others bears out this statement.

[82] *B. & F. S. P.*, XXVIII (1839-1840), 342 *et seq.*

[83] *B. & F. S. P.*, LXXVII (1885-1886), 159 *et seq.*

[84] *B. & F. S. P.*, *LXXIX* (1887-1888), 18, 22.

[85] *B. & F. S. P.*, CI (1907-1908), 1058.

[86] *Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Tunisie, 1870-1881* (Paris, 1881); *Supplément* April-May, 1881 (Paris, 1881); and *Revision des Traités Tunisiens 1896-Janvier, 1897* (Paris, 1896).

[87] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1883, XLVIII, LXXXII; 1884-85, LV; 1886, XLVII; 1890, LI, LXXXI; 1898, LX; 1899, CIX.

[88] *B. & F. S. P.*, LXXII (1885-1886), 1099 *et seq.*; Hertslet, *op. cit.*, III, 882 *et seq.*, and 899 *et seq.*

[89] *B. & F. S. P.*, XCV (1901-1902), 146 *et seq.*, 160.

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This holds true also for the political problems of the Far East; but here the influence of two extra-European Powers, first of the United States and then of Japan, enters the political picture. In addition, in our period the spread of certain essential elements of Western civilization over the whole globe was instrumental in bringing about the complete inclusion of the Far Eastern countries in our system of international law, thereby progressively extending the field of application of the principle of legal equality of states, a process which Professor Philip C. Jessup has called "emergence into equality".[90] In this respect, even the so-called "unequal treaties" served to bring about the final victory of the principle of legal equality in Western relations with the Far Eastern countries.

The diplomatic history of the political international conferences before the First World War seems to justify the following conclusion: In the period before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, a kind of legal superiority of the Great Powers in the settlement of political problems had been in the process of becoming customary international law, but there was no evidence of such a *legal* position of the Great Powers at the time of the outbreak of the First World War. This change was due to the decay of the "European Concert", resulting in a discontinuation in the period between 1870 and 1914 of the former "clear and continuous practice"[91] of the Great Powers to claim by their actions a position of legal superiority.

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[90] The Far Eastern part of this development will be treated in the second part of this essay to be published in a later issue.

[91] Oppenheim, *op. cit.* (5th ed.), I, 25.

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THE LAST TORY PRIME MINISTER [1]

"I DON'T think my enemies will get me down this time. I would be sorry if they did, because I should then have to leave this lovely place." These were almost the last words that Neville Chamberlain wrote from Chequers, the country residence of British prime ministers. While he was writing, British troops were evacuating Norway. Less than a week later Nazi armor and legions were to pour into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Before Hitler struck at Poland, Chamberlain had said that he felt himself indispensable to carry out his policy of appeasement and to preserve "peace in our time." If he failed, half a dozen persons "could run the war." Now, if his enemies did get him down, he thought Lord Halifax should and would be his successor.

After Munich—certainly after the Nazi descent on Prague in March 1939—Neville Chamberlain was a tragic figure to those who realized what England had lost and what it was likely to suffer. When the war came and went badly, the whole world knew that he was a prime minister who had failed, but there is nothing to indicate that Chamberlain himself realized it. He would have to leave a "lovely place." Mr. Feiling lets it go at that and makes no attempt to put somber colors on a vast canvas—to portray the effects of disillusionment, of despair of self, or of suffering for country. In the private papers to which he had complete access, he apparently could not find the paints.

Nor has Mr. Feiling, able and admiring historian of the Tory Party in an earlier age of glories, sought to make his biography throw rays of light beyond its principal character. He does not make it plain that in her critical hour England could not turn to anyone of the men who, under Stanley Baldwin and then under Chamberlain, had shared responsibility for the difficulties that had come and the disasters that threatened. Baldwin's mind "was tuned into the national wave length." Chamberlain's mind "never got beyond the Midland Regional."

Mr. Atlee's biting comment was equally applicable to others of the regular members of the Conservative team which served under these

[1] *The Life of Neville Chamberlain.* By Keith Feiling. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947. ix, 475 pp. $6.

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two captains. They were men of pre-1914 mentality and it is curious (although perhaps not meaningful) that some of them had a bond in common. The Prime Minister was a Unitarian. Stanley Baldwin pointed with pride to the fact that among his ancestors were Nonconformist divines. Sir Samuel Hoare was a Quaker, Runciman and Kingsley Wood were Wesleyans, Sir John Simon was the son of a minister, and Ernest Brown, the Minister of Labor, was a local preacher. To be sure, Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, was a High-churchman, but he is a pale shadow on only a few pages of the biography. It was not in this group that a great war minister could be found. England must turn to one who had been a Cassandra and who had always maintained that appeasement was no more than a means of losing friends without influencing enemies. Mr. Chamberlain was late in realizing that this was the case.

His entry into national politics had been long delayed. Austen, in the father's opinion less able than the younger half-brother, was to try for a political career. Neville was to go into business. He did so in the Bahamas, where, even though his father had had expert advice on the feasibility of the scheme, he lost £50,000 in an unsuccessful endeavor to raise sisal. At the age of twenty-eight he was back in England.

It is always difficult to weigh the influences of early life on the development of character and habits of work during maturity. Mr. Feiling suggests—and he could have been more positive—that the Bahama experience "made"—that is, "formed"—Mr. Chamberlain. "Initiative had become a habit, for with him alone it had rested, and confidence in his own judgment, since there had been no one else to judge." He had acquired reserve, because "for six years he had hardly spoken to an equal." Away from family influences "perhaps he had never been one who reached opinion through discussions, but for six years on Andros he could only think in silence." He was happy about what he could do for "his people". He acquired "an unreflective turn". These characteristics were apparent when he became Prime Minister.

Success in business in Birmingham preceded participation in municipal politics. He was Lord Mayor in 1915 and a good one. Then Lloyd George who in December 1916 succeeded Asquith as Prime Minister, appointed Mr. Chamberlain Director General of National Service. Perhaps Lloyd George did not give his new Minister the support that he should have had, but a square peg had been put in a round hole. Mr. Feiling does not seriously question the judgment

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that Mr. Lloyd George expressed in his *Memoirs* (1934): "Mr. Chamberlain is a man of rigid competency." His qualities had their uses "in conventional times or in conventional positions . . . but are lost in an emergency or in creative tasks." The job called for the exercise "of supreme tact in dealing with other departments." But Mr. Chamberlain had "a vein of self-sufficient obstinacy" which "contributed to the difficulties that baffled all our endeavors." He resigned and wrote "my career is broken." "The obstinate vein" was dominant until the end, but he was wrong about his career, which was just beginning.

At the khaki election of 1918, the Conservatives found him a Birmingham constituency and his first ministerial office was that of Postmaster General. Later he went to the Ministry of Health, where he was excellent. Out of office twice because of the MacDonald Labor governments, he again took the Ministry of Health in 1931 (preferring it to the Exchequer) because he genuinely wanted to do something for the underprivileged. He had a long-term program of legislation, much of which he was able to see in the statute book. "A good Lord Mayor of Birmingham in a lean year", Lloyd George had cruelly said, but Mr. Chamberlain proved himself to be well above that level. When the general election of 1935 came, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, in view of the reports that the Cabinet had on the progress of German rearmament, he wanted to take "the bold course of actually appealing to the country on a defence programme." Mr. Baldwin overruled him and a year later acknowledged to the House of Commons how he had deceived the electorate: "Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election, from my point of view, more certain."

Before the election had been decided upon, Mussolini had invaded Abyssinia and from then on foreign affairs dominated British politics, save for the interval when Baldwin roused himself from his lethargy, and, as James Maxton said, "sacked" a king with little more difficulty than he would have had in sacking an office boy. For Baldwin's retirement Chamberlain had to wait until May 1937. At once the new Prime Minister began to think that he might have better ideas than those which emanated from the other side of Downing Street. Some of these were based on assurances which Mussolini had given his sister-in-law (Sir Austen's widow). Against the advice of the Foreign

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Office he insisted on trying to begin conversations with Italy before good faith was shown by the withdrawal of troops from Spain. Anthony Eden, resigning, must have recalled Lord Palmerston's withdrawal from a cabinet whose foreign policy he did not approve and of which Lytton Strachey wrote in his *Queen Victoria:* "The government had been swinging backwards and forwards between two incompatible policies—that of non-interference and that of threats supported by force—either of which consistently followed might well have had a successful and peaceful issue, but which mingled together could only lead to war." There was one difference. Palmerston and Lord John Russell had had a striking force "in their aristocratic hands." Incompatible policies, tried at the time of the Abyssinian adventure and in the case of Spain, were finally to demonstrate their fatal inconsistency when the European problem was Hitler. Chamberlain was never to realize this.

With the departure of Eden and the appointment of Lord Halifax as his successor, Mr. Chamberlain became his own Foreign Minister, and such was the dominance that he had over his Cabinet and the House of Commons that there was little open criticism as there had been when Lloyd George played the same dual rôle, but less disastrously. Chamberlain was familiar with Europe from extensive travel, but he had no more than an ordinary knowledge of outstanding international questions. It could almost be said of him, as the French said of Lord Dudley and Ward (Foreign Secretary under Canning) that he had been entrusted with the care of foreign affairs "*parceque ses affaires lui ont été toujours étrangères.*" Perhaps Lord Halifax was not as much of a rubber stamp as the rare appearance of his name in Mr. Feiling's pages might seem to suggest. Nevertheless, he must have been pretty well effaced. The principal interventions that the biography mentions are protests that communiques to the press lauding the Prime Minister's policy were entirely too optimistic.

German troops entered Austria, and then the Sudeten question came to the fore. That had been festering for six years, but not until late in 1937 did the British government urge Beneš to make concessions. In September 1938 Chamberlain asked: "Is it not positively horrible to think that the fate of hundreds of millions depends on one man, and he is half mad?" He kept racking his brains "to try and devise some means of averting a catastrophe." Finally he thought "of one so unconventional and daring that it rather took Halifax's breath away." He would go and see the "half mad" man. He "sent the fateful telegram and told the Cabinet next morning" what he had done.

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Long letters to sisters give full details of what happened on the three visits: the layout of the rooms at Berchtesgaden, tea, and the pictures, many of nudes. You "would take him for the house painter he once was." "I did not see any trace of insanity." "I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word." The first conversation was preliminary. A week later, after consultations in London and with the French, Chamberlain flew to Godesberg. The Czechs had rejected the Anglo-French proposal that they transfer to Germany areas with more than fifty per cent German population and that an international commission should adjust frontiers and exchange peoples. Hitler threatened to march at once and then agreed to wait until October first. Whether, if he did so, the French would keep their treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia was doubtful, but it looked like war. Then, at the eleventh hour, when the Prime Minister was telling the House of Commons of his failure, there came word that Hitler had agreed to another conference. Munich followed and Hitler consented to eat the cherry in five bites.

Down to the German drive on Prague in March there is little evidence of uneasiness, and Mr. Feiling must have tried to find any that there was in a diary and in lengthy letters written weekly and alternately to two surviving sisters and indubitably with the thought that they might some day be made public. In April Mr. Chamberlain was "afraid that such faith as I ever had in the assurances of dictators is being rapidly whittled away"; but he seemed serenely unconscious of the fact that when the stakes were war or peace, the fall or rise of empires, he (without an interpreter of his own) had negotiated as if Hitler were another Birmingham business man. He did not remember the old adage which in the version attributed to his father was that "he who sups with the devil should use a long spoon."

Mr. Feiling overwrites. He has produced the most stylized authorized biography since Winston Churchill's life of his father, Lord Randolph Churchill. But the difference is that the man who many years later was to become the biographer of Marlborough and a great war minister whose magnificent speeches accounted for much of his success never overdoes *his* rhetoric. Mr. Feiling tells us that when England had to go off gold in 1931, "£2,000 million of short term borrowings, like wild beasts caught in a glacier, were crying out to be liquified." Not infrequently he substitutes pontifical sententiousness for the cautious expression of judgment we have a right to expect. "Whether it was necessary to pay it [the price], let not our still uninformed judgment undertake boldly to say, but whether he was a man armed to do battle with Hitler is fit for discussion here." Mr. Feiling

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discusses this question very briefly. Of course, as has been said, Mr. Chamberlain was not armed—either in awareness of what the Nazi régime meant or in Foreign Office assistance.

Nor was he armed by temperament. He had read widely but he had little sense of history. He was so self-sufficient that he never attempted to learn from the achievements or the mistakes of great predecessors. Almost his only reference to one of them (Mr. Feiling does not mention it) is a speech after Munich when he compared himself to the younger Pitt who, like himself, faced a Europe full of dire ferment. The severe but accurate reply could have been that he and Pitt had only two things in common: fathers abler than they and a tendency to gout. Nor did he have the slightest sense of humor. In November 1925 the diary records that in Cabinet "S. B. didn't seem to be attending to me, and presently he passed an open note across the table to Winston, who was sitting beside me. On the note was written 'MATCHES, lent at 10:30 A.M. Returned?' This triviality, while a very grave question was being discussed under S.B.'s chairmanship, made the most deplorable impression on me."

Moreover, there was some deficiency—a lack of vision or of imagination—that made it possible for some of his phrases to be turned against him. To a group at the airdrome, on his departure for Munich, he quoted: "Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety." That was Hotspur's comment on a letter he was reading, but Mr. Chamberlain failed to remember that the letter went on to say: "The purpose you undertake is dangerous; the friends you have named uncertain; the time itself unsorted; and your whole plot too light for the counterpoise of so great an opposition." When, on his return from Munich, he spoke from the window at Downing Street he said: "This is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time." Two days before, Mr. Feiling records, when Disraeli's phrase had been suggested as appropriate, Chamberlain impatiently dissented. A week later he was telling the House of Commons not to read too much into words "used in a moment of some emotion, after a long and exhausting day."

Of course it may be argued that by the time Mr. Chamberlain became Prime Minister nothing could have stopped Germany from making war. In 1935 he had been willing to go to the country on the issue of adequate defense. Later he should have insisted that Britain prepare, but he did not do so. The Ministry for the Coordination of Defence, which had been set up in 1936, was little more than

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a gesture. Then when public opinion forced the creation of a Ministry of Supply, its powers were limited and the appointee to the post was conclusive evidence that the government did not expect the Ministry to do a serious job. Even after home defense preparations were begun, the Home Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer quarreled for months with local authorities over who should bear the cost of certain protective measures, and nothing was done. Mr. Chamberlain was admirably equipped to take charge of such housekeeping measures and to insist on action. Instead, he thought of himself as the only instrument through which peace could be maintained.

Probably the most personal Prime Minister that Great Britian had ever had, he viewed the members of the Cabinet not as colleagues but as juniors. Disraeli had taken his Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, to Berlin, but Mr. Chamberlain went to Munich, leaving Lord Halifax behind, and unaccompanied by any Foreign Office official. His only companion was Sir Horace Wilson—a civil servant from the Ministry of Labor—who had been useful and pliant when Mr. Chamberlain negotiated the Ottawa agreements. Cruelly but not unfairly it could be said that the blind was leading the blind. His speeches spoke of *his* responsibility and burdens. The cabinet system was in abeyance. *Le gouvernement, c'est moi.* His control of the House of Commons was so great that he could resist the popular pressure after Munich to bring Eden and Churchill into his Cabinet. He based his refusal on the ground that such an action would annoy Hitler (it would have demonstrated Britain's sincerity) but the real reason was that he did not wish his Cabinet to include independent minds. His opposition in the House of Commons was so feeble that he could win the game with the scrubs. Until the war came he did not think it necessary to try star players. There is little or nothing in Mr. Feiling's biography on the abortive steps that were made in the summer of 1939 to bring Russia into a grand alliance, nor is there much on the logic of a blanket pledge to Poland when the British had been willing to sacrifice "a far away country" of whose people "we know nothing"—but a country which had had successes and which possessed strength.

In his rhymed Christmas greeting in a December 1938 *New Yorker*, Frank Sullivan (I quote from memory) paid his respects

> "To every moral eunuch
> Who had a hand in the pact of Munich
> The rhyme is bad but the pact was worse
> What was Neville's plane may be Europe's hearse."

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If Mr. Chamberlain had no alternative save to pay the price demanded, this was because the Baldwin and his own governments had failed to arm the country and to prepare the public mind for the choice that would have to be made.

A year after Munich the British public was ready. That at least was a gain. It had readied itself, despite utterances from high places that all was going well, but the country was still inadequately armed. Of Neville Chamberlain's life only the last three years of his threescore and ten matter for history. The man is adequately, perhaps completely, revealed in Mr. Feiling's biography. Future inquirers will concern themselves with the overshadowing of the Foreign Office, the appreciations of the Services, the intelligence that came from abroad and the approaching doom on which the Nuremberg documents are so revealing. They will have to go far back in history—perhaps to the days when George III and Lord North's ministers lost the American colonies—to find a governing group that had served their country so badly.

LINDSAY ROGERS

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INDIA—PAST, PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

I

THE British Labor Government, by its declaration of February 20, 1947, has already committed itself to the definite policy of transferring the "power" of the government of India to the central government to be formed under the constitution, which is to be framed by June 1948, according to the British Cabinet Mission proposal of March 16, 1946. If such a constitution be not framed because of opposition of the Moslem League or the Princes, then "the British Government will have to consider to whom the powers of Central Government in British India should be handed over on due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing provincial governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people."

The Constituent Assembly, which has been boycotted by the Moslem League and in which the representatives of the Indian States have not yet participated, has already declared for the establishment of a federal Republic of the United States of India. There is considerable uncertainty in India, because of large-scale rioting which may be regarded as a kind of civil war between the Hindus and the Moslem League, precipitated by the latter, under the leadership of Mr. Jinnah.

Whatever may be the final solution of the Indian question, it is a fact that the rôle of India in world affairs will be no less significant than that of China.

Will India with full dominion status remain as a partner of the British Commonwealth of Nations? Will an independent India, outside of the British Commonwealth of Nations, act as a virtual ally of the Anglo-American Powers in the present unsettled world; or will she, as a whole or as a part (Pakistan), align with Soviet Russia against the Anglo-American Powers and China and Turkey? These are some of the grave questions which are receiving considerable thought from statesmen in world capitals, especially in Moscow, Washington and London. No student of world affairs can ignore the importance of India.

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II

To understand or even to anticipate possible developments in the India of tomorrow, one should have a good grasp of India's past, her national aspirations, her struggle for freedom, the present trends of her internal difficulties and also her relations with the great Powers. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru in his work, *The Discovery of India*,[1] gives us an account of India from the days of Mohenjo-daro (pre-historic India of some five thousand years ago) up to the present time. He devotes some 230 pages to a summary of the history from the earliest period to the rise of British power in India. This discussion is not merely a recording of important events of Indian history, but is an excellent synthesis of all factors which have contributed toward development of Indian thought—religious and social. It may be regarded as an essay on Indian culture, in which the author gives lucid expression to the ideas and ideals behind philosophical works of the Hindus and Buddhists and deals with such topics as mathematics in ancient India, influence of Indian art abroad, Indian influence on Chinese civilization, flowering of Arab culture through contacts with India, influence of Islamic culture in India, efforts toward development of synthesis of Hindu-Moslem culture and effects of European penetration of India. There is nothing new in these discussions for those who have devoted years to the study of the cultural history of India; but for laymen these essays will be useful and helpful.

During the twentieth century, Swami Vivekanada, Rabindranath Tagore, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Sri Arabindo Ghose, Lajpat Rai and Mahatma Gandhi have played significant parts in shaping the revolutionary ideals of the people of India. (It should be noted that these leaders were not materialists.) During recent years many other Indian leaders have contributed a great deal in the struggle for Indian freedom; but the part played by the late Subhas Chandra Bose who formed and led the Indian National Army of some 75,000 or more men, along with the Japanese forces, who was the most uncompromising partisan in the movement to establish an Indian republic outside the British Empire, and who is regarded as the De Valera of India, and the part played by Mr. Nehru in recent years, in shaping the destiny of India during the present transition period, are going to leave permanent marks on the future development of India as a nation and world Power.

[1] *The Discovery of India*, by Jawaharlal Nehru. New York, The John Day Company, 1946. xii, 595 pp. $5.00.

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Mr. Nehru has devoted some 300 pages to a discussion of vital problems affecting India and the world: British rule in India, Indian nationalism which is a part of Asian nationalism or re-awakening, and other important issues of India's internal and international problems. Because of Mr. Nehru's position in India today, every serious student of Indian affairs should be acquainted with his views and therefore cannot afford to miss reading this work. Regarding the present Hindu-Moslem problem and Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan idea, Mr. Nehru holds the idea that India like other multinational states—the United States and the U. S. S. R.—will develop national consciousness and unity. But will this unity come after a great deal of suffering? Mr. Nehru writes:

> One wrong step leads to another; so it has been in the past and so it may be in the future. And yet wrong steps have to be taken sometimes lest some worse peril befall us; and that is the great paradox of politics, and no man can say with surety whether present wrong doing is better and safer in the end than the possibility of that imagined peril. Unity is always better than disunity, but an enforced unity is a sham and dangerous affair, full of explosive possibilities. Unity must be of the mind and heart, a sense of belonging together and of facing together those who attack it. I am convinced that there is that basic unity in India, but it has been overlaid and hidden to some extent by other forces. These latter may be temporary and artificial and may pass off, but they count today and no man can ignore them. It is our fault of course, and we must suffer for our failings. But I cannot excuse or forgive the British authorities for the deliberate part they have played in creating disruption in India. All other injuries will pass, but this will continue to plague us for a much longer period. Often I am reminded of Ireland and China when I think of India. Both differ from India and from each other in their past and present problems, and yet there are many similarities. Shall we have to tread that same path in the future? (p. 538)

Mr. Nehru stands for world freedom and is opposed to imperialism. He is for world coöperation and against world domination. The following extracts will explain the philosophical foundation of the policies which he hopes a free, sovereign Republic of the United States of India will follow:

> Mr. Walter Lippmann's vision of three or four orbits encompassing the globe—the Atlantic Community, the Russian, the Chinese and later the Hindu-Moslem in South Asia—is a continuation of power politics on a vaster scale, and it is difficult to understand how he can see any world peace or co-operation out of it.... There really seems no alternative between world conquest and world association; there is no choice of a middle course. The old divisions and the quest of power politics

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have little meaning today and do not fit in with our environment, yet they continue. The interests and activities of states overflow their boundaries and are world-wide. No nation can isolate itself or be indifferent to the political or economic fate of other nations. If there is no co-operation, there is bound to be friction, with its inevitable results. Co-operation can only be on a basis of equality and mutual welfare, on a pulling-up of the backward nations and peoples to a common level of well-being and cultural advancement, on an elimination of racialism and domination. No nation and no people are going to tolerate the domination and exploitation by another, even though this is given some pleasant name. Nor will they remain indifferent to their own poverty and misery when other parts of the world are flourishing. That was only possible when there was ignorance of what was happening elsewhere (pp. 550-552).

Mr. Nehru's work is subjective; but it is not dogmatic. It is somewhat like an exposition of his quest for the freedom of man which takes the form of national freedom. Nehru is not a politician in the ordinary sense of the word; he is in politics to do his share in raising his people and to serve humanity. Politics cannot save man. This he seems to understand; and thus he quotes the following from Einstein: "the fate of the human race is more than ever dependent on its moral strength today. The way to a joyful and happy state is through renunciation and self-limitation everywhere." In the conclusion of his work Nehru quotes the following from Lenin: "Man's dearest possession is life, and since it is given to him to live but once, he must so live as not to be seared with the shame of a cowardly and trivial past, so live as not to be tortured for years without purpose, so live that dying he can say: 'All my life and my strength were given to the first cause in the world—the liberation of mankind.'" In the reviewer's estimation the real strength of Mr. Nehru lies in the appreciation of the following delicately expressed ideal: "Though we may be weak and erring mortals, living a brief and uncertain span of life, yet there is something of the stuff of the immortal gods in us."

India's future is bound up with the moral strength of the nation, in the sense of duty to serve the cause of freedom of mankind and in the realization that man must act to give expression to the divine in him and not be bound by worldly trappings.

III

The author of *India Today: An Introduction to Indian Politics*[2] hopes that in his volume "readers will find combination of fact and analysis about the great complex of Indian politics." The scope of

[2] *India Today: An Introduction to Indian Politics*, by Raleigh Parkin. Toronto, Longmans, Green & Company; New York, the John Day Company, 1946. Revised Edition. xi, 287 pp. $3.75.

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the work can be fairly understood from the topics discussed in eleven chapters: "Social Structure", "Economic Structure", "Constitution and Government", "Administration and Defense", "The Political Groups", "The Indian States", "External Relations", "The Development of Indian Nationalism", "Indian Politics Between Two Wars", "India and the War", "Since the Cripps Mission". Discussion of these subjects is factual and based upon documents and authoritative opinions which throw considerable light on various problems. For instance in discussing famine in Bengal during 1942-43, the author bases his arguments on the findings of the Woodhead Commission which deal with the causes of the tragedy and inefficiency of the governments (provincial and central) in India:

> The Commission pointed out that "Only one section of the community suffered from starvation—the poorer classes in the rural areas... perhaps one-tenth of the population—6 million people—were seriously affected by the famine" and condemned particularly certain sections of the community who had made enormous profits out of the calamity.
>
> It has been reckoned that the amount of unusual profits made on the buying and selling of rice during 1943 was Rs 150 crores... every death in the famine was balanced by roughly a thousand rupees of excess profit.
>
> A million and a half of the poor of Bengal fell victim to circumstances for which they themselves were not responsible. Society, together with its organs, failed to protect its weaker members. Indeed there was a moral and social breakdown, as well as administrative breakdown (p. 264).

The book contains nineteen appendices which have valuable and informative materials on population, trade, fiscal conventions, finance, Indian States and their relation with the paramount Power, various resolutions of the All India National Congress Party as well as Lord Wavell's statement on British policy in India, made during September 1945, which has become the foundation for the negotiations toward Indian independence. The book has a good bibliography on the subject matters treated in the volume. Thus it may supplement in some respects the work of Mr. Nehru.

IV

Serious students of history are well aware of the fact that, even before the days of Alexander's invasion of India and since then, India has played an important part in world politics. Today India's position in the "balance of power" is singularly significant. In the world of tomorrow, free India, with her strategic position, vast population and resources, may serve as the most important single factor affecting world politics, because the balance is shifting in Asia, and India is the heart of Asia.

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Mr. K. M. Panikkar, in his brilliant essay *India and the Indian Ocean*,[3] presents a connected story of the influence of sea power on Indian history and discusses supremacy in the Indian Ocean in its relation to world politics and India's national defense. In the chapter on the Hindu period in the Indian Ocean he gives some insight into Hindu sea power as a factor in India's past greatness and substantiates the thesis that one of the causes of the loss of Indian independence was the failure of the Hindus to maintain command of the sea, a fact which is often overlooked by students of Indian history. He gives a vivid account of the rôle of the Arabs, the Portuguese and other Powers in controlling the Indian Ocean and of Britain's rôle in establishing an empire in India. No European Power, which did not have control of the Atlantic, could maintain its supremacy in the Indian Ocean, and, without the control of the Indian Ocean, there could be no security in India. British supremacy in the Indian Ocean made British rule somewhat inevitable.

Mr. Panikkar foresaw the outcome of World War II and the rise of American influence in the Indian Ocean:

> America has developed considerable interests in the Middle East. Oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and in Iran, not to speak of the Bahrein islands indicate the growth of strong economic interests in the drainage area of the Indian Ocean. America will emerge out of the present war with global and not hemispheric ideas of strategy, and the possibility therefore has to be visualised of America entering the Indian Ocean as a major naval power (p. 87).

He also points out Soviet Russia's interest in securing a footing in the Persian Gulf, and its significance for the future of India and the whole of the Indian Ocean area:

> The lines of traffic developed for the purposes of Lend Lease aid to Russia in the present war [World War II] have demonstrated the vital importance of the Persian Gulf to the Soviets.... The possibility of the presence of a naval power of the magnitude, resources and persistence of Russia on the Persian Gulf is in itself sufficient to revolutionise the strategy in respect of the Indian Ocean.... A strong military State on the Persian Gulf could make that an impregnable base and resist successfully all attacks from the sea. If that power is also industrially advanced and capable of constructing and maintaining on the sea large and powerful navies, then the Persian Gulf could become what Scapa Flow is to the Atlantic and Wilhelmshaven to the Baltic. The problem is of the utmost importance to the future of India (pp. 88-90).

[3] *India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History*, by K. M. Panikkar. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1945. 109 pp. $1.75.

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Finally, for the defense of South East Asia, a naval Power in India is bound to become a decisive factor.[4] Thus for national defense, free India will need her own navy and will have to develop her own sea power. This is not an easy task; and the author suggests:

> The control of the Indian Ocean must, therefore, be a co-operative effort of India and Britain and other Commonwealth units having interests on the Ocean with the primary responsibility lying on the Indian Navy to guard the steel ring created by Singapore, Ceylon, Mauritius and Socotra. With the naval might of Britain in the background and with the whole policy of the Commonwealth decided by a Supreme Council enabling the total power of the Empire to be brought to bear at any threatened point, such a defence of India will not be outside the range of practicability (p. 95).

This of course presupposes coöperation between Britain and India as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations or an alliance between free India and the British Commonwealth. However, the reviewer thinks that, in place of Indo-British coöperation, Indo-American-British coöperation will be imperative because common interests between India and the United States will develop, and Britain is more or less dependent upon the United States for her own defense.

V

In the past, security of India has been one of the main objectives of British diplomacy. In the report on *British Security*.[5] prepared by a Chatham House Study Group for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, it has been pointed out:

> Nelson could even speak of Malta as an important outwork to India. Acceptance of the necessity for the maintenance of a strong position in that area [Eastern Mediterranean and the area between the Suez and India] has become one of the traditional features of British policy. Other cogent reasons making it desirable have also arisen *but its origin and one of the principal causes of its continuance was an effort to provide a buttress for India against the overland menace.*[6] But even this useful territorial buttress could not usurp the primary function of sea power (p. 27).
>
> . . . the Middle East is, in a sense, the nodal point of the Commonwealth. Britian, South Africa, India, Australia and New Zealand are all directly concerned to see that no hostile Power becomes dominant

[4] Mr. Panikkar has discussed this question at length in his work *The Future of South East Asia.*

[5] *British Security: A Report by a Chatham House Study Group.* London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946. 176 pp. 8s. 6d.

[6] Italics are the reviewer's.

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> there and consequently able to irrupt into the Indian Ocean, to control the Eastern Mediterranean or to sever the principal line of imperial sea and air communications. This lifeline through Suez, however, involves the passage of the Mediterranean which, as the war [World War II] has shown, is a vulnerable link. It may be cut there even though the Canal itself and the Middle East bastion to the Indian Ocean region remain firmly held. In that event the security of the Middle East itself comes to depend largely upon Britain's ability to use the sea route round Africa; and this is then also the only practicable alternative link between Britain, India and the Pacific Dominions. The security of the route round Africa in its turn depends on the South African base (pp. 73-74).

But the most significant point should not be overlooked that a strong hostile Power in India not only can cut off the connecting link between South Africa and the Pacific Dominions, but would menace the whole Middle and Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus a friendly India is an essential factor toward the security of the Empire.

> Britain's special needs in the Middle East from the point of view of security have remained much the same for the last two hundred years. Her vital interests are threefold: that the area should be peaceful; that it should be well disposed towards her; and that no other Great Power should gain a predominant position there such as would enable it to threaten seriously British interests (p. 115).

To carry out these ideas, Britain favors consolidation of states—such as the formation of the Arab League—closer defensive alliance among Powers of this region, "expansion of the Saadebad Pact, signed on July 8, 1937, between Turkey, Persia, Iraq and Afghanistan", and closer coöperation between this group of Powers and the Arab League bloc of Powers, while Britain would take a leading rôle in this combination (p. 123). A friendly Middle East is as vital to the interests and security of India as it is for Britain. Thus it is conceivable that India will be able to collaborate in such a program. Lastly, as the United States' interests are growing and are also not opposed to those of Britain, India and the states of the region, an Anglo-American-Indian understanding is desirable for the stability of the region.

With the establishment of the United Nations, India, Britain and the United States and also member states from the region of the Middle East are bound to coöperate with the Security Council of the United Nations. But it is clear that these nations and others will be forced to maintain bilateral or multilateral types of understandings which may fit in the framework of the United Nations Charter. For instance, commitments of the type of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of October 19, 1939 or the recently executed Anglo-French Alliance or the Alliance between Turkey and Trans-Jordan signed on January 11, 1947 are going to remain valid within the United

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Nations Charter. Thus any arrangement that might be made between Britain, the United States, India and states of the Middle East for the preservation of peace will not be inconsistent with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

VI

India, with an area equal to that of all of Europe except Russia, has a population of nearly 400 millions. Some of the Western experts on population problems think that India is overpopulated and that even adequate industrialization will not solve the problem; because, according to their estimate, industrialization of India will tend to increase population in an overpopulated country. Dr. Chandrasekhar, in his small but exceedingly valuable book, *India's Population: Fact and Policy*[7], gives us valuable data on the subject. For instance, density of Indian population is not as great as generally thought. "The mean density for all India does not exceed 246 persons per square mile. While this is nearly five and a half times the density of the United States of America, it is considerably lower than that of Germany, Japan, England, Italy, Java or Puerto Rico" (p. 16). It may be pointed out that, compared to many other countries, India's population has not increased with extreme rapidity. Dr. Chandrasekhar, quoting Professor Kingsley Davis, states that in India "the population, adjusted to the present area (excluding Burma), increased about 54 percent during the period from 1872 to 1941. The United Kingdom during the same period increased 56 percent, and if we take the 70-year period from 1821 to 1891 (perhaps more comparable to India's last 70 years) we find it increased 81 percent [in spite of millions emigrating to America and other parts of the world]. Similarly Japan during the 70 years from 1873 to 1942, experienced a growth of approximately 136 percent" (p. 17).[8]

Dr. Chandrasekhar rightly points out:

> The crux of the Indian population problem with its inescapable corollary issues of food and agriculture is the incredible poverty of the people. With all her latent and potential wealth in natural resources—inferior only to those of the United States and the Soviet Union—India today is among the poorest countries in the world.... In summary, poverty, starvation and disease stalk the land, worse than the war-devastated regions in Europe and Asia. Nearly two-thirds of the population are chronically under-nourished and disease-ridden. Well over one hundred million people suffer annually from malaria alone.

[7] *India's Population: Fact and Policy*, by S. Chandrasekhar. With an Introduction by Warren S. Thompson. New York, The John Day Company, 1946. 117 pp. $2.00.

[8] This is quoted from Kingsley Davis, "The Population of India", *Far Eastern Survey*, April 19, 1945.

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Nearly ten million people die every year, mostly from preventable diseases, diseases of malnutrition born of poverty. The rates of infant and maternal mortality are the highest in the world. The mean expectation of life is less than half the figure for the United States.

The basic reason for this appalling condition is the nature of the existing economy which is characterised by an extreme overpressure on agriculture and the lack of industrialisation. Nearly 70 percent of the population subsist on agriculture, and about 85 percent are directly or indirectly dependent on the land. Barely one percent is engaged in organised industry, and not more than five percent derives a living from industry of all sorts, including cottage industries and handicrafts.

So long as this fundamental imbalance between agriculture and industry is not corrected, so long as the problem of poverty is not tackled at its very root, the question of raising the standard of living and the question of an improved nutritional and health standard for India will remain largely an academic one. To preach the gospel of good food, good health, good living, to the people of India, without first securing for them the means of even a bare subsistence, is as meaningless as advising the starving to eat cake when they cannot afford even bread (pp. 98-99).

VII

Free India will have to face the above problems and many other urgent ones in the field of education and national reconstruction. Will she be able to succeed in her efforts? With her glorious past, she lost her freedom because of internal disintegration and lack of moral leadership of the so-called Upper Class, and also because of an adverse international situation. With marvellous vitality, under the most adverse circumstances, India has carried on the struggle for survival and she is on the road to success. The task before her is not an easy one; but it is to be expected that her future is bright and she will contribute her share to further the cause of freedom and world peace based on world coöperation.

TARAKNATH DAS

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REVIEWS

Total War and the Constitution. By EDWARD S. CORWIN. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.—xiii, 182, vi pp. $2.50.

This book represents the first over-all attempt at a scholarly appraisal of the impact of World War II on the American constitutional system. The contents were organized initially as a series of lectures before an audience predominantly of lawyers and law students at the University of Michigan under the auspices of the William C. Cook Foundation. The first lecture deals with "The War Before the War", in which the author analyzes the constitutional justification or lack of justification of American activities connected with the war prior to the date of the attack on Pearl Harbor. It closes with a lecture entitled "The Post War Constitution". In the intervening lectures the author summarizes the story of American conflicting attitudes toward the position of the war powers within the American constitutional system and discusses the impact of total war on the national government and on constitutional rights. He portrays a continuous course of constitutional change through World War I, the Great Depression and the New Deal, and World War II. He finds, throughout, a movement away from state rights, away from Congressional domination of the federal government, and away from judicial intervention to protect the people from the political branches of their government. Consistently throughout, he sees the increase of executive power and the growth of control by inadequately restrained administrative agencies. He sees this trend as likely to continue in the régime he calls "Total Peace".

The American people have recently gone through a novel period as far as constitutional interpretation is concerned. For large numbers of people generally and for a considerable group of intellectuals in particular, including many who possess some legal training, almost any type of governmental action having the approval of President Roosevelt and his leading advisers has been *ipso facto* constitutional. The constitutional beliefs of Professor Corwin have not been dominated by the captivating personality of this powerful leader. Rather, he is at many points sharply critical. In one instance he refers to a doctrine announced by President Roosevelt as "a doctrine with a strong family

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resemblance to the Leadership principle against which the war was supposedly being fought" (p. 65). He will cause some discomfort among those of his readers interested in glorifying both President Roosevelt and American entrance into World War II by his quotation of Secretary Stimson's statement that in November 1941 the President and the War Cabinet, in planning war with the Japanese, discussed the question "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." He lists many instances of sharp practice on the part of Administration officials in justifying whatever course the Administration saw fit to take in protecting themselves against interference from any source.

Having a profound distrust of executives and administrators as final interpreters of law governing their action, Professor Corwin naturally believes in the preservation of the institution of judicial review, yet he is no advocate of what he calls "judicial absolutism" and he is no great admirer of the decisions of Supreme Court justices which bear upon the conduct of World War II. It is perhaps not fair to say that he is always against the Court no matter what position the Court takes, but certain it is that his constitutional philosophy shows no more malleability than do the philosophies of the present members of the Court. If the extremes of judicial independence now periodically being made manifest lead the reader to admit the possibility of nine unyielding approaches to every decision in which the present nine justices participate, it would be perfectly natural to expect that the addition of Professor Corwin to the present Court would bring about not an amalgamation of philosophies but merely the addition of a tenth point of view.

When, in earlier years, students of the Constitution tended to assume that there was a "right" interpretation of the Constitution which needed only to be found and when the personnel of the Supreme Court tended to submerge individual differences in unanimous opinions, a learned dissertation like that of Professor Corwin's upon the group of war cases would have been carefully scrutinized in terms of the "rightness" of its interpretation. A current reader of Supreme Court decisions, however, is likely already to be hopelessly confused by the multiplicity of approaches of Supreme Court justices to every important constitutional problem, with the result that the assertion of still another independent position has primarily the effect of adding to his mental weariness. He can and must search for knowledge of governmental processes, including the process by which the Supreme Court exercises its control over the development of the Constitution, but he has little hope of finding in any individual an authoritative guide to a correct interpretation of the Constitution. Professor Corwin's book will have great value in so far as it portrays the course of events con-

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nected with total war and the line of interpretation marked out by Supreme Court decisions. For the reason mentioned above it will probably not be highly influential in so far as it is devoted to constitutional exegesis.

CARL BRENT SWISHER

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Arsenal of Democracy: The Story of American War Production. By DONALD M. NELSON. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.—xviii, 439 pp. $4.00.

As one of the first published "revelations" of the operation of war preparation and the war economy by one of the inner group of policy makers this book is of historic importance. It appears to be a frank and factually reliable picture of the struggles between industry, civil authorities and military chiefs as seen by a tolerant and understanding business man. Mr. Nelson knows well that administrators must be expected to represent certain institutional interests, and while he criticizes such institutions as the army he seldom blames an individual for his attitude.

Regardless of how much there is to be said on the other side, this sympathetic approach to human problems tends to win the reader to Mr. Nelson's point of view. He was, for example, persuaded of the correctness of the Roosevelt-Morgenthau belief in the likelihood of war and the need for all-out preparation after the fall of France in May 1940. But business men as a whole did not embrace the same belief, or have the advantage of Mr. Nelson's inside information regarding the Administration attitude. As he points out himself, by early 1941 even the men in "most government agencies" did not expect a shooting war. "If we had not been attacked at the end of 1941," he concedes, "the kind of economic dislocation which our side favored would have ruined us, because the entire industrial equilibrium of the country would have been completely upset without the valid excuse of war." Yet he criticizes both industry and government agencies for failure to go "all-out".

Mr. Nelson adds his bit to the mystery of why the men at Pearl Harbor were unprepared. On Tuesday of the fatal week the President is quoted as saying, "Don, I wouldn't be a bit surprised if we were at war by Thursday." And Secretary Knox assured him on Wednesday, December 3, "We'll hunt their navy down and blow it right out of the water."

From beginning to end relations with the Army were the chief administrative problem of both the National Defense Advisory Committee and the later War Production Board. It is impossible for the

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outsider to judge the ins and outs of this Nelson-Army feud, but the WPB chief at least states his side of the case convincingly, and where the reviewer has been able to check his statements they are accurate. The high point of war production as a whole was reached in November 1943, and as contracts declined in 1944 WPB was under heavy pressure to start reconversion to civilian production. Big manufacturers fully occupied with war contracts joined with the Army in opposing Mr. Nelson's decision to allow limited reconversion—the manufacturers because they did not want small competitors to get a head start in the civilian goods market, the Army, according to Mr. Nelson, "to protect war production by the simple means of creating pools of unemployment." In recounting the final stages of this quarrel which culminated in Mr. Nelson's resignation from WPB he, probably to avoid hurting people, avoids some details that an objective observer might emphasize. He puts the chief blame upon the Army rather than on big business, concluding: "The lesson taught by these recent years is clear: our whole economic and social system will be in peril if it is controlled by military men."

If Mr. Nelson has any political ambitions, his statements in this book should make him acceptable to the most liberal groups in either party. He fears the post-war results of the inevitable favoring of large companies in war contracts, and warns that "our economy certainly needs strong and independent small business units, both as an opportunity for individual initiative, and as a check against the acquisition of too much power by big business." He believes thoroughly in more democratic administration of industry through labor management committees, and that "throughout the war strikes were never one of our major problems." In a concluding chapter on his Russian visits he expresses views fully as friendly as those of Henry Wallace toward the U.S.S.R.: "I can see no more reason why we should get into a fight with Russia than with the planet Mars. We have no fundamentally conflicting interests. We have no fundamental disputes worth the sacrifice of a single life."

THOMAS C. COCHRAN

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia. By JOHN R. DEANE. New York, The Viking Press, 1947.—viii, 344 pp. $3.75.

General Deane, who was head of the United States Military Mission to the U.S.S.R. from the fall of 1943 to October 31, 1945, has set forth a personal account of his experiences in directing American attempts at military collaboration with the Soviet Union. He has writ-

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ten a factual, fairly objective, and generally interesting book. The title chosen, however, unduly prejudices the issue. It is further disconcerting to find the author declaring more than once that there is no such thing as an expert on the Soviet Union, and that " that land of contradictions " is " beyond understanding."

The Strange Alliance has some significance for historians as a record of Soviet-American collaboration in a variety of military ventures ranging from the establishment of shuttle-bombing bases in the Ukraine to the exchange of weather information. It is of some additional value for its notes and comments—some of them quite revealing—on the major international conferences at Moscow, Yalta and Potsdam, which Mr. Deane attended. His observations on Stalin, and his description of the interaction between the Soviet leader and Churchill, testify to his keen perception of personality.

This book will be most valuable, however, not to the historian but to the student of bureaucracy. The Soviet Union possesses one of the most imposing bureaucratic structures of modern times, and this is acknowledged, at least indirectly, in Soviet sources. Mr. Deane, having been a major-general, is intimately acquainted with bureaucracy, and is sensitive to its manifestations. He has directed considerable attention to the structure and operation, particularly at the highest levels, of the military and to a lesser extent the civil bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Deane is a soldier and diplomat, however, and not a social scientist. His analysis suffers, therefore, from a failure to distinguish between those elements which are inherent in bureaucratic structures and those which merely reflect the social and political contexts in which they operate. In evaluating one incident, for example, he falls into the error of confusing a characteristic bureaucratic sensitivity, namely, consciousness of status, with what he loosely terms class consciousness.

The Strange Alliance will be least rewarding to those who seek to find in it some increased insight into the Soviet Union as a dynamic, integrated social system. General Deane thinks more in terms of " basic traits of character " (p. 318), than in terms of social structure. His intimate personal contacts with Soviet citizens, moreover, were largely restricted to those with his cook, housekeeper, and chauffeur. He was never invited to a Russian home, for which he most likely was not at fault. He had been in Moscow almost two years, however, before taking his first ride in the Moscow subway, for which he must bear sole responsibility.

In the latter part of his book Mr. Deane generalizes from his successes and failures in the military sphere to the realm of foreign policy. This process of reasoning by analogy has obvious pitfalls, many of which the author does not escape. He favors his own version of a " tough "

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policy toward the U.S.S.R., and advises placing all negotiations on a *quid pro quo* basis. The nature of the evidence which he adduces, and the manner in which he uses it to prove that policy's efficacy, call attention once again to the great need for a wider dissemination of more rigorous techniques for handling problems involving the process of social causation.

ALEX INKELES

LONG ISLAND CITY, N. Y.

The Soviet Impact on the Western World. By EDWARD HALLETT CARR. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947.—xi, 113 pp. $1.75.

In spite of a long and responsible diplomatic service, in his study of the effects of Soviet political, economic and social practices and ideas upon those of the Western Powers, Professor Carr is more hospitable to socialist ideas than are most American diplomatic historians. Some of his axioms will find many to dispute them here. His reference to " the recent weakening of popular faith in the democratic institutions of the western world " (p. 13), and the assertion that " the forces of individualism have somehow lost their potency and their relevance in the contemporary world " (p. 111), are cases in point. None the less, the book is consistently stimulating and often convincing.

In the chapter on the political impact he states persuasively that the Soviet concept of democracy—government by the masses, rather than by all classes alike—was generally accepted until the events of 1848. After 1848, the Marxists continued their use of the term, while it fell into disuse in non-Marxist Europe until Woodrow Wilson revived it. In World War II, according to the author, it was first emphasized by Stalin, in July 1941. Thus the Soviet conception of democracy, derived from Rousseau, has equal validity with the Western concept, which traces back to Locke. Moreover, Professor Carr states that Soviet charges against Western democracy are widely accepted—including the allegation that it is excessively concerned with constitutional forms and neglects class content, and the related charge that economic differences between masters and men make it an illusion. Another criticism is that freedom of speech denotes weakness, as showing that bourgeois democracy is not sufficiently sure of itself to discriminate between good and evil. Soviet democracy, knowing where lies ultimate truth, prevents the circulation of untruth. Another allegation is that Western democracy is primarily concerned with voting, and, unlike

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the Soviet Union, does little to promote popular participation in administration.

A treatment of the economic impact discusses planning and the managed currency and price system, while that on the social aspect considers the series of social incentives for work which the USSR has devised, and its ability through the trade unions to convince its workers of the duty to increase output. These innovations, as well as Soviet standards of equality of race, sex and creed, pose a challenge to the Western World, and to some extent have forced it to imitate.

Soviet diplomacy stresses realism, and has largely succeeded in discrediting idealism as a professed motive. It also emphasizes power as the decisive factor, and this, as well as its foreign-trade monopoly and its use of propaganda as an instrument of diplomacy, has made its mark. It is in the ideological field, however, that the author sees the greatest influence radiating from the USSR. Bolshevism, a creed and a philosophy as well as a political program, has done much both to discredit the moral assumptions of the bourgeois world, and to present a new moral value. Thus the new East-West trend of ideas in Europe, backed by a growing Slavic mass, will, according to Professor Carr, penetrate western Europe, not by force of arms, but through the appeal of its ideas, emanating from a dynamic and inspiring center of power. The West, while it can perhaps check this thrust with its own power, will in the long run be judged by the respective results of the two systems. The West, the author holds, needs new and dynamic forms of social and economic action to combine the vital elements of individualism with the coming mass civilization.

This review can at best give only a limited idea of the breadth and scope of this little volume. While many will not agree with some of the ideas expressed therein, the importance of the subject and the competence of the author combine to give this book the right to be read.

JOHN SHELTON CURTISS

DUKE UNIVERSITY

Democracy in France: The Third Republic. By DAVID THOMSON. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1946.—283 pp. $4.00.

Mr. Thomson describes his book as " something of a *post mortem* on the Third Republic," but he denies that he ever contemplated a post-mortem on France (preface). What he has written is a closely reasoned, pocket-size manual on French politics since 1870. Six chapters,

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" The Revolutionary Tradition ", " The Social Bases ", " The Democratic Instrument ", " The National Vision ", " The Modern Challenge " and " The Future Outlook ", analyze delicately the entire spectrum of French political elements. Compact footnotes, reading lists of French and English titles, and three documentary appendices fortify without impeding the reading text. Mr. Thomson's intimate acquaintance with the literature of his subject and his gift for drawing subtle but sane distinctions from spidery evidence make his prose an intellectual challenge.

French national politics (local politics are scanted here) were a mélange of contradictions under the Third Republic. This book analyzes many of the contradictions, accounts for them historically and socially, and reveals the weakening effect which the essential bargaining, compromising and fractionalizing had upon all who sought power. One familiar consequence, the cabinet crises which produced eighty-eight ministries in seventy years, is noted as an example of the " over control " of the government, and the less manifest control exercised by the standing committees of the French Senate and Chamber is also shrewdly evaluated (p. 111). The detailed dissection of the political machinery, the calculation of minor stresses and strains, and the cautious conclusions on French democracy in action finally build up a discouraging picture which the author seems reluctant to contemplate.

Instead, he offers two measuring rods by which French democracy may be tested: (1) its capacity to realize " its own standards and values " and (2) " its response to the challenge of modern problems which are common to all twentieth-century nation-states " (p. 115). Contemporary opinion in general has judged the institutions of the Third Republic harshly on both counts. Mr. Thomson admits that it is difficult to gauge how adequately French political practice vindicated the French national vision: his verdict is ambiguous on this question (pp. 168-169). Arraigned under the second article (the failure to meet the challenge of modern problems) the Third Republic escapes with a verdict of " Not Proven " although the circumstantial evidence is admittedly adverse.

Mr. Thomson's own estimate of French democracy between 1870 and 1940 is not easy to guess; he seems unresolved, or unwilling to pronounce judgment. He makes the sound point that French democracy cannot be blamed for the fact of the German military preponderance in 1940 which made French defeat almost certain. He then adds that there was nothing in the logic of the French defeat in May 1940 that made inevitable the total capitulation in June or the Vichy régime in July. " The transition from one stage to the next had to be engi-

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neered and managed. It did not happen inevitably" (p. 211). The corollary to be noted here is one which many people voiced at the time and more have accepted since. It was not democracy which failed the French people. It was the French people, or a critical minority of them, who failed democracy.

GEOFFREY BRUUN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

French Labor: From Popular Front to Liberation. By HENRY W. EHRMANN. New York, Oxford University Press, 1947.—x, 329 pp. $4.00.

Recent years have brought to pass major changes in the social structure of all but a few European nations. France, noted for rapid social changes in the past, has been no exception. Perhaps the transformation in France can best be exemplified by the rise of the "new" trade-union movement as a prominent social force. This "new" movement is a radical departure from the traditions of the Proudhonian past, since it disavows a basic principle of the Charter of Amiens, syndical independence of all political affiliation. By closely integrating itself with the Communist Party in a mass movement of influential proportions, the secular French union movement has abandoned its previous nonpartisan character to cast its lot with the political fortunes of the extreme Left. This is a development of no minor importance, for, by virtue of the war, the forces of organized labor have assumed much of the new key responsibility held by France as intermediary between the Soviet Union and the West. If for no other reason than this, a study of the successes and failures of French labor in the decade preceding World War II is a timely contribution to an understanding of western European political and social forces.

Mr. Ehrmann has produced a competent, enlightening and judicious history of the entire French trade-union movement between 1934 and 1944. A publication of the Institute of World Affairs, his volume is a worthy addition to the studies already published under the auspices of that organization. Written from a standpoint essentially sympathetic to labor, the book highlights the author's concluding conviction that "never before has the fate of democratic institutions in France been so closely dependent on the influence of a strong labor movement, bold in its aspirations and realistic in its procedures" (p. 281). Whether the post-war labor front in France will measure up to the author's specifications cannot yet be determined.

But many questions fundamental to a comprehension of the current line of development are scrupulously expounded and brilliantly inter-

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preted. Divided into three main sections, the study considers first the pre-war period 1934-1939, second, the war 1939-1940, third, the Vichy-Resistance period 1940-1944. The treatment of the background of the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, its split into reformist and Communist sections in 1920, its reunification in 1934 and its place in the Popular Front is deftly handled and amply documented. While not primarily a political history, this study contains numerous shrewd observations on the political aspects of the problems with which labor was concerned in the late thirties. Ehrmann's censure of the halfheartedness of Popular Front measures "which endeavored to alter the mechanism of the existing order without providing new incentives" (p. 85) is a point well taken, but his observations concerning "the 'iron law' of the French republic . . . the law that at the polls the voters expressed their sympathy for a left formation which before long had to give way to a government of the right" (p. 73), are perhaps too metaphorically strong to be completely justifiable.

By all odds, the best portion of this book is contained in the chapters directly relating to the positions of labor, management and government in the productive enterprise of preparing for and waging total war. The discussion of government shortsightedness and stupidity, managerial vindictiveness and intransigeance, labor confusion and restriction is crystalline in its expository brilliance. Only when it was too late, in March 1940, at Reynaud's accession to power, did hope appear for social policy changes so necessary to weld French productive capacity into a smoothly functioning entity. Defeat and occupation were necessary, observes the author, to reveal the degree to which "the strength of a state depends upon the organized representatives of employers and workers, and their collaborators with each other and with the institutions of government" (p. 194).

Owing to the lack of official documentation, Mr. Ehrmann has been forced to treat the Vichy era in sketchy, summary fashion. This was a period pregnant with labor resurgence, for in the course of the Resistance many scales were removed from the eyes of French labor leaders, many earlier doubts were resolved and much earlier weakness was converted into staunch militancy of action as well as purpose. The former failure of the trade-union philosophy to adapt itself to the changing character of industrial society and the uneasy, superficial union of Communist and non-Communist elements were revealed as singular pre-war weaknesses. In the Resistance a new orientation was envisaged and applied, thus indicating that some of the lessons of the past had been marked and inwardly digested.

Only minor adverse criticism of this excellent book can be made. Stylistically pedestrian, the work could be much improved graphically

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by the inclusion of handy reference tables and charts similar to those contained in David Saposs' fine study, to which this has been termed, in many respects, a sequel.

RUSSELL E. F. PLANCK

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe. By RUDOLF SCHLESINGER. New York, Oxford University Press, 1946.—x, 533 pp. $6.00.

To those who believe that federalism is the cure for international discord, Mr. Schlesinger's volume will offer small comfort. The author seeks to establish the conditions of successful federalism by an examination of the historical record. His discussion is focused on Germany, Austria-Hungary and two of its successor states, and the Soviet Union. Only in the last does he find that federalism succeeded in accomplishing its essential purpose: the maintenance of sectional diversity and a certain measure of autonomy within a unitary state. Where there is agreement on the basic aims and structure of the society (however such "agreement" may be produced), i.e., where social conflict is minimal, there federalism can operate successfully.

The author analyzes German federalism from the Revolution of 1848 to the rise of Hitler in the setting of internal social and political conflict. He correctly emphasizes that, as early as 1848, fear of radicalism led the middle class to accept as federal units dynastic territorial states which did not correspond to the actual cultural and social diversity of German life. He ignores the purely nationalist factors influencing the Frankfurt Assembly in this direction: the desire for a fleet against the Danes and for the suppression of the Polish uprising in Posen, which strengthened their dependence on Prussia.

With respect to the federalism of the Empire and Weimar, the author rehearses the familiar story of the utilization of federalism as an instrument of reaction. The retention of the old federal states under Weimar was a major factor in preserving the old bureaucracy, one of the pillars of reaction. Under the present United States proposals for a federal Germany, the same dubious result threatens for the western zones. The federal states, organized under the conflicting social systems of the Western and Eastern Powers, may again become strong points in the indigenous social and political conflict, and may prevent national issues from finding their solution at a national level. Here again, Mr. Schlesinger's basic conclusion would apply: federalism is a healthy political form only where there is general agreement on the basic purposes of the unitary state. Where this agreement is absent, federalism is an obstacle to its achievement.

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Mr. Schlesinger's analysis of the federal problem in the multinational Hapsburg empire is based largely on the work of Redlich and Bauer. Only in the Austrian Republic does he make an original contribution, where he analyzes in some detail the operation of provincial autonomy in Vienna, and the relation of the successes of Austrian federalism to the political balance between left Christian Social and Social Democratic forces. Each party, unable to secure clear control of the federal government, tolerated social experimentation in the provinces dominated by the other. One could wish that Mr. Schlesinger were more precise in his description of the sabotage of Austrian federalism. The upper Catholic hierarchy and Viennese high finance are the villains in his piece, but the way in which they used the federal system in their machinations does not emerge clearly in this volume.

The author makes a strong case, within his definition, for the existence of true federalism in the Soviet Union. He carefully relates the history of the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union to the phases in the consolidation of the socialist revolution. At home in the field of Russian law, he is less dependent on secondary works here than in dealing with Austria or Germany. He shows how the essentially Great Russian Communist Party favored the colonialized backward peoples of central Asia and the Caucasus against their Great Russian oppressors—in marked contrast to the Social Democrats of the Hapsburg empire.

The author is careful to define the limits of Soviet federalism. The competence of the autonomous regions and union republics is narrowly circumscribed, and the Communist Party is, of course, the essential centralizing force. The autonomy of the federal units rests on a compulsory allegiance of those units to the common aims of the society (as does the federalism of the United States). The civilization of the Khazaks must be communist in politics and economics. But, with the preservation of those elements in Khazak cultural tradition which do not conflict with the economic and political bases of Soviet society, Khazak civilization will necessarily be an amalgam of Great Russian and Khazak culture.

The reader should expect little enlightenment on the problems of Balkan and Danubian federation between the two world wars. Even the author's sure touch in selecting the best secondary sources fails him here; for example, he ignores L. S. Stavrianos' excellent work, *Balkan Federation*. One can only regret the scanty treatment of this significant aspect of the European federal problem. A fuller examination could throw much light on the evolution of the Soviet nationalities policy as reflected in the Third International.

One can subscribe to the author's principal conclusion: that federalism, construed as the maintenance of diversity in unity, can be realized

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only where there is agreement on the fundamental direction which society is to take. The Communists of the Soviet Union have established such agreement by force. The United States, despite its Civil War—or because of it?—still enjoys a social basis for federalism. But to western Europe and to Germany, torn as they are by social conflict and by disagreement as to the fundamental purposes of state and society, federalism can represent only a series of strong points in the battle of social forces whether internal or external. Mr. Schlesinger's volume is a convincing answer—if one be needed—to the idealistic federalists of the John Foster Dulles school. For those interested in federalism as a political form, the work provides a sound case-study of the German, Austrian and Russian experience.

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The United States and the Near East. By EPHRAIM A. SPEISER. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947.—xvi, 263 pp. $2.50.

Saudi Arabia: With an Account of the Development of Its Natural Resources. By K. S. TWITCHELL. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947.—xiii, 192 pp. $2.50.

That Professor Speiser is competent to write on the United States and the Near East needs little argument. A prolific author of books and articles reflecting the highest standards of scholarship and careful research, Dr. Speiser has been known by students of the ancient Near East for two decades. So far back has he probed into the origins of our civilizations that most of his writings deal with the millennia beyond the Christian era. In numerous field expeditions he has uncovered the remains of early and even prehistoric civilizations. Upon the advent of World War II, his skills were called for in Washington, and, hurdling the intervening millennia in a single leap, Dr. Speiser headed the Middle East Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services where he weighed and evaluated the telegrams dispatched a few hours before from the regions with which he was so familiar. Dr. Speiser thus brings to the study a remarkable vision marked by depth of time and breadth of scope.

He opens his study with the thesis of the unity of the Near East both as a geographic highway between the three continents of Asia, Europe and Africa and as an enduring cultural unity. Differences exist, but they are secondary to the primary forces which make for unity. In his first chapter, he traces the rise and decline of empires and cultures down to the present day. The following chapters are short but pithy and trace the course of events to the fateful year 1939.

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The chapters dealing with the war give a concise portrayal of the psychological and political factors which led to the various campaigns in Iraq, Syria and Egypt and the play of the great Powers for position as the victory neared. Part III is entitled "Problems of the Present and the Future". In this part, Dr. Speiser notes that all the great nations are involved in strategic considerations. The recent discovery of the world's greatest oil fields near the Persian Gulf intensifies the age-old strategical rivalry. The poverty and industrial immaturity of the region complicate the situation by upsetting any balances in regional economy.

In the chapter on "Social Problems", Dr. Speiser analyzes the conflicts which hinder Arab leadership in its effort to westernize, and which result in instability and frustration. He points out how this insecurity brings an oversensitivity to criticism, a desire to blame all ills on outside influences, and a tendency to react emotionally in the face of obstacles. Arab state governments are western in form but eastern in their apathy to public needs and standards of honesty. Dr. Speiser thinks that it will take some time for Arab leadership to find a satisfying blend of eastern and western concepts which will afford them self-confidence.

Because of its vital position in world strategy, all the great Powers gravitate toward the Near East. To Great Britain, the area is central in the Empire's over-all design, wherefore Britain above all other Powers desires tranquillity in the Near East. Yet British paternalism in the past generation has met violent Arab nationalism. This has forced Great Britain to adopt a policy favoring development of a stable Arab society, organized politically in the Arab League. The revival of Russia as a world Power and the intrusion of the United States have destined the Near East to serve as an international barometer sensitive to the world climate. As small an incident as the application of Trans-Jordan for membership in the United Nations led to a clash of the great Powers and a Soviet veto. Conservative Britain and Tzarist Russia clashed head on for over a century, this basic struggle being continued under socialist Britain and communist Russia. Russia had accumulated assets in her favor in 1944 but frittered them away in her disregard of pledges to remove troops from Iran in March 1946, thereby arousing fears in other neighboring states. The French bowed out in undignified fashion in 1945.

On the problem of Palestine, Dr. Speiser points out that Palestine has almost never ordered her own affairs, normally being ruled from a distant center. Britain desires to control it because of the need for security of her far-flung empire. The Arabs have just and long-standing claims while Zionists have come to believe that the only

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solution to the Jewish problem is a Jewish state in Palestine. The fallacies of many of the arguments of all parties are exposed; and in three pages (216-19) Dr. Speiser sketches the solutions offered. He inclines toward " the operation of an effective international body . . . through constructive international control ", but this is as yet far off. The final chapter outlines the expansion of United States interests and the need for an over-all policy. Without a clear understanding of the existing dangers on the part of the United States the opportunity for peace may be lost, thus plunging the world into a new Armageddon.

In a book of such careful judgments and superior scholarship, criticism can be leveled only at minor points. Such is the brief paragraph on page 288 in which he calls Saudi Arabia an " absolute monarchy ruled by a fanatic and autocratic king . . . as totalitarian . . . as any we have seen in our generation." He refers to the restrictions on Americans as " incredible ". Dr. Speiser's book appears the same month as the book on Saudi Arabia by Mr. Karl Twitchell who finds the King a strict conformist to Islamic patterns which represent the faith of the people. Futhermore, to compare the patriarchal Saudi Arabian government with the minority communist government of Bulgaria, as is done in the same paragraph, seems out of place in one who has the penetrating analytical power of Dr. Speiser. On page 114 there is a minor error in dates. The Bahrayn oil concession was granted in 1930, that of Saudi Arabia in 1936.

This book is an important contribution to American studies on the Near East. It is clear, profound, objective, informative and readable. For the hurried reader—it is short enough. Finally it is timely, for it appeared at the same moment as the enunciation of the new " Truman Doctrine " toward the Middle East.

When Mr. Twitchell in his Preface to *Saudi Arabia* states, " I have probably been longer and more closely associated with King Ibn-Saud and his country than any other American," he is not boasting but rather guilty of understatement. The book is divided into three sections: " Characteristic Features "; " Social and Political Development "; " The Position of Saudi Arabia in World Economy ". The first section will give the ordinary intelligent reader more new information than the other two. The descriptions indicate an intimate personal knowledge of the land and throughout witness to the desperate lack of water in seemingly endless wastelands. The only breaks in arid stretches are where underground seepages nurture oases of date palms and supply a minimum amount of water for a village or town. Mr. Twitchell has given a sort of Baedeker's guide in the listing of the main towns. If there is a criticism of the material in the book, it

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would be to state that Mr. Twitchell sees only the best in Arabia. He is obviously sympathetic to the Arab and feels the dweller of the desert has done a good job at adjusting himself to a stern and rugged world. Instead of accusing the Arab for backwardness, he points out how modern techniques can conserve better his meager resources of water and food. The limitations, both mental and physical, which dominate the life of Arabia, are lightly touched and not stressed, while, on the contrary, potential improvements are constantly suggested.

Of the government, Mr. Twitchell remarks that, though it is outwardly autocratic, it is in reality patriarchal and shows certain attributes of democracy. The historical sketch of the rise to power of Abdul Aziz is brief but sufficiently detailed to explain why "Ibn-Saud ranks among the foremost figures of this age". There can be no doubt of the author's admiration for the great personality who has unified Arabia for the first time in centuries—and it is just as well to have the opinion of an American who knows the King intimately to offset the denunciations of too often ignorant or prejudiced writers who have never been in Arabia. The picture of the King, portrayed here, is of a patriarch of the type of Abraham in an Islamic setting suddenly thrust into the twentieth century, purchasing wireless sets and flying about in planes.

Into this ancient setting there enters the dynamic force of Western civilization. Airfields, railways and oil derricks begin to appear, foreign legations and consulates are established. Americans by the thousands are entering and residing in an area unknown on American maps a generation ago. Because of its strategic position lying across a tricontinental bridge of international communications and because of the billions of barrels of oil underlying the eastern sands, Saudi Arabia has suddenly become a focal point of world attention. And far-off America has unconsciously become identified with Arabia's economy, stability and sovereignty. This book therefore fills a real need for a brief, simple, accurate and sympathetic study of the heart land of the Arab and Islamic world—by one who knows it well and loves both it and its people in spite of or because of that knowledge. Anyone who has had the good fortune to become acquainted with Mr. Twitchell knows that his optimism is not a conscious effort o paint the Arabian scene in rosy hues, but the innate expression of a kind and generous person who is passionately devoted to the cause of enriching all facets of the Arabian world.

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